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SEEDS OF SUSPICION: 
THE PERPETUAL CYCLE OF ANTI-MUSLIM STEREOTYPES, MIDDLE EAST 
INTERVENTION, AND TERRORISM 
 
The central theory guiding my research is that interstate conflict, at least as covered 
in mass media, leaves residual cultural attitudes that can shape the political context in 
which elites formulate policy.  Specifically, U.S. interventionism in the Middle East has 
given rise to fundamental hostilities, founded on misguided biases, that shape involvement 
in the region today.  I focus on one step within that broader theory, to test it empirically: 
the hypothesis that anti-Muslim stereotypes, when activated, will shape an individual’s 
foreign-policy preferences.  I begin by considering competing accounts that link 1) 
ethnocentrism or 2) targeted stereotypes with support for the use of military force in the 
Middle East.  After careful review of the group-based and social-identity theories that 
undergird the two accounts, I synthesize them.   
 
My more-complete theory can be summarized as: Someone will exhibit an 
ethnocentric response toward an out-group when negative stereotypes about the group 
combine with an individual’s in-group identity to result in perceived threat.  Applying the 
logic of that hypothesis to Muslims and American foreign policy, I argue that, for American 
whites, Muslims are uniquely situated to be perceived as realistic and symbolic cultural 
threats to their core national identity because they may differ in terms of ethnicity, culture, 
and religion.  Mass media portray Muslims as violent and encourage Americans to evaluate 
them in terms of such cultural dissimilarity.  On the other hand, Muslims present little 
identity threat to blacks, whose core in-group identity typically revolves around their status 
as a racial minority in the United States.  Even blacks who identify with the nation will not 
view Islam as incompatible with their national identity because that identity is typically not 
predicated on looking, living, or believing a certain way.   
 
I develop these ideas into testable hypotheses and investigate how anti-Muslim 
attitudes shape opinion about important contemporary Middle East issues.  Using survey 
and experimental data, I find compelling evidence linking anti-Muslim attitudes – among 
whites – to support for using military force (rather than diplomacy) against Iran and against 
Islamists.  Those attitudes also predict opposition to accepting Syrian refugees.  Finally, I 
turn from this narrative of negativity to argue that the anti-Muslim stereotypes many 
 
 
 
 
citizens bring to bear when forming judgments of Middle East policy can be shifted.  I base 
this optimistic expectation on media framing theories, which suggest that issue frames can 
shift opinion when they emphasize strong and credible arguments.  After constructing 
frames from debate statements during the 2016 Presidential Election, and an original frame 
that affirms counterstereotypes of Muslims, I expect and find evidence that strong frames 
emphasizing the obligations of American identity and factual counterstereotype-affirming 
information can shift those who oppose accepting refugees to more moderate positions.   
Broadly, my research offers a theoretically-grounded schematic for how 
stereotypes and identity construction operate together cognitively to shape public opinion.  
My methods offer leverage to those endeavoring to explain how these idea elements shape 
opinion in other issue domains.  I also divulge important nuances about how specific actors 
(i.e., whites) propagate a cycle of anti-Muslim attitudes, warfare, and terrorism.  I 
contribute to rivalry theory in international relations by explaining how cultural biases 
shape an enduring rivalry of the grandest scale: the perpetual U.S.-Middle East conflict.  
My framing research offers both academic and practical contributions by providing 
evidence on behalf of existing theory and by suggesting how media and political elites – 
by describing issues in unbiased ways – could knock off course the perpetual cycle of 
American interventionism, retaliatory terrorism, and resulting anti-Muslim stereotype 
generalizations. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Ethnocentrism, Stereotypes, Public Opinion, Framing, Middle East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        Christopher William Ledford                            
 
                 April 11, 2019                                                    
 Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEEDS OF SUSPICION: 
THE PERPETUAL CYCLE OF ANTI-MUSLIM STEREOTYPES, MIDDLE EAST 
INTERVENTION, AND TERRORISM 
 
 
 
By 
 
Christopher William Ledford 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                      Dr. D. Stephen Voss 
                                                                                      Director of Dissertation 
 
                                  
                                                                                          Dr. Justin Wedeking 
                                                                                          Director of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
                                                                                      April 11, 2019 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This project focuses on the consequences that anti-Muslim prejudices have for 
American political behavior, public opinion, and foreign policy.  In writing about these 
subjects, I would be remiss to not mention my own relationships with dozens of Muslim 
friends, schoolmates, and colleagues – all of which have been uniformly positive personal 
experiences.  My earliest knowledge of Islam and its practitioners trace to experiences with 
Muslim friends and classmates, as well as their parents, in my small Kentucky school 
system.  As my friends and I got old enough to start driving and staying away from home, 
the house of our classmates from Egypt quickly became a favorite hangout spot during the 
Summer.  When I was there, I was most interested in perfecting my cannonball, no doubt 
about it.  However, I could not help taking an interest in the religious and cultural artifacts 
in their house and, as a result, in Islam itself.  Many years later, I can say that I have visited 
mosques, read parts of the Quran, and learned about a religion that teaches values not 
especially different from my own Christian values.  My personal interests in Islam were 
not developed as a student or academic, but rather during the summer days I spent with 
friends that truly espouse the Golden Rule of Islam: kindness to others. 
Most of my Muslim friends of now 25+ years are the children of people who, as 
civic leaders, serve on the frontlines of our local Muslim community, and who as doctors 
have invested countless hours of time and service to revitalizing and growing the capacity 
for first-rate medical care in our little town.  On the former point, I have always held great 
admiration for the ways in which my friends’ parents have constantly put forth efforts to 
involve non-Muslim families in community discussions and events at the local mosque.  
On the latter point, my parents, an uncle and aunt, and I have all at some point been under 
 
 
iv 
 
the care of the patriarch of that family, a prominent local doctor, and any of us would 
readily use terms like “kindness,” “friendliness,” and “excellence” to describe our care.  
When my father was in the hospital just a few weeks after the events of 9/11, we never 
once made linkages between that tragedy and the good doctor. 
My relationships with these friends and their families were not exceptions or 
unique.  After leaving my hometown to attend two major research universities, I 
frequently found myself working as a college instructor and in various university service 
capacities with Muslims.  When I think about the many Muslim friends I have from Iraq, 
Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and India, I cannot recall any instance where I have felt 
uncomfortable, threatened, or unsafe.  In fact, in most of those circumstances, I have 
worked with Muslim friends and colleagues of various backgrounds to create and promote 
cultures of inclusion in our mutual workplaces and learning environments.  I spent many 
nights at my college job discussing politics, religion, and life with my Iraqi friend, who 
formerly served in Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard and, later, served the regime as 
a translator.  I vividly recall going to work on Monday, May 2, 2011, the day after justice 
had been served on Osama bin Laden, and my friend toasting Mountain Dews with me.  
For him and dozens of other friends of Muslim faith, I am very grateful.  I am thankful to 
them for sharing their experiences — good and bad — with me, for never “othering” me, 
and for never holding against me the hostilities that they have endured from people who 
look like me.  They provided my initial inspiration for this dissertation research. 
As I have developed this research from its early stages to its present form, I have 
had the good fortune to be advised by Drs. D. Stephen Voss, Horace Bartilow, Jim Hertog, 
Aiyub Palmer, and my appointed member, Dr. J.S. Butler.  From the time Dr. Voss first 
 
 
v 
 
agreed to be my dissertation chair, he was available, ready to help, and enthusiastic about 
the project.  His pleasant disposition made the dissertation phase a really enjoyable part 
of my doctoral career.  Further, the balance Dr. Voss struck between advising me and 
encouraging my creativity helped me to thrive as a researcher and writer.  As long as I 
could justify an idea or direction that I took, I was given the freedom to do so.  Dr. Voss 
also worked tirelessly to read drafts and offer professional edits and suggestions.  To say 
the least, I hope that someday I can reach the standards Dr. Voss set as both a mentor and 
an academic professional.  Drs. Palmer, Hertog, and Bartilow have helped me focus on 
big-picture questions.  It is for this benefit that I first asked each of them to serve on the 
advisory committee.  When I looked at the themes throughout my work, I wanted advice 
from experts in each of those fields: race politics, methods, political communications, 
Islam, and Middle Eastern politics.  That’s just what I got: thoughtful, expert advice.  
Equally important, they helped me focus on little things like making clear figures, clearly 
explaining diagnostics, and so forth.  These are the vehicles that move written ideas to 
comprehension, credibility, and critique.  They worked hard to leave no stone unturned.  
I am also grateful to my appointed outside examiner, Dr. J.S. Butler, who offered 
thoughtful comments and methods advice that helped with the final revisions. 
I am particularly thankful for my personal and professional relationships with Dr. 
Jason Gainous and Dr. Laurie Rhodebeck.  While their undergraduate student, I became 
quite interested in teaching politics, political research, and the substantive content of their 
work.  They encouraged me to pursue a Ph.D.  I went on to develop some of the ideas in 
this project with them as a Master’s student.  After I went on to the Ph.D. program, both 
stayed engaged with me and interested in my work.  As I developed my ideas and formed 
 
 
vi 
 
new ones, they were always willing to look things over for me and offer constructive 
feedback.  They played a big part in keeping me motivated through the long-haul of 
getting a Ph.D.  Sadly, Dr. Rhodebeck passed away in 2016.  Although I miss her, I look 
at this research project and find much happiness in knowing that she would have enjoyed 
reading it – after covering it in her infamous red ink – and seeing me complete the Ph.D.  
Hundreds of her former graduate students could say the same. 
I am grateful for helpful comments and revisions suggested by participants at the 
2019 Kentucky Political Science Association Meeting.  Two chapters of this dissertation 
benefitted from suggestions offered by Dr. John Heyrman, Dr. Benjamin Knoll, and Dr. 
Jasmine Farrier. 
I am grateful for my parents – Robyn and Mike Baker and James Ledford – and 
grandmother, Paula Burkett.  They have provided the requisite number of snacks and 
feelgood thoughts needed to get through a dissertation.  More importantly, my folks are 
among the most open-minded, tolerant, and kind people that I know.  If not for them, I 
doubt I would have such a broad interest in other peoples and cultures or quite the respect 
for others and others’ ideas that I do.  Of course, I am also thankful to them for countless 
constructive discussions and for always being on-hand to read drafts. 
 I am thankful for a long list of aunts, uncles, and cousins who have supported me.  
I am especially thankful for the families of Steve, Jerry, and Charlie Ledford for looking 
after me while I was living on my own throughout college and graduate school.    
I am grateful for my girlfriend, Angela Weddle, who provided support and 
motivation throughout the Ph.D. program and dissertation process.  Her encouragement 
kept me going.  I also thank Angela for accompanying me to every UK home basketball 
 
 
vii 
 
game.  There is no better place on Earth to take a break from dissertation writing than 
Rupp Arena.   
I thank many friends and their families who asked about the project and provided 
encouragement.  Thank you: Powers and Briana Gillespie, Bruce Gillespie, Joey Phillippi, 
Scott Newell, Chad and Sarah Hinton, Ryan Jamison, Denny and Wanda Fries, Steve 
Kaiser, Brad Coffey, Dr. Allen Copenhaver, Donna Wilson, Will Wilson, Lee Daley, 
Aaron Sheehan, Roger and Anna Weddle, Tim Burton, Vicki Hiestand, Don and Sharon 
Whitehead, Jeff and Debbie Wiles, and Dr. Carl and Renee Peters.   
Finally, I am thankful for my grandparents – Gerry and Carl Ledford and Jim 
Burkett – who have passed on from this life.  I am blessed to have known all my 
grandparents and I remember them well.  They taught me to laugh and love.  They taught 
me to work with integrity, to work hard, and to aim high.  I hope that the ethic and effort 
behind this research would make them proud. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ xii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xiii 
 
Chapter One - Introduction ..................................................................................................1 
 
Chapter Two - U.S. Intervention in the Middle East ...........................................................7 
Realpolitik in the Middle East ....................................................................................7 
Contemporary Confusion ..........................................................................................12 
Two Accounts of Support for the War on Terror: Ethnocentrism vs. Stereotyping .....15 
Ethnocentrism ...........................................................................................................16 
Targeted Stereotyping ...............................................................................................18 
A New Account of Support for the Use of Military Force in the Middle East .............18 
Isolating Anti-Muslim Impulses from Anti-Terrorist Impulses ....................................21 
Shifting the Tide ............................................................................................................22 
Contributions .................................................................................................................24 
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................27 
 
Chapter Three - Anti-Muslim Stereotypes: Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response across 
Race and the Political Potential of Affirming Counterstereotypes .................................29 
Ethnocentrism, Anti-Muslim Stereotypes, and Middle East Policy Preferences ..........31 
Ethnocentrism ................................................................................................................33 
Some Conceptual Issues ...........................................................................................33 
Defining Ethnocentric Response...............................................................................34 
What Kind of Threat?  Who Has a Stake in It? ........................................................35 
Putting it All Together: Identity Formation across Race in the United States ..............39 
Base Personality Orientation: Authoritarianism .......................................................43 
Core Identity Attachments: National ID, Patriotism, Linked Fate, and Political 
Ideology ..............................................................................................................43 
Intergroup Attitudes: In-Group Favoritism, Out-Group Negativity, and Intergroup 
Preference ...........................................................................................................46 
Putting it All Together: The Role of Media in Driving Threat and Activating Hostile 
Anti-Muslim Stereotypes .......................................................................................47 
Lack of Contact .........................................................................................................47 
Negative Media Coverage.........................................................................................48 
Negative Elite Rhetoric .............................................................................................49 
 
 
ix 
 
What Kind of Threat?  Who Has a Stake in It? ........................................................51 
Putting it All Together: Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response .......................................54 
Lessons from the Identity Politics of Immigration ...................................................54 
The Final Piece: Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response toward Muslims ...................56 
American Tunnel Vision of Terrorism .....................................................................58 
What Can Be Done about This? ....................................................................................59 
The Framing Process and Competitive Framing ......................................................59 
Competitive Framing of Issues Involving Muslims and Majority-Muslim Countries
.............................................................................................................................61 
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................63 
 
Chapter Four - Anti-Muslim Stereotypes and Ethnocentric Response toward Iran ..........65 
What Lies Ahead ...........................................................................................................68 
U.S.-Iranian Foreign Relations Since the Hostage Crisis .............................................69 
The Iran-Iraq War .....................................................................................................70 
The Axis of Evil and Nuclear Sanctions ...................................................................71 
The “Iran Deal” .........................................................................................................72 
Identity, Threat, and Ethnocentric Response .................................................................74 
Base Personality Orientation: Authoritarianism .......................................................75 
Core Identity Attachments: National Identity, Patriotism, Linked Fate, and Ideology
.............................................................................................................................75 
Intergroup Attitudes: In-Group Bias, Out-Group Negativity, and Intergroup 
Preference ...........................................................................................................76 
Perceived Threat from Muslims and Iran .................................................................77 
Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response toward Muslims ..............................................78 
Support for Policies to Deter Iranian Nuclear Development: 2012 ANES Survey .......79 
Methods.....................................................................................................................80 
Variables ...................................................................................................................80 
Analysis.....................................................................................................................84 
Support for Using Military Force to Deter Iranian Nuclear Development: Framing 
Experiment .............................................................................................................96 
Recruitment ...............................................................................................................97 
Design .......................................................................................................................97 
Post-Test Measures ...................................................................................................99 
Findings...................................................................................................................100 
Discussion ...................................................................................................................101 
 
Chapter Five - Anti-Muslim Stereotypes and American Tunnel Vision of Terrorism ....103 
Motivating Examples ..................................................................................................104 
Revolutionary Struggle - Greece ............................................................................104 
 
 
x 
 
Lord’s Resistance Army - Uganda ..........................................................................105 
What Lies Ahead .........................................................................................................105 
Anti-Muslim Stereotypes and Stereotype Generalization ...........................................108 
Expectations ................................................................................................................110 
Methods .......................................................................................................................111 
Recruitment .............................................................................................................112 
Design .....................................................................................................................112 
Measures .................................................................................................................115 
Support for the Use of Military Force against Islamist and Non-Islamist FTOs ........117 
Discussion ...................................................................................................................120 
 
Chapter Six - The Political Potential of Affirming Muslim Counterstereotypes .............125 
What Lies Ahead.....................................................................................................126 
The Syrian Civil War and Refugee Crisis ...................................................................129 
Framing Effects ...........................................................................................................133 
Framing the Syrian Refugee Crisis .............................................................................134 
Pretest 1: Direction and Applicability .....................................................................138 
Pretest 2: Availability .............................................................................................142 
Expectations ................................................................................................................144 
Single Exposure Conditions ....................................................................................144 
Dual Exposure (Competitive) Conditions ...............................................................145 
Methods .......................................................................................................................147 
Recruitment .............................................................................................................147 
Design .....................................................................................................................149 
Measures .................................................................................................................150 
Pre-Experiment Support for Allowing Embattled Syrians to Seek Refuge in the United 
States ....................................................................................................................151 
Analysis: Framing the Syrian Refugee Crisis .............................................................154 
Discussion ...................................................................................................................158 
 
Chapter Seven - The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East ..........................163 
Anti-Muslim Stereotypes and Ethnocentric Policy Preferences in the Middle East ...164 
Theory Building ......................................................................................................165 
Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response .......................................................................166 
Taking the Right Approach .....................................................................................167 
Theory Integration: Tunnel Vision of Terrorism and Opposition to Accepting 
Refugees ............................................................................................................168 
Contributions...........................................................................................................169 
The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East ................................................171 
The Political Potential for Framing Counterstereotypes of Muslims ..........................172 
 
 
xi 
 
Future Research on Framing and Building Positive Narratives about Muslims .........175 
 
CHAPTER FOUR APPENDIX .......................................................................................178 
Re-specification Models with Race Subsamples .........................................................178 
Structural Equation Model Measures ..........................................................................178 
Framed and Unframed Articles ...................................................................................180 
Framed Article ........................................................................................................180 
Unframed Article ....................................................................................................181 
 
CHAPTER FIVE APPENDIX .........................................................................................183 
Threat Experiment Conditions ....................................................................................183 
 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................188 
 
VITA ................................................................................................................................213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 5.1 | Conditions in Threat ID Experiment ..............................................................127 
Table 5.2 | Model 1 – American Support  for the Use of Preemptive Military Force 
against Terror Groups ...................................................................................131 
Table 5.3 | Model 2 - Support for the Use of  Military Force against Terror Groups in 
Black and White ...........................................................................................133 
Table 6.1 | Elite Framing of the Syrian Refugee Crisis ...................................................152 
Table 6.2 | Conditions in Syrian Refugee Crisis Framing Experiment ............................163 
Table 6.3 | Pretest Support for Accepting Syrian Refugees into the United States .........167 
Table 6.4 | The Effect of Framing on Support for Accepting Syrian Refugees into the 
United States .................................................................................................169 
Table 6.5 | The Effects of Framing on Support for Accepting Refugees into the United 
States among Prior Opponents and Supporters ............................................171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1 |Theoretical and Operational Approaches in Extant Research on Ethnocentrism
 ........................................................................................................................55 
Figure 4.1 | New Structural Approach to Explain Linkages from In-Group Identity to 
Ethnocentric Response ...................................................................................88 
Figure 4.2 | Percent Supporting Various Policies to Deter Iranian Nuclear Development 95 
Figure 4.3 | Cognitive Schematic of Whites’ Support for Policies to Deter Iranian Nuclear 
Development ................................................................................................100 
Figure 4.4 | Cognitive Schematic of Blacks’ Support for Policies to Deter Iranian Nuclear 
Development ................................................................................................101 
Figure 5.1 | Example of Explicit Islamist (Haqqani) Frame Condition ...........................128 
Figure 6.1 | Pretest Direction of Syrian Refugee Crisis Frames ......................................154 
Figure 6.2 | Pretest Strength of Syrian Refugee Crisis Frames ........................................155 
Figure 6.3 | Pretest Available Considerations about the Syrian Refugee Crisis ..............157 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter One - Introduction 
The Middle East has come to define foreign policy in the American mind.  Younger 
generations of Americans can see video footage from Syria and Iraq daily.  They hear 
reports of alleged Iranian nuclear development, the destruction of Aleppo, the refugee crisis 
in Turkey, and the deployment of U.S. troops against groups with names like Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS.  Despite the conflicts in Southeast Asia after World War II, even the oldest 
generations may tend to conceive of foreign policy as a “clash of civilizations” between 
Christianity and Islam: They came of age when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
began supporting regime changes in Syria and Iran in the late 1940s, and U.S. involvement 
in the region has been continuous since then (Wilford 2013; Bacevich 2016). 
U.S. intervention in the Middle East did not begin as part of a cultural struggle, at 
least not one growing out of religious differences.  The CIA initiatives of the late 1940s 
mostly aimed at Soviet containment or they grew from economic motives (such as 
maintaining friendly relations with major oil-producing states).  Historian Andrew 
Bacevich summarizes that, “just as the American Revolution was about independence and 
the Civil War was about slavery, oil has always defined the raison d’être of the War for the 
Greater Middle East” (2016: 1).  Nonetheless, those initiatives set the tone for three decades 
of interventionism, not to mention what many understand as short-sighted military and 
intelligence operations (Fisk 2005; Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Johnson 2015).   
U.S. relations with Iran are a case in point of interventionist policies that some may 
define as short-sighted or opportunistic.  When Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq 
attempted to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now part of British Petroleum) 
in 1953, which he saw as exploiting Iran unfairly, the CIA staged Operation Ajax to 
 
 
2 
 
overthrow the Iranian leader (Wilford 2013: 3, 160-162; Bacevich 2016: 13).  Rather than 
sit idly by as the West lost its controlling interests in Persian oil, the U.S. government 
installed the staunchly anti-communist and pro-American Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi.  
In the years after the coup, the United States had no qualms about selling the Shah billions 
of dollars in arms and nuclear technology, so long as Iran provided a buffer against Soviet 
encroachment from the north (Bacevich 2016: 13-14).  However, Operation Ajax caused 
unforeseen consequences that endure to this day: the Iranian Hostage Crisis, U.S.-Iran 
hostilities during the Iran-Iraq War, the formation of the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah, and 
tense diplomatic relations over alleged Iranian nuclear development.  Robert Fisk, a British 
journalist who amassed over three decades of experience as a Middle East foreign 
correspondent, summarizes the outcome of Operation Ajax: 
 “The return of the young Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi was the ultimate goal.  It 
cost a couple of million pounds, a planeload of weapons and perhaps five thousand 
lives.  And twenty-five years later, it all turned to dust [foreshadowing the Iranian 
Revolution]” (2005: 94).  
 
Rather than pursuing clear goals that might have been understandable to the 
American electorate, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East likely comes across as a 
muddle.  Time and again, the United States intervened to support regime changes in Middle 
Eastern countries — other examples include Iraq and Syria — only to reverse course and 
condone coups d’état against those regimes (Fisk 2005; Wilford 2013).  Dr. Bassam 
Haddad argues that, after nearly eighty years of intervention in the Middle East, U.S. 
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policymakers must spend much of their time correcting their many previous policy failures 
and destabilization of the region (Johnson 2015).0F1  
The research presented here will probe the domestic consequences of those 
interventions to portray the serious implications they have had, and will continue to have, 
for American attitudes toward Muslims and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  The 
overarching theory guiding my investigation is that interstate conflict, at least as covered 
in the mass media, leaves residual cultural attitudes that later can shape the political (and 
especially electoral) context in which policymakers formulate foreign policy.  Specifically, 
previous U.S. involvement in the Middle East has given rise to fundamental hostilities, 
founded on misguided biases, that shape involvement in the Middle East today.   
This research will focus on one step within that broader theory, to test it empirically: 
the hypothesis that anti-Muslim stereotypes, when activated, will shape an individual’s 
specific foreign policy preferences.  To test the hypothesis, I utilize survey and 
experimental data collected on public opinion about several important contemporary issues 
in the Middle East, such as public support for (1) various policies intended to deter Iranian 
nuclear development, (2) the use of military force to combat global terrorism, and (3) 
allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  In doing so, I employ a 
variety of analytical techniques, including structural equation modeling (SEM) and 
multiple regression, to determine the influence that respondents’ anti-Muslim stereotypes 
have in shaping opinion about these issues. 
                                                     
1 Haddad is the Director of the Middle East Studies Program at George Mason University.  His comments 
are taken from a forum and debate in 2015 at Cornell University, entitled “American Foreign Policy in the 
Middle East: Success or Failure?” 
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The news media play a central role in my narrative.  I argue that concurrent (and 
arguably biased) media coverage of these interventions, of terrorism, and of political debate 
over U.S. policy in the Middle East gave rise to anti-Muslim stereotypes among the 
American public (Hammer and Safi 2013; Sides and Gross 2013; Pennington and Kahn 
2018).  Not only would it prove difficult for most ordinary Americans to think about U.S. 
policy without imagining intervention in the Middle East, but decades of biased media 
coverage have primed many Americans such that they are unable to think about these issues 
without subconsciously retrieving anti-Muslim considerations (Kumar 2012; Iftikhar 2016, 
2018; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2007, 2018).  Hilary Kahn summarizes the consequences 
of negative coverage of Muslims: 
 “Large swaths of the general public only encounter Islam and Muslims in news 
stories when something tragic or terrifying happens, such as the 2017 attacks in 
London and Istanbul and the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting.  The representation 
of Muslims in these stories often portrays them as radicalized, irrational, and 
uncontainable terrorists or depicts their suffering in a desensitized and inhumane 
way.  While a story will occasionally be found in which Muslims are humanized or 
their faith contextualized, the typical narrative people find in news media is one 
that distances Islam and Muslims, decontextualizes the faith and its believers, 
misrepresents the religion as a security risk, and presents a community that is, quite 
simply, not us” (2018: 1). 
 
Throughout this project, I offer an argument – and present strong evidence – that 
anti-Muslim stereotypes shape public support for military operations in the Middle East 
(and specifically the killing of Muslims).  This correlation persists even after accounting 
for other political attitudes that might shape foreign policy opinions (e.g., political ideology 
and party identification).  The evidence I find that links anti-Muslim stereotypes to support 
for the use of American military force in the Middle East suggests dire consequences for 
the bigger picture of U.S. foreign policy and the global war on terrorism.  Anti-Muslim 
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stereotypes, the foundations of support they lend for the use of American military force in 
the Middle East, and the interventions themselves risk conflict in the future, due to the 
seemingly irreversible and demoralizing nature of cultural conflict.  Indeed, Western 
attitudes help create a feedback loop.  Foreign policy rooted in ethnic or religious antipathy 
naturally gives rise to anti-American and anti-imperialist orientations abroad, of a sort able 
to foment modern Islamist extremism and perhaps even fuel terrorism: a “perpetual cycle 
of intervention, terrorism, and anti-Muslim stereotypes,” once those extremist acts in turn 
shape American attitudes (Tessler 2003; Tessler and Robbins 2007; Blaydes and Linzer 
2012; Gerges 2016; Iftikhar 2016). 
An important caveat in my narrative is that the cognitive linkages between 
perceived threat from Muslims, anti-Muslim stereotypes, and justifications for using 
military force in the Middle East are stronger among white Americans compared to black 
Americans, what I call an “asymmetric ethnocentric response” toward Muslims across 
American racial groups.  In two studies herein, I find compelling evidence that, among 
whites, anti-Muslim stereotypes structure support for: the use of military force rather than 
diplomacy to deter Iranian nuclear development (Chapter Four) and restrictive policies 
toward the emigration of embattled Syrian refugees (Chapter Six) to the United States.  In 
a third study, I find evidence in a survey experiment that, when ordinary Americans are 
exposed to news stories about various terror groups, they are more likely to support the use 
of preemptive force against Islamist groups compared to non-Islamist groups even if they 
make equal threats against the United States (Chapter Five).  When I dig deeper, I find that 
support for using military force against Islamists is highest among white participants 
compared to black participants. 
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These differences in how whites and blacks think about Muslims have the potential 
to cause severe policy consequences (e.g., invading or bombing other countries, turning 
away refugees).  Whites typically make up 70% of the electorate and even larger 
proportions of most survey samples, which means that both the electorate and 
representative polls will be driven by any subcultural norms found among that portion of 
the population.  Further, whites form the vast bulk of the Republican electorate 
(approximately 90%), meaning that their perspective will dominate national leadership 
when the GOP governs.   
I conclude this narrative of negativity with a bit of optimism by offering a 
theoretically-grounded argument that media and political elites can cover issues in the 
Middle East in ways that uproot the deep-seated biases that set the current context for 
American foreign policy.  Specifically, I investigate how different news frames (i.e., 
arguments) of varying strength and quality influence public opinion surrounding the Syrian 
refugee crisis.  I find strong empirical evidence suggesting journalists can mitigate the 
influence that unfounded anti-Muslim stereotypes exert on American public opinion and 
U.S. foreign policy by affirming counterstereotypes of Muslims in coverage of issues in 
the Middle East.  My investigation of the political potential of fair reporting and 
counterstereotype-affirming approaches is both timely and important, a point which several 
scholars make in their collaborative volume entitled On Islam: Muslims and the Media.  
Hilary Kahn summarizes the volume’s overarching purpose: 
  “This responsibility and ability to rescript the narratives around Islam and 
Muslims comes at no better time.  Tides of anti-immigrant, antidifference, anti-
Islam, and antiglobalism sentiment are swelling, and a public response of exclusion 
and nationalism is a global and complicated issue that requires more nuanced 
understanding (2018: 5).  
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Chapter Two - U.S. Intervention in the Middle East 
This chapter presents a cursory review of the historical context that precipitated 
today’s commonplace anti-Muslim stereotypes.  The discussion must start there in order to 
put the current research and its contributions into perspective.  My narrative thus begins 
with a summary of nearly eighty years of continuous and seemingly muddled U.S. 
interventionist policies in the Middle East, the context in which current American opinion 
formation takes place. 
 
Realpolitik in the Middle East 
After supporting Middle Eastern regime changes in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the U.S. government entered the Cold War looking to develop diplomatic relations with 
several states in the region.  U.S. policymakers and diplomats approached their Arab and 
Muslim counterparts in Middle Eastern states with contempt, based on a perception of their 
“backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women’s rights” (Said 1978: xix; 
1997; 2004).  According to Said, who popularized Orientalism theory, U.S. policymakers 
felt they had an obligation to intervene in the Middle East to civilize and democratize the 
primitive Muslims and protect them from Soviet communism.  These “demeaning 
generalizations,” inherited through centuries of European conquest and literature, led to 
U.S. intervention in the Middle East and planted the seeds of anti-Muslim attitudes (Said 
1978, 1994, 2004; Kumar 2012).  Said (2004: 871) summarizes the consequences of the 
Orientalist worldview: 
“It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of 
changing the map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can 
be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar.  But this has often happened with the 
‘Orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 
the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power 
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acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the Orient’s 
nature, and we must deal with it accordingly.  In the process the uncountable 
sediments of history, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of 
peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, 
relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless 
fragments that were taken out of Baghdad’s libraries and museums.  My argument 
is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-
written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and 
disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ East, ‘our’ Orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess 
and direct.” 
 
 
The United States initiated the Baghdad Pact (also known as the Central Treaty 
Organization or CENTO) in 1958 with the intention of uniting Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and 
Turkey against Soviet expansion from the north.  Just four years later, however, Prime 
Minister Abd al-Karim Qassim withdrew Iraq from CENTO, as part of a broader agenda 
to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) for the benefit of his own state economy 
(Fisk 2005: 148).  Qassim demanded that Western corporations share IPC ownership and 
profits with his government. 
Qassim’s strategy proved to be the downfall of his regime’s relations with the 
United States and, ultimately, the downfall of Qassim himself.  U.S. officials began 
colluding with revolutionary Baathists in Iraq — namely a young Saddam Hussein — to 
overthrow Qassim (Fisk 2005; Mansfield 2013; Wilford 2013).  Within a year of 
withdrawing Iraq from CENTO, Qassim and his Syrian counterpart, President Nazim al-
Kudsi, were ousted by American-backed Baathists.  Both countries emerged from the 
1960s with strong Baathist governments rooted in Arab nationalism and authoritarian 
socialism.  While the CIA-backed coups initially proved beneficial for the United States, 
the unanticipated rise of Arab nationalism over the next decade deteriorated the new 
regimes’ relations with their American counterparts.   
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One particular event catalyzed the sharp decline in diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Iraq: The Six Day War of June 1967 (or the Third Arab-Israeli War).  
After alleged threats and attacks by Palestinian organizations inside Israel, the Israelis 
launched strikes against Palestine, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan (Bowen 2017).  Israel tripled 
its land territorial claims and killed nearly 15,000 Arabs, including 10,000 Egyptians and 
2,500 Syrians (Bowen 2017).  The United States supported Israel, which flew directly in 
the faces of those who trumpeted Arab unity and strength.  Arabs and Muslims in the region 
saw the United States as complicit in Israel’s conquests and, in response, the Iraqi 
government severed ties with the United States and instead sought to improve relations 
with the Soviets.  By the early 1970s, the U.S. government again was colluding with local 
factions to promote regime change.  This time, U.S. officials supplied ethnic Kurdish rebels 
(the peshmerga) with resources to help them overthrow the now-standoffish Iraqi 
government that the CIA helped bring to power just a decade earlier.  
Around the same time, Islamist extremism – at the core of modern terrorist group 
ideologies – was taking root in the Middle East under two major political revolutions.  U.S. 
involvement in regional politics resulted in unforeseen consequences that endure to this 
day.  In Iran, for example, the Shah had “always [been] seen as a tool of the United States 
and Britain” after his installation with CIA help in 1953 (Fisk 2005: 98).  The Americans 
profited from relations with his regime while underwriting its corruption (Fisk 2005: 98; 
Bacevich 2016: 15).  Growing unrest with the inhumane and corrupt Shah dictatorship 
finally exploded in 1978 – with riots, protests, and calls for a new Islamist regime – forcing 
the Shah to flee the country.  Growing anti-American sentiment reached a fever pitch when 
the U.S. government allowed the exiled leader into the country for cancer treatment in 
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1979.  In retaliation, members of an Islamist student group overtook the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran and held 52 Americans hostage for fifteen months.  To this day, the incident 
remains the longest hostage crisis in recorded history.  
Media coverage and imagery out of the 1979 Iranian Hostage Crisis changed how 
many ordinary Americans perceive Muslims.  This period – which I discuss at greater 
length in Chapter Four – marked a shift from the typical Orientalist view of Muslims held 
by many Americans to the pervasive anti-Muslim stereotypes that exist today.  By the end 
of the crisis, many Americans no longer just saw Muslims as primitive and patriarchal 
savages, but instead saw an immediate national security threat posed by turbaned, AK-47-
toting, brown men living in the Middle East (Elba 2018).  Elba (2018) summarizes the 
development of anti-Muslim stereotypes during the late 1970s and early 1980s: 
 “The hostage crisis demonstrated the early stages of the development of the 
modern Muslim terrorist.  You saw these turban-clad, beard-wearing Iranian men 
carrying rifles handling these ambassadors and statesmen who were largely white.  
And remember, it was around the clock coverage at the time.  People came home 
and were watching for updates, it was on the front pages of the New York Times 
and the Washington Post.  News anchors were building careers off of this.  The 
ratings for coverage of the hostage crisis were through the roof….The sheer scale 
of the event and that political moment led to the permeation of this male, Muslim, 
brown, bearded threat, which becomes the modern prototype for how we think 
about the Muslim terrorist.  In addition to that, it had a major psychological impact 
in that American hegemony isn’t as strong as we might think.  It was a moment of 
vulnerability, that these guys can really do harm if they want.” 
 
 
In Afghanistan, another coup d’état brought the pro-Soviet and communist People’s 
Democratic Party to power in 1978.  When the Soviet Union began sending troops to 
defend the new government against Islamists, the United States again began funneling 
resources to insurgents.  The United States sent billions of dollars in arms and aid to 
mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan as an indirect way to combat its Cold War nemesis.  It 
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also may have been a direct attempt to make up for the lost strategic partnership with Iran 
by brokering new power relationships in the region, thereby undermining Soviet influence 
and preventing their encroachment on U.S. oil interests in the Persian Gulf.  President 
Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote that the Shah’s overthrow 
had shattered the “protected tier shielding the crucial oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf 
from possible Soviet intrusion” (Bacevich 2016: 23).  Fisk summarizes the U.S. 
government’s predicament in the late 1970s: 
“America had just lost its very own ‘policeman of the Gulf’,’ Shah Mohamed 
Pahlavi, in favour of that most powerful of Islamic leaders, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini…Now it was in the process of ‘losing’ Afghanistan — or at least 
watching that country’s last pitiful claim to national independence melt into the 
Kremlin’s embrace” (2005: 41).  
 
With aid and resources from the United States, the mujahideen eventually drove the 
Soviets from Afghanistan.  However, in several later interviews, Osama bin Laden was 
often quick to point out that, regardless of any account of U.S. aid, the Americans were 
enemies (Fisk 2005).  Specifically, when asked about his contempt for the United States, 
bin Laden referenced American imperialism, crusades for oil, and support for the 
illegitimate state of Israel that was partitioned out of Muslim holy lands after World War 
II: “For us, there is no difference between the American and Israeli governments or 
between the American and Israeli soldiers” (Fisk 2005: 22-31, quoting Osama bin Laden).  
Any positive relationships that were forged between the U.S. government and the 
Afghan rebels quickly deteriorated after the Soviet evacuation.  Many in Afghanistan 
viewed the U.S.-supported postwar regime as corrupt and out of sync with traditional 
Islam.  Furthermore, when the United States withdrew its presence, a power vacuum was 
created that led to an outbreak of violence between tribal war lords.  Many Afghanis, living 
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amid a brutal civil war, felt abandoned (Fisk 2005: 5).   Consequently, most of the fighters 
once trained and funded by the United States channeled their intensifying anti-American 
views into the founding of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Gerges 
2016: 20).   
 “Once the Russian bear had burned its paws and the Soviet Union was on its way 
to perdition, the Americans and their Arab and Pakistani suppliers abandoned 
Afghanistan to its fate and ignored the thousands of Arabs who had fought there,” 
Fisk explains (2005: 90). 
 
 
Contemporary Confusion 
American attitudes hardened during the “confusion and incoherence,” not to 
mention the “shortsighted opportunism,” that characterized U.S. foreign policy in the 
1980s and 1990s (Bacevich 2016: 87).  This period marked the beginning of the 
abandonment of covert intervention by the U.S. government in favor of directly using its 
military power in the Middle East.  It is likely that ordinary Americans were confused by 
their government’s intervention in the Middle East – which lacked a clear articulation of 
motives and goals – and also wondered, in retrospect, why the stakes were enough to justify 
risking American lives (Bacevich 2016: 11).  No survey data exist to document this 
confusion, but a rather unimpressive list of achievements in the Middle East – where all 
U.S. military casualties since 1980 have occurred – motivates my supposition about 
American confusion over Middle East policy.  That list includes: a hostage crisis, a scandal, 
four Gulf wars, a failed regime change, hundreds of terror attacks, the birth of the most 
formidable terror group to date, and a refugee crisis. 
 This story of confusion over U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, with the 
(likely) added component of concern for the loss of American life, begins with the U.S. use 
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of its military might during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).  Iraq and Iran were at war over 
border disputes and Saddam Hussein’s fears of uprisings among Iraq’s Shi’ite factions 
(encouraged by their religious brethren to overthrow Hussein, just as they had overthrown 
the Shah in Iran).  The U.S. military intervened, with its unparalleled naval power, to 
protect Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil tankers travelling through the Persian Gulf.  Not only did the 
Americans have a vested interest in protecting the oil on which they depended, but the 
Iranian regime’s support of the student hostage-takers in 1979 was still a sore spot for U.S. 
leaders. 
What was seemingly a clear direction in foreign policy, however, became muddled 
when the U.S. government was exposed for funneling weapons to Iran through Israel in 
hopes of securing the safe return of American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon.  
These events, which became known as the Iran-Contra Affair, cast a dark cloud over the 
second term of one of America’s most beloved presidents, Ronald Reagan.  These 
conflicting policies also seemed to cause many Americans to have ambivalent attitudes 
toward Reagan and his policies, which was understandable, given how the military served 
a double-agent role in that war.  On the one hand, an overwhelming majority of Americans 
stood against the actions of the Reagan administration:  80% disapproved of the decision 
to sell weapons to Iran and 70% were bothered “a lot” by Reagan’s decision to contradict 
the will of Congress (Saad 2016).  On the other hand, many of those same Americans still 
approved of President Reagan.  His job approval only fell to 47% after the scandal became 
public in November 1986 and rebounded back to 60% by the end of his term.  Further, 75% 
of Americans maintained that they still liked Reagan as a person (Saad 2016).  
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The United States’ policy in the Middle East only became more muddled from 
there.  After essentially saving Saddam Hussein from the Iranians – who enjoyed the 
advantage of superior U.S.-made technology purchased by the Shah before his downfall – 
the U.S. twice deployed military force against Iraq in the years following the ceasefire 
(Bacevich 2016).  First, after Saddam Hussein invaded oil-rich Kuwait in 1990, the United 
States quickly drove the Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Bacevich 2016).1F2  Then, in 2003, the 
United States again invaded Iraq as part of a coalition force, under the pretenses that 
Hussein was exterminating Kurds and Shi’ites, harboring weapons of mass destruction, 
and supporting al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks. 
According to Fawaz Gerges (2016), U.S. leaders’ lack of foresight in the 1990 and 
2003 interventions created many of the conditions that led to the birth of ISIS and, to this 
day, present challenges to stable and legitimate governance in Baghdad.2F3  The U.S. military 
dismantled most of the Iraqi Republican Guard in the first war, and in the subsequent 
occupation, what was left of the military and the ruling Baathist party was excluded from 
ever serving the state again.  These policies sparked centuries-old sectarian divisions and, 
when American fatigue with the occupation led the U.S. government to withdraw troops, 
the movement known today as ISIS arose to fan those sparks until they blazed into chaos 
and violence:  
                                                     
2 The U.S. intervention against Iraq was somewhat of a “final straw” for Osama bin Laden.  The United States 
used Saudi Arabia as its headquarters and base of operations for the offensive against Iraq, which outraged 
bin Laden.  To him, disputes between Arabs and/or Muslims should be settled without outside interference.  
Furthermore, bin Laden saw it as disgraceful to allow infidels to occupy the most holy of Islamic lands in 
Saudi Arabia.  Osama bin Laden protested the Saudi government, which led to his exile and the revocation 
of his citizenship.  Just two years later, radicals linked to bin Laden carried out the bombing on the World 
Trade Center and the ambush of American troops in Mogadishu, Somalia.  
3 Fawaz A. Gerges is Emirates Professor in Contemporary Middle East Studies at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
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The United States “caused a rupture in an already fractured Iraqi society.  
America’s destruction of Iraqi institutions, particularly its dismantling of the army 
and the ruling Baathist party, unleashed a fierce power struggle, mainly along 
sectarian lines, creating fissures in society.  These growing ruptures provided the 
room necessary for non-state actors and armed insurgent militias, including Al 
Qaeda, to infiltrate the fragile body politic in post-2003 Iraq” (Gerges 2016: 24).3F4 
 
 
In conclusion, this historical review has set the context during which biased media 
coverage of terrorism and issues in the Middle East gave rise to anti-Muslim stereotypes 
in the United States.  My cursory review also describes the history of American 
interventionism in the Middle East and provides a background for the anti-U.S.-imperialist 
and anti-U.S.-interventionist ideologies that motivated terror attacks (of which September 
11 is one of hundreds to take place throughout the United States and Europe).  It theorizes 
a chain of causality that creates a perpetual cycle: stereotypes lead to intervention, which 
lead to terrorism, which reaffirms stereotypes.  Others have documented how U.S. 
intervention encourages such backlash (Tessler 2003; Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Gerges 
2016).   My task, in subsequent chapters, will be to test for the first link in this cycle: anti-
Muslim stereotypes shaping support for military interventions in the Middle East.  In the 
next section, I summarize the theoretical perspective I will employ when testing for that 
linkage. 
 
Two Accounts of Support for the War on Terror: Ethnocentrism vs. Stereotyping 
The emergence of global terrorism paralleled technological developments that 
enable scholars to study public support for the war on terrorism.  Specifically, the rapid 
                                                     
4 Survey data provide evidence of the “fatigue” I describe.  In March 2003, days after the invasion, only 23% 
of Americans agreed that it was a mistake to send troops into Iraq.  That number climbed steadily to around 
60% at the end of Bush’s second term and hovered there until the troop withdrawal in December 2011. 
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development of the Internet and file-sharing capabilities during the late 1990s and early 
2000s led data consortiums to start digitizing public opinion – some dating back to the 
1930s – for easy storage and sharing.  As technology and Internet speeds have continued 
to improve, universities and polling organizations are increasingly forming partnerships 
with these popular consortiums to increase data accessibility.   Today, researchers from 
partner organizations can search and access data from these consortiums – like the 
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of 
Michigan – for free and on almost any topic.  Further, data are typically available in file 
formats for nearly every data analysis program and can be downloaded in a matter of 
seconds. 
With these advances, researchers sought to understand American public opinion 
about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East using recurring national survey data collected 
on those topics.  Two mainstream theories have emerged to describe American public 
opinion toward Middle Eastern affairs: an approach built on general ethnocentrism and an 
approach built on targeted stereotyping.  Rather than adjudicating between those two 
approaches, my theoretical perspective will synthesize them. 
 
Ethnocentrism 
One approach to explaining the foundations of American support for anti-terrorism 
policies focuses on the influence of ethnocentrism.  Ordinary Americans were more likely 
to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as President Bush’s handling of those 
wars, if they exhibited ethnocentric attitudes (Kam and Kinder 2007).  In this research, 
ethnocentrism is defined as a broad worldview guided by the “commonplace inclination to 
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divide the world into ingroups and outgroups, [where] the former [are] characterized by 
virtuosity and talent, the latter by corruption and mediocrity” (Kam and Kinder 2007).  That 
is, if you think your in-groups stand out in a positive way, or you think other out-groups 
stand out in a negative way, then you are more likely to support actions against people of 
from the latter groups.  The researchers believe this ethnocentric impulse applies to support 
for the War on Terror: 
“To most Americans, the adversaries in this war are unfamiliar.  They come from 
far away and exotic places.  Their language, religion, customs, and sheer physical 
appearance: all of it is strange.  And after 9/11, not just strange, but sinister.  
Americans who are generally predisposed to ethnocentrism…should be especially 
likely to lend their support to the new war on terrorism” (2007: 323).  
 
 
Think of an ordinary American citizen.  Let’s suppose the citizen rates in-groups – 
such as the citizen’s own racial and religious groups – very highly and has warmer feelings 
toward members of those groups compared to outsiders.  According to the authors, the 
strange and shadowy enemy in the war on terrorism, from far away and exotic lands, should 
present this individual with a particularly appealing target for out-group hostility.  Kam 
and Kinder (2007) indeed find evidence that their measure of the ethnocentric 
predisposition predicts support for several policies related to the “new war on terrorism,” 
including increased spending on Homeland Security, border control, and defense, as well 
as support for military action in Iraq.  The authors’ empirical evidence is thought-
provoking, especially considering that their findings are robust when accounting for a wide 
array of political dispositions and demographic factors that might influence support for 
military action (e.g., partisanship, perceptions of the state of the economy, etc.). 
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Targeted Stereotyping 
Sides and Gross (2013), on the other hand, focus on a much more proximate cause: 
targeted stereotyping.  They suggest that ordinary Americans rely on their specific anti-
Muslim stereotypes – in particular, that Muslims are “violent” – when forming judgments 
of support for the wars in the Middle East.   According to the authors, the media climate 
portrays potential enemies in the Middle East as barbaric and violent – a perception that 
shapes foreign-policy attitudes (Sides and Gross 2013).  Their quantitative analysis 
confirms the relationship between anti-Muslin views and support for military intervention 
in the Middle East, a pattern that is robust even when accounting for other political factors 
that might explain respondent preferences toward Middle East policy. 
This thesis will synthesize the stereotyping explanation with the preceding, and 
arguably competing, ethnocentrism explanation.  In doing so, I advance several key 
arguments that come together to form a new account of American support for the use of 
military force in the Middle East.  They are sketched out briefly below, then elaborated in 
Chapter Three.   
 
A New Account of Support for the Use of Military Force in the Middle East 
The first step taken in this research is to explore previous accounts of American 
support for the use of military force in the Middle East.  I do so by revisiting the 
foundational group-threat and social-identity theories that are central to both the 
ethnocentrism and stereotype explanations.  Through this undertaking, I develop a theory 
that could explain the rise of out-group hostility (or an ethnocentric response) toward 
Muslims.  The theory may be summarized in this way: Someone will exhibit an 
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ethnocentric response toward Muslims (e.g., support for the use of military force against a 
majority-Muslim country) when anti-Muslim stereotypes combine with an individuals’ in-
group identity to result in perceived threat.  In other words, I differ from accounts that 
emphasize either generalized ethnocentrism or specific stereotypes about Muslims, 
because my theory links the two as part of a subconscious causal process.  I elaborate on 
this thinking in Chapter Three. 
After outlining this cognitive process, my research turns to asking why these idea 
elements might become linked for some people but not others – because that is the key to 
explaining when individuals will be more prone to adopt an ethnocentric response.  Social 
identity research traces differential in-group identity attachments to an individual’s 
personal background and experiences.  It logically follows that two people with differing 
in-group identity attachments might view outsiders in different ways, with some perceiving 
them as threatening while others do not (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009; 
Masuoka and Junn 2013).  This logic guides the development of my second key argument 
in Chapter Three:  Because whites and blacks often have differing life experiences in the 
United States, Muslims are more likely to be perceived as a threat by whites, and as a result, 
whites are more prone than blacks to exhibit an ethnocentric response toward Muslims. 
For American whites, Muslims are uniquely situated to be perceived as realistic and 
symbolic cultural threats to their core national identity attachments – because they may 
differ from other Americans in terms of ethnicity, culture, language, and religion.4F5  Biased 
media coverage of issues in the Middle East reinforces this perceived threat by portraying 
                                                     
5 In a similar vein, Shryock (2013) posits that Islamophobia is more than fear and hatred of Muslims; rather 
it is grounded in the vagueness of our hegemonic models of what it means to be an American and how our 
national identities are formed.   
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Muslims as violent, emphasizing cultural differences, and encouraging Americans to 
evaluate Muslims in terms of such cultural dissimilarity.  Even worse, biased media 
coverage also tends to espouse the idea that Muslims are hell-bent on conquering the West 
and imposing their religion and culture on Americans.   
On the other hand, I argue that Muslims present little identity threat to blacks, 
whose core in-group identity typically revolves around their status as a racial minority in 
the United States.  Even blacks who strongly identify with the United States – a 
commonality with white Americans – will not view Islam as somehow incompatible with 
their national identity because black membership with the nation is typically not 
preconditioned on looking, believing, or worshipping “like me.”  Absent such a rigid 
understanding of national identity, I argue that blacks should be less likely than whites to 
view Muslims as a threat.   
To recap, my theory of Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response (AER) posits that (1) 
differing core identity attachments will cause whites and blacks to experience different 
levels of perceived threat, and (2) because they differ in how threatened they feel, whites 
will be far more likely than blacks to support the use of military force in the Middle East – 
or, more generally, the killing of Muslims.  I will test observable implications of this theory 
rigorously in the chapters to come, including empirical investigations of support for 
allowing Syrian refugees into the United States and of support for various policies to deter 
Iranian nuclear development.  In each case, my analyses find compelling evidence 
supporting AER theory. 
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Isolating Anti-Muslim Impulses from Anti-Terrorist Impulses 
So far, I have discussed how different constructs operate together in cognition to 
produce ethnocentric response, but my focus on Muslims as the target group of 
ethnocentric response has been consistent.  Understandably, this reflects a general trend in 
political science research: Given the constant challenges the U.S. military faces abroad and 
constant political debate over the Middle East, few would dispute the importance of 
understanding the factors that shape American public opinion about those issues.  
However, by only investigating public opinion about issues concerning Muslims and 
Islamist terrorism, researchers run the risk of confounding what they are measuring: 
attitudes about terrorism or attitudes about Muslims.  The next step of this research is to 
address that issue. 
The narrow focus on Muslims and Islamist terrorism in the literature derives, in 
part, from the skewness and negativity of media coverage of Muslims:  Most Americans 
do not have accessible considerations of non-Islamist groups because they typically are not 
exposed to news about these groups, even though groups operating outside of the Middle 
East also commit acts of terror against U.S. installments, troops, and citizens.  In fact, 
groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa use terror tactics very 
similar to those employed by Islamist groups like ISIS, such as: kidnapping, rape, sex 
trading, and murder.  Perhaps as a result of selective news coverage, political scientists 
typically do not investigate attitudes about non-Islamist groups like the LRA.  My 
dissertation will probe how ordinary Americans would react to such groups if actually 
exposed to them, to understand the differences in how Americans think about Islam and 
terrorism.  
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After carefully considering news coverage of terrorism and extant research on 
stereotype processes, I develop a third key argument (explicated in Chapter Five):  The 
same cognitive processes and stereotype generalizations that characterize how Americans, 
particularly whites, think about Muslims also shape how they think about terrorism.  
Whereas I expect that it is difficult for many ordinary Americans to think about Muslims 
without thinking about terrorism and violence, I contend that many also evaluate terrorist 
threats relative to their anti-Muslim attitudes.  In other words, I expect that stereotype 
generalizations about Muslims lead white Americans to perceive threat from Islamists and 
justify the use of military force against them, in addition to leading white Americans to 
perceive a greater threat from Islamists and to be more likely to justify the use of lethal 
force against them relative to non-Islamist groups.   I find evidence in an original survey 
experiment supporting this argument: When subjects are exposed to news about terrorism, 
they are more likely to support the use of force against Islamist groups compared to non-
Islamist groups.  I also find that support for the use of military force against Islamists is 
substantively and significantly higher among whites compared to blacks.  The take-home 
point is that ordinary Americans’ perceptions of and reactions to terrorism operate in a 
“tunnel vision of terrorism,” wherein they are structured first and foremost by anti-Muslim 
attitudes. 
 
Shifting the Tide 
So far, I have outlined my arguments, and later provide evidence, that anti-Muslim 
stereotypes exert strong influence on support for the use of military force against Iran and 
restrictive policies toward Syrian refugees, as well as shape how ordinary Americans 
evaluate and form judgments of support for the use of force against terror groups.  These 
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cumulative findings motivate my fourth and final argument (Chapter Six): Anti-Muslim 
stereotypes that individuals bring to bear when evaluating issues concerning Muslims or 
foreign policy in the Middle East can be shifted.  I make this argument after careful 
consideration of research on media framing and mass media effects, which suggests that 
strategic issue frames can shift considerations of issues and public opinion when they 
emphasize strong and credible arguments (Chong and Druckman 2007b).5F6   
I apply these insights to explain how real-world elite framing of the ongoing Syrian 
refugee crisis shapes public support for allowing refugees into the United States.  After 
constructing frames from statements made in debates and speeches during the 2016 
Presidential Election, I expect and find compelling evidence that strong issue frames 
emphasizing the obligations of American identity, such as helping others in need, can shift 
anti-refugee opponents to a moderate position.  Similarly, by developing an original issue 
frame that advocates for allowing Syrian refugees into the United States by emphasizing 
factual counterstereotype-affirming information, I investigate how exposure to this type of 
information would influence opinion surrounding the Syrian refugee issue if it were part of 
the elite debate.  I expect and find compelling evidence that strong counterstereotype-
affirming narratives produce similar moderating influences on negativity toward Syrian 
refugees underwritten by anti-Muslim attitudes.   
 
                                                     
6 Throughout this project, I use the terms “framing” and “framing effects.” Frames are strategic alterations 
to the presentation (e.g., words, titles, etc.) of news or information intended to influence opinion about the 
subject matter (Chong and Druckman 2007a).  Framing effects, then, refer to changes in opinion that result 
from changes in the presentation of an issue and the considerations of an issue on which the presentation of 
the issue focuses and bring to mind (Chong and Druckman 2007a). 
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Contributions 
This dissertation does not only contribute to scholarship through the theoretical 
refinements it offers.  The specific empirical explorations in later chapters contribute both 
to political science and (at least potentially) to public discourse in more immediate ways 
as well.  I end the introduction by outlining what those contributions will be. 
This research offers a theoretically-grounded schematic for how stereotypes, 
identity construction, and other group-based attitudes operate together cognitively to shape 
public opinion.  In Chapters Three and Four, I employ an appropriate and feasible method 
– structural equation modeling – to investigate how these related idea elements structure 
support for the use of military force to deter Iranian nuclear development.  In Chapters Five 
and Six, I employ similar methods to investigate how these related idea elements structure: 
1) support for the use of preemptive military force against Islamist and non-Islamist anti-
U.S. terrorist groups that threaten the United States; and, 2) opposition to allowing Syrian 
refugees to enter the United States. 
Although this research focuses on a specific topic – how anti-Muslim stereotypes 
shape American foreign-policy preferences – both the theoretical and methodological 
developments herein offer leverage to scholars endeavoring to understand more broadly 
how group-oriented idea elements and identity attitudes can shape public opinion.  It 
applies to numerous issue domains – not just other areas of foreign policy, but also 
immigration issues, racial issues, LGBT issues, and so on. 
While this research investigates American public opinion, it also makes 
contributions to research on American foreign policymaking and theory in international 
relations.  While I am not the first to suggest that anti-Muslim stereotypes structure support 
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for the use of American military might in the Middle East, or the idea that this process is 
part of a larger system of perpetual bias-driven warfare (Said 1978; Kumar 2012; Little 
2016), the current research does provide several pieces of evidence that corroborate the 
theorized linkages between anti-Muslim stereotypes and support for the use of American 
military force in the Middle East.  This research also divulges important nuances about 
specific actors propagating the cycle of anti-Muslim attitudes, warfare, and terrorism:  
Anti-Muslim stereotypes are more likely to be held by American whites, compared to 
blacks, and these biases tend to shape whites’ preferences for anti-Muslim policies and the 
use of military force against Muslims rather than diplomacy.   
Together, my empirical findings and the broader scholarship on “Orientalism” – or 
the notion that American hegemonic worldviews and cultural biases fuel support for 
militarism – are also useful in explaining over thirty years of U.S. intervention in the 
Middle East.  This contribution offers some perspective to theories about rivalries in the 
international relations literature.  International relations scholars typically conceptualize 
rivalries as prolonged interstate disputes that tend to arise from competition over materials, 
resources, or territory (Goertz and Diehl 1993, 1995; Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl 2000; 
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006).  This framework is limited insofar as its ability to help us 
understand consistent conflict between states in an entire region (i.e., the Middle East) and 
a much larger, geographically-distant state (i.e., the United States).  However, the theory 
and findings advanced herein, and the broader discussion on American Orientalism, 
explain how cultural biases shape an enduring conflict of the grandest scale: the perpetual 
U.S.-Middle East rivalry. 
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The findings from my Syrian refugee framing experiment offer important 
contributions, both academic and practical.  From an academic perspective, my experiment 
provides evidence on behalf of existing framing theory by replicating outcomes observed 
in studies of how issue frames shift opinion in other policy domains (Chong and Druckman 
2007b).  On a practical level, the results imply that journalists, media elites, and public 
officials – by describing issues in unbiased ways – could disrupt the perpetual cycle of 
American military interventions, retaliatory terrorism, and resulting anti-Muslim 
stereotype generalizations.   
Recognition of how framing matters could become particularly useful when 
considering recent research that sheds light on why news coverage of foreign conflict is so 
biased.  A recent study of news coverage of the Arab Spring from 113 countries finds that 
biased reporting of foreign armed conflict is often a reflection of political context (Baum 
and Zhokov 2015).  In market-based democracies like the United States, reports of armed 
conflict tend to focus on what sells: the sensational, the dramatic, and major events that 
typically correspond with casualties of war (Baum and Zhokov 2015).  What this means is 
that most of the issue coverage from the Middle East focuses on catastrophes and 
casualties, and Americans understand that such events usually were caused by Muslims 
and sometimes targeted Americans.  They do not hear reports that distinguish between 
terrorists and ordinary citizens, or how terrorist ideologies distort what the Quran says.  
They do not understand that “Islamic extremism” is a fringe political movement, not 
merely a religious belief system.  Alongside research that helps us understand why typical 
news coverage of American interventions in the Middle East might excite anti-Muslim 
attitudes, the current project offers empirically-grounded evidence of how journalists and 
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elites can report on issues in ways that mitigate the influences that anti-Muslim stereotypes 
have on Americans’ (particularly whites) preferences for ethnocentric policies in the 
Middle East and on discrimination Muslim-Americans face here at home (O’Connor and 
Jahan 2014; Green 2017; Collingwood, Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018).6F7  
  
Conclusion 
At a normative level, it is troublesome that unfounded biases about Islam are 
generalized to billions of its practitioners, such that those biases can exert a strong influence 
on American public opinion and policy preferences.  In fact, large proportions of Muslims 
in many countries have favorable attitudes toward Americans and Western culture and they 
loathe violence and terrorism undertaken by terror groups like ISIS (Tessler 2003; Blaydes 
and Linzer 2012; Gerges 2016).  What is worse is that whites typically make up 70% of 
the electorate and even larger proportions of opinion polls, and they form the vast bulk of 
the Republican electorate, meaning that often there is opportunity for these anti-Muslim 
biases to dominate national leadership and policymaking.  To put it another way: It is bad 
enough that so many Americans harbor unfounded vitriol toward Muslims, but the worse 
reality is that so much unfounded vitriol can enter the foreign policymaking process and 
shape how and when the U.S. military is deployed: This can only serve as fuel to the 
perpetual cycle of intervention, terrorism, and stereotypes (Iftikhar 2016).  Although the 
primary purpose of this research is to make scientific contributions to the research 
literature, I hope that in the long run these scientific insights help lay the groundwork for 
                                                     
7 On the latter point, a recent study by the Pew Research Center finds evidence that anti-Muslim assaults 
and anti-Muslim intimidation in recent years surpassed 2001 levels (Kishi 2017), despite 92% of sampled 
Muslim Americans expressing proudness to be an American (Lipka 2017). 
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breaking that perpetual cycle, a development that would represent change on a moral level 
in addition to an academic one. 
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Chapter Three - Anti-Muslim Stereotypes: Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response 
across Race and the Political Potential of Affirming Counterstereotypes 
 
 
The central goal of this chapter is to provide theoretical clarity to extant accounts 
of American support for the use of military force in the Middle East – specifically, those 
emphasizing the roles of anti-Muslim stereotypes and ethnocentrism.  The first milestone 
on the way to that goal is to illuminate how stereotypes and ethnocentrism operate together 
in the subconscious mind and how we can measure this cognitive process.  Later, this 
research applies that cognitive map to understand how anti-Muslim stereotypes and other 
related idea elements help predict opinions about Iranian nuclear development, policies 
toward terrorism, and the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Reaching the first milestone of disentangling stereotypes and ethnocentrism 
requires two important steps: 
1) Theoretical: Presentation of a working definition of ethnocentric response that 
links in-group identity to out-group hate, resulting from perceived threat that 
can produce an ethnocentric response toward outsiders (Brewer 2001);   
2) Research Design: Formulation of a structural equation modeling strategy to 
help draw a schematic for these linkages and explain how they shape public 
opinion (Hoyle 1995; Kline 1998; de Carvahlo and Chima 2014). 
 
Different explanations for how stereotypes and consequent out-group hostility 
might arise lead to different observable implications within survey data.  In particular, the 
United States includes an African-American minority that might resist some forms of 
ethnocentric response while being susceptible to others.  The second milestone to reach on 
the way to theoretical clarity, therefore, requires developing a more nuanced understanding 
of how the intensity of anti-Muslim stereotypes can have differential implications across 
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American racial groups.  I offer a theory of Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response (AER) to 
explain how anti-Muslim stereotypes and ethnocentric response could become linked for 
American whites but not for American blacks.  This distinction may not show up in a 
simple analysis of policy preferences, because whites comprise the largest single group 
within opinion-poll samples.  However, that distinction could matter for public policy.  
Whites form the vast bulk of the Republican electorate, so depending on electoral 
outcomes, these negative perspectives might dominate national leadership.  The core 
hypotheses of the AER theory are: 
 Muslims are more likely to be perceived as threatening (expressed as 
stereotypes) by whites compared to blacks; 
 Whites are more likely than blacks to politicize this sense of threat by 
supporting the use of military force against Muslims. 
 
The next objective of this research is to put the AER theory through rigorous 
empirical testing.  Much of the analysis in the next two chapters focuses on understanding 
how anti-Muslim stereotypes among whites and blacks shape support for the use of military 
force in the Middle East.  In Chapter Four, I investigate predictors that might shape support 
for the use of military force intended to deter alleged Iranian nuclear weapons 
development; in Chapter Five, I do the same to predict support for preemptively striking 
Islamist terror groups.  The AER theory also helps to explain the deleterious effects that 
anti-Muslim stereotypes have on whites’ support for allowing embattled Syrians to seek 
haven in the United States, as presented in Chapter Six. 
The final, and perhaps most important, objective is to provide an explanation for 
how journalists can promote narratives that would mitigate the influence that anti-Muslim 
stereotypes have on American policy preferences.  Perhaps shifting issue frames also would 
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shift public opinion about an on-going political issue in the Middle East?  I develop a theory 
to explain why frames that target considerations or ideas with which consumers of political 
news are familiar, understand, and deem relevant to a given political issue would be most 
likely to influence public opinion.  In Chapter Six, I test that possibility using the example 
of the Syrian refugee crisis.  The take-home point is that journalists can appeal to the 
obligations of American identity (e.g., helping others) and can emphasize factual 
counterstereotypes of Muslims to mitigate the role that misguided biases play in 
perpetuating cycles of intervention, terrorism, and stereotypes.  
Throughout every part of this project, the consistent conclusion is that ideas of 
threat, stereotypes, and identity are the prime considerations that ordinary Americans bring 
to bear when thinking about issues in the Middle East and concerning Muslims.  News 
coverage that accentuates those fears increases endorsement of the use of force; framing 
that accentuates other considerations can deflate that preference.  In the following section, 
I embark on the central goal of this chapter: understanding and reconciling extant accounts 
of how anti-Muslim stereotypes and ethnocentrism encourage support for the use of 
military force in the Middle East. 
 
Ethnocentrism, Anti-Muslim Stereotypes, and Middle East Policy Preferences 
 Two rival approaches attempt to explain why Americans support using military 
force in the Middle East.  Both draw on group-identity theory, just as my approach will.  
The first account maintains that ethnocentrism – defined therein as a general propensity to 
favor one’s in-groups and to dislike out-groups – exerted strong influence on support for 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Kam and Kinder 2007; Kinder and Kam 2009).  
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Americans predisposed to ethnocentrism find Muslims, in particular, to be appealing 
targets because they are typically associated with strange lands, cultures, and a strange 
religion – making it easy to define them as an out-group and carry that negative 
predisposition over to foreign policy preferences.  Kam and Kinder (2007) find strong 
evidence supporting their theory, using multiple policy measures related to the “new war 
on terrorism,” including: increased spending on Homeland Security, border control, and 
defense, as well as support for military action in Iraq. 
The second account proposes that specific stereotypes of Muslims (e.g., as violent) 
are powerful predictors of support for the use of military force in the Middle East (Sides 
and Gross 2013).  The crux of this argument is that specific anti-Muslim stereotypes speak 
directly to public attitudes about Middle Eastern affairs, thereby predicting policy 
preferences independent of broader orientations toward in-groups and out-groups.  Sides 
and Gross assert that decades of biased media coverage have made anti-Muslim stereotypes 
readily accessible considerations that many ordinary Americans can and do apply to their 
judgments of support for foreign policies in the Middle East.  This coverage could shape 
the opinions of people with no special predilection for ethnocentric thinking. 
These studies, although using different canvases, both paint clear pictures tracing 
political opinion to group-based attitudes.  However, they disagree as to how specific 
stereotypes and group attitudes are linked cognitively.  Stripping down to the essentials, 
the first approach emphasizes generalized group attitudes (which they call 
“ethnocentrism”) as a driving cause, while the second emphasizes specific group attitudes 
(stereotypes).  One of my contributions will be to explore how specific stereotypes produce 
ethnocentrism.  In doing so, however, I will make a second contribution, which is to specify 
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more clearly what ethnocentrism is and, therefore, how ethnocentrism ought to be 
measured.  Finally, neither approach focuses on the question of whether the dynamic they 
describe might function differently among various groups of individuals, leaving open the 
possibility that a diverse survey sample would obscure some of the effects they wish to 
examine.  Thus, differentiating racial groups will be a third contribution to extant literature.  
 
Ethnocentrism 
 Recent studies by Kinder and Kam rejuvenated research on the political 
implications of ethnocentrism (2009; Kam and Kinder 2007; 2012).  To recap, the authors 
define ethnocentrism as the commonplace inclination to divide the world into virtuous in-
groups and contemptuous out-groups.  Their research provides convincing evidence of the 
role that generalized group attitudes play in shaping public opinion about several 
contentious issues (e.g., candidate choice, gay rights, foreign aid spending, immigration, 
and support for the war on terror).  There is no mistaking the impact of their research:  As 
of this writing, their cumulative research on ethnocentrism has been cited a total of 785 
times by other investigations (Google Scholar 2019). 
 
Some Conceptual Issues 
Despite the popularity of this research agenda, however, scholars still lack a 
universal definition and measurement of ethnocentrism.  Some conceptualize 
ethnocentrism as in-group bias (Hammond and Axelrod 2006) or out-group negativity 
(Pettigrew et al. 1998), while others argue that ethnocentrism arises at the intersection of 
both (Sumner 1906; Kinder and Kam 2009).  Brewer (1999; 2001; 2010), who popularized 
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group- and social-identity theory, ultimately takes issue with all three approaches: She 
asserts that generalized group attitudes are not alone a sufficient explanation for hostility.  
For example, individuals can be prideful about their in-groups without necessarily hating 
outsiders (or the reverse).  In another example, individuals might rate out-groups lower 
than their in-groups, but that does not necessarily mean they want to engage in hostilities 
or violence toward specific outsiders.  In light of these possibilities, Brewer would argue 
that equating in-group bias, or a gap in the favoritism shown to the in-group as compared 
to the out-group, with hostile ethnocentrism is theoretically suspect. 
 
Defining Ethnocentric Response 
How, then, can we reconcile all these different approaches to the study of 
ethnocentrism?  Two sets of studies help us better understand the cognitive process that 
produces ethnocentrism and provide a framework that can be used to develop expectations 
about the factors and contexts that might produce ethnocentrism.  These studies are 
discussed here and will guide my own research throughout this dissertation.   
First, digging deeper into Brewer’s work helps with the important theoretical task 
of defining ethnocentrism.  Researchers have to consider when a specific out-group 
presents a threat (or is perceived as a threat) to in-group identity, resulting in hostility 
toward that out-group (what I will call the ethnocentric response).  She summarizes that:  
“Understanding the relationship between in-group identification and outgroup 
hostility requires understanding how the interests of the ingroup and those of the 
outgroup come to be perceived as in conflict…we need to reconsider the 
fundamental motivations underlying ingroup attachment and the path from in-
group identity to outgroup threat” (underline emphasis added; Brewer 2001: 28).  
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Brewer is not the only one to suggest the important role that (perceived) threat plays 
in linking in-group attachment to out-group hostility.  Nor is she the first to recognize that 
in-group attitudes and out-group attitudes can vary independently of each other.  For 
example, Berry (1984) argues that an in-group favoritism based on a sense of confidence 
and security in one’s group identity could generate an attitude of tolerance and acceptance 
toward out-groups, whereas out-group intolerance might be engendered by threats to one’s 
social identity.  Kam and Kinder (2007) also recognize that ethnocentrism alone did not 
fuel their results.  Rather, perceptions of threat – and, in particular, fear of terrorism – arose 
among the American public after 9/11 and activated that ethnocentrism.  What I will add 
to those background insights is an attempt to specify the cognitive calculus that converts 
that perceived threat from terrorism into support for the use of military force against 
Muslims.  
 
What Kind of Threat?  Who Has a Stake in It? 
To this end, a second set of research builds on Brewer’s advice and provides 
additional theoretical guidelines that will direct my investigation.  Cumulatively, research 
by Stephan and Stephan (2013) and Voss (1996a; 1996b; 2000; 2001) suggests that 
understanding intergroup conflict requires digging deeper than simply treating out-group 
prejudice as a purely psychological reaction that is universal across members of an in-
group.  Such an approach would be naïve, Voss would argue, because psychological 
reactions to outsiders often derive from perceived threats that have rational or materialist 
roots and, therefore, understanding these reactions requires investigating how “any given 
divide is arranged politically, economically, culturally, and geographically” (2000: 298, 
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305).  Simply, good research should evaluate: 1) what is presumed to be threatened; and, 
therefore 2) who has a stake in it.   
Stephan and Stephan (2013), who popularized integrated threat theory, provide a 
framework that helps with these two objectives.  The authors explain that there are four 
basic types of threats that might lead a group to be prejudiced toward another group.  The 
authors’ framework distinguishes types of threat based on the consequences presumed by 
the in-group: 
 Realistic threats: Threats to the very existence of the in-group (e.g., 
warfare), the political and economic power of the in-group, and/or to the 
physical or material well-being of the in-group or its members. 
 Symbolic threats: Symbolic threats primarily involve perceived group 
differences in morals, values, standards, beliefs, and attitudes.  Symbolic 
threats are threats to the worldview of the in-group.   
 Intergroup anxiety: Intergroup anxiety arises when people feel personally 
threatened in intergroup interactions because they are concerned about 
negative outcomes for the self, such as being embarrassed, rejected, or 
ridiculed. 
 Negative stereotypes: Almost all out-group stereotypes embody threats to 
the in-group because one of the functions of stereotypes is to serve as a basis 
for expectations concerning the behavior of the members of the stereotyped 
group. 
 
In their empirical investigations, both Stephan and Stephan (2013) and Voss 
(1996a; 1996b; 2000; 2001) find evidence supporting the nuances of group-threat and 
prejudice about which they theorize.  Stephan and Stephan (2013) apply the integrated 
threat framework in a series of path analyses and structural equation models – similar to 
the models I construct in Chapter Four – and find that each of the different types of 
perceived threats play significant roles in shaping prejudice toward the same out-groups, 
across a variety of contexts, including: American whites’ attitudes toward beneficiaries of 
affirmative action, Mexicans’ attitudes toward Americans and vice versa, Spaniards’ 
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attitudes toward Moroccan immigrants, Israelis’ attitudes toward Russian immigrants, and 
Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants in the United States.  On each of these issues, 
some individuals’ prejudicial impulses toward an out-group are guided by perceived 
realistic and symbolic threats to their in-group, while others’ are guided by stereotypes and 
anxiety.  The main takeaway is that, though perceptions of threat tend to produce similar 
prejudicial attitudes toward outsiders, the presumed consequences that shape those 
perceptions are hardly uniform.  Simply, perceptions of threat and prejudicial attitudes are 
not universal ideas that operate in a cognitive vacuum.  Those who are inclined toward 
prejudice usually have different rational bases for their attitudes.  
Voss’ and his colleagues’ empirical research challenges an “old hypothesis” about 
race relations in the South (1996a; 1996b; 2000; 2001; Voss and Lublin 2000, 2001; Voss 
and Miller 2001).  That “old hypothesis” argues that whites who live in racially 
heterogeneous areas in the South are more likely to perceive political and economic threats 
from blacks and, thus, are more likely to vote for candidates who would presumably 
preserve white superiority (e.g., segregationists) (Key 1949; Blalock 1967; Giles and 
Buckner 1993).  Voss and his co-authors, however, expect that racially conservative 
attitudes in the South are not uniform but, rather, have been shaped over time by cultural 
and geographic factors.   
On the one hand, Voss argues that “improving civil rights and economic changes” 
afforded to blacks during the Civil Rights Movement have shifted racial conflict from that 
described by earlier studies (2000: 300).  He argues that, in urban areas, blacks have come 
to share political and economic demands with their white neighbors rather than pose a 
threat to them.  Indeed, after analyzing data at the precinct, county, state legislative, and 
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congressional district levels – across four southern states – Voss and his co-authors 
consistently find evidence that the “white backlash” effect has reversed in the urban 
landscape (1996a; 1996b; 2000; 2001; Voss and Lublin 2000, 2001; Voss and Miller 
2001). 7F8   
On the other hand, Voss also expects and finds evidence that white racial 
conservatism still thrives in rural areas.  Voss argues that predominantly white suburbs and 
rural areas feature a middle-class subculture that is idiosyncratic to the South and generally 
at odds with minorities, especially when they reside close enough to appear threatening but 
not close enough to for cultural exchange (2000: 4).  An exogenous shock to that way of 
life – such as an affirmative action program that introduces black workers to an area where 
they were previously absent – would therefore be more likely to discomfit the rural white 
compared to the urban white (Voss 2000: 301-302).  The rural white would likely perceive 
the program as a symbolic threat to his or her culture norms and way of life, based on the 
stereotypes that blacks violate traditional values such as self-reliance, work ethic, and 
discipline (Kinder and Sears 1981; Ledford 2018).  In these rural areas, where ignorance 
trumps knowledge and outweighs any tolerance promoted by intergroup contact, the 
perceived cultural threat is more likely to guide a racially conservative response toward 
blacks and, thus, toward the program.   
 
                                                     
8 For a specific example, Voss (1996a) finds that whites living in racially heterogeneous Louisiana parishes 
were no more likely than those living in less-diverse locales to support former Ku Klux Klansman David 
Duke in three early-1990s campaigns for statewide office. 
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Putting it All Together: Identity Formation across Race in the United States 
 
As I unpack my arguments and expectations, a key goal will be to explain how 
different types of perceived threat might lead ordinary Americans to develop negative 
attitudes toward Muslims and lead them to justify ethnocentric policy preferences – 
including the use of military force – against Muslims or majority-Muslim countries.  Rather 
than assuming that perceptions of threat from Muslims and consequent ethnocentric 
reactions to Muslims are purely psychological reactions that are universal among 
Americans, I will be paying careful attention – like Brewer, Stephan and Stephan, and Voss 
et al. – to why and among whom perceptions of threat from Muslims are likely to develop. 
To recap, the cognitive process theorized in social identity research maintains that 
mere in-group positivity is not a sufficient explanation for active hostility against an out-
group:  Antipathy toward a specific out-group becomes linked to in-group identity through 
a perception of threat that may arise from political, economic, or cultural sources (Voss 
2000; Brewer 2001; Stephan and Stephan 2013).  The individual must believe that outsiders 
threaten their interests, goals, values, group cohesion, or even their very existence (Brewer 
2001).  They will develop negative stereotypes about the out-group as a method of 
counteracting that perceived threat, and armed with those hostile stereotypes, they will 
exhibit a willingness to engage in intergroup conflict: a willingness that, when expressed 
in survey data, I will call the “ethnocentric response.”   
I apply these insights to develop expectations about how this cognitive process 
produces ethnocentric response toward Muslims.  I also rely on insights from the race-
relations literature discussed above and research on the identity politics of immigration – 
focused on explaining how identity and threat intersect to shape attitudes about Latinos and 
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immigration – to guide theory development and expectations as I investigate how parallel 
cognitive processes shape attitudes about Muslims and foreign policy in the Middle East. 
  To aid my theoretical discussion, I develop a map (Figure 3.1) of the hypothesized 
causal patterns between threat, identity attachments, and ethnocentric response toward 
Muslims.  Later, in Chapter Four, I embed that cognitive map within a structural equation 
model (SEM) and apply it to data collected during the 2012 American National Election 
Study about American preferences for policies intended to deter Iranian nuclear 
development.  Two characteristics make the Iranian nuclear issue a suitable test of the 
expectations I develop:  
1) Iran is an Islamic theocracy and Muslims make up over 99% of its population, 
and;  
 
2) The prospect of a nuclear Iran is a salient and potentially threatening issue for 
many ordinary Americans. 
 
Put those two features together, and Iran becomes an ideal case for investigating the 
linkages between anti-Muslim stereotypes and foreign-policy opinion, allowing those 
stereotypes are likely at work in shaping policy preferences.  
Two issues concerning the coming statistical models are important to note here.  
First, I do not assume causal directions, contrary to the impression my map might give: I 
will test them.  Specifically, although the models are specified in a way that assumes a 
causal or structural flow of attitudes, from each level down to the next, it will allow for the 
possibility that structural relationships may have a feedback loop.  For example, 
authoritarianism increases the likelihood that one forms core identity attachments, but 
those attachments in turn might give rise to more authoritarian tendencies. 
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Second, the actual statistical models to come will include control variables not 
portrayed in the map outlining my theoretical narrative.  Specifically, I account for the 
likelihood that certain exogenous demographic and societal factors may influence 
important outcomes in the model.  For example, education and attention to politics likely 
decrease generalized out-group negativity, as individuals learn about and become more 
tolerant of outsiders (Solt 2011).  Also, differences in expressions of anti-Muslim 
stereotypes and “ethnocentric expressions” might emerge as a function of whether 
respondents were interviewed via the internet or face-to-face; it is possible that those who 
were interviewed in person gave socially desirable responses compared to those 
interviewed online.  Finally, I account for the likelihood that men are less reluctant than 
women to deploy the use of military force for political purposes (Conover and Sapiro 
1993).  Later models can control for exogenous influences such as those resulting from 
gender, education, attention to politics, and survey mode.  To start us off, however, Figure 
3.1 offers a map of the causal patterns I will be describing. 
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Figure 3.1 |Theoretical and Operational Approaches in Extant Research on Ethnocentrism 
 
Previous Approaches 
Variables in Single-Dimension Approaches 
 In-Group Bias + Authoritarianism                                                                     Public Opinion 
 Out-Group Negativity + Authoritarianism                                       Public Opinion 
 
  
Variables in E-Scale Approach (e.g., Kinder and Kam 2009) 
 (In-Group Rating – Out-Group Rating) + Authoritarianism                   Public Opinion 
 
Multiple Variables Approach (e.g., Sides and Gross 2013) 
 Ethnocentrism + Authoritarianism + Stereotypes                                       Public Opinion 
 
New Structural Approach  
                                      Authoritarianism                                             Base Personality Orientation 
 
 
Patriotism      National Identity               Linked Fate      Ideology              Core Identity Attachments 
 
 
In-Group Fav.           Out-Group Neg.         Intergroup Preference                       Intergroup Attitudes 
 
 
                                  Activated Hostile Stereotypes                                                  Perceived Threat 
 
 
               Policy Preference (e.g., support use of military force)                       Ethnocentric Response 
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Base Personality Orientation: Authoritarianism 
Cognitive factors shape the strength and content of in-group identity attachments.  
In particular, extant research suggests that a base personality orientation toward 
authoritarianism – a rigid need for order that develops early in life – serves as a 
fundamental backdrop for group identity (Adorno et al. 1950; Stenner 2005; Feldman and 
Stenner 2007; Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 2018).  As individuals’ social and political 
worlds become more important and complex with age, authoritarians will sort themselves 
into social in-groups that achieve, maintain, and affirm the understanding of order 
developed during their formative years (Adorno et al. 1950; Stenner 2005; Hetherington 
and Weiler 2009, 2018).  I include authoritarianism at the top of my cognitive schematic 
to illustrate my expectation that attachments to the nation, the racial group, and the political 
group all should be stronger among authoritarians than among those who tolerate a messier 
social situation (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Osborne, Milojev, and Sibley 2017).  Therefore, 
at the top of the “New Structural Approach” in Figure 3.1, authoritarianism is specified as 
a predictor of the strength of core in-group identity attachments. 
Hypothesis 4.1: Authoritarianism will predict stronger core identity attachments. 
 
 
Core Identity Attachments: National ID, Patriotism, Linked Fate, and Political Ideology 
Social-identity research consistently roots group-based attitudes in core 
attachments to the nation, the country, the racial or ethnic group, and the political group 
(whether defined by party or ideology).  Absent a strong sense of those groups existing as 
meaningful constructs, an individual would struggle to develop loyalty toward or 
stereotypes about the categories in question.  Here, I consider how different individuals 
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develop loyalties to those categories, with the ultimate goal of explaining how these ideas 
shape perceptions of Muslims. 
National identity (i.e., the subjective or internalized sense of belonging to a nation) 
and symbolic patriotism (i.e., pride in being a citizen of a country) are not as distinct in the 
United States as they are when relatively unified ethnic or tribal groups span country 
borders.  Nevertheless, both represent expressions of group awareness that ordinary 
Americans might use to orient themselves when relating to others on a global scale (Huddy 
and Khatib 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009; Wong 2010).  They can define social groups as being 
part of the nation or not, good for the country or not. 
Racial linked fate is an expression of group awareness reflecting the perception that 
one’s own life chances depend heavily on the status and fortunes of the racial group as a 
whole.  Such a perception leads individuals to substitute racial group utility for individual 
utility in political and social decision-making (Dawson 1994; Gay, Hochschild, and White 
2016). 
This stage in the cognitive model serves as the basis for my belief that blacks and 
whites will behave dissimilarly in an empirical analysis.  Attachment to the country or to 
the racial group can be important sources of identity and belonging for white and black 
Americans, but the strength and conceptualization of these identities differ quite a bit 
across race (de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996; Citrin et al. 2007; Huddy and Khatib 
2007; Masuoka and Junn 2013).  For example, whites are far more likely than blacks to 
express their in-group identities vis-à-vis national attachments and to place very strict 
conditions on membership in the group:  For many whites, to be an American means 
(implicitly if not explicitly) to be white and English-speaking; their racial identity is 
 
 
45 
 
subsumed by their identification with the country and/or nation.  The connection between 
that identification and authoritarian tendencies therefore should be strongest among whites. 
On the other hand, race has been the predominant factor in the African-American 
experience.  Black political and social homogeneity derives from their historical and 
contemporary lack of status within the broader American nation, which has resulted in 
disadvantage and discrimination that the country has been slow to redress (Dawson 1994; 
Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016).  Their relationship to the country or the nation quite 
rightly might be ambivalent.  Blacks are more likely to express their social identities in 
terms of racial linked fate.  If authoritarianism is going to prompt a black respondent to 
express a strong group identity, it would be more likely to manifest itself as a perception 
of in-group linked fate, and it is the presence or absence of that core identity among black 
respondents that should shape policy preferences.  The most obvious influence of racial 
identity on black political homogeneity – put another way, how a perceived linked fate 
unites blacks – is partisan identification: Over 80% of blacks identify with or lean toward 
the Democratic Party, an identification that spans education levels and economic classes.  
Johnson (2015) summarizes the important role that attachments to the racial group play in 
structuring political attitudes and opinions among blacks:  
“Linked fate, in a political context, suggests that black voters approach elections 
with one simple question: Which candidate is better for the African American 
population?  The analysis begins at the most fundamental level by ascertaining 
which party or candidate is most likely to protect civil rights and support equal 
access to economic opportunity for blacks.  Everything else is secondary.  For 
example, a politician’s stance on renewable energy, free market economics, 
abortion, immigration, national debt, and role of the military in regional conflicts 
all pale in comparison to basic considerations of liberty.” 
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Hypothesis 4.1a: The connection between authoritarianism and national identity 
and symbolic patriotism will be stronger among whites 
compared to blacks. 
Hypothesis 4.1b: The connection between authoritarianism and racial linked fate 
will be stronger among blacks compared to whites.  
 
Intergroup Attitudes: In-Group Favoritism, Out-Group Negativity, and Intergroup 
Preference 
 
 The next step along this theoretical journey is to explain when perceptions of threat 
are likely to emerge from core identity attachments, laying the groundwork for ethnocentric 
response.  Thinking about this graphically, the next task is to illuminate which series of 
arrows in Figure 3.1 stand out as the most likely paths from broader In-Group Identity 
Attachments – which, as Brewer warns, may or may not result in hostile stereotypes – to 
an active commitment to protecting the border between in-group and out-group. 
 Earlier, I discussed theoretical and empirical inconsistencies with how previous 
research has treated in-group favoritism, out-group negativity, and intergroup preference.  
The theoretical mapping in Figure 3.1 helps illustrate those issues.  First, consistent with 
Brewer’s assertion that appreciation for one’s own group does not necessarily lead to out-
group negativity or significant preferences for one group over another, those three 
constructs appear on the same row with no arrows among them.  On the other hand, those 
group-based orientations might result from national or racial identities, so they appear 
under such core identity attachments in the causal flow.  Summarized as formal hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4.2a: Core identity attachments will have a positive relationship with 
intergroup preference and in-group bias. 
Hypothesis 4.2b: Core identity attachments will have no relationship with out-
group negativity.  
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Putting it All Together: The Role of Media in Driving Threat and Activating Hostile 
Anti-Muslim Stereotypes 
 
The key goal of this section is to describe anti-Muslim stereotypes harbored by 
many ordinary Americans and how those attitudes are shaped by actors in the news 
business and political elites.  In the following section, I will develop these ideas to explain 
when anti-Muslim attitudes might intersect with in-group identity attachments to produce 
an ethnocentric response. 
 
Lack of Contact 
A majority of Americans report that they have no Muslim friends, no Muslim 
colleagues, and no contact with Muslims, and nearly sixty percent report that they do not 
have a basic understanding of Islam (Gottschalk 2018: 27, 32; see also Chapter Six).  So, 
how do ordinary Americans form opinions about Muslims?  Rather than having personal 
experiences with Muslims, most Americans instead only encounter Islam and Muslims in 
the news.   
In general, extant research suggests that media and political elites can have a great 
deal of influence on public opinion about issues by dictating what issues are covered 
(agenda setting), what issues are important (priming), and how to think about those issues 
(framing; see Chong and Druckman 2007a).  However, when ordinary citizens form 
judgments about complex issues or issues about which they have little prior information 
(e.g., Muslims or Islam), they are even more likely to depend on media and elite cues to 
impute otherwise missing information (Downs 1957; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 
1991).  Therefore, media and elite discourse about Muslims has likely played an even 
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greater role in shaping ordinary citizens’ attitudes about Muslims, compared to other 
issues, since most citizens only have a minimal amount of personal and social experience 
with Muslims upon which to draw.  So, how can we describe typical portrayal of Muslims 
in American news?   
 
Negative Media Coverage 
The short answer is “bad.”  Most news stories about Muslims are produced in the 
wake of tragedies or terrorist attacks in the Middle East.  In fact, this has been the trend in 
the United States for four decades, as coverage of Muslims has been overwhelmingly 
negative since the rise of political Islam in the 1970s (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; 
Elba 2018; Kahn 2018).  Worse yet, most stories use “catch-all” terms to describe Muslims 
– instead of distinguishing ordinary Muslims from Islamist terrorists – and employ negative 
images of Muslims (Shaheen 2009; Jackson 2010; Iftikhar 2016, 2018).8F9  Imagery in news 
media often portrays terrorists or fundamentalists in stereotypical attire.  On the big screen, 
the common depiction of an Arab or Muslim is that of a man who lives in the desert with 
his “curved dagger, scimitars, magic lamps, giant feather fans, and nargelihs” (Shaheen 
2009; see also Gottschalk and Greenberg 2007; 2018).  Kahn (2018: 1) summarizes that 
these stories often portray Muslims as radicalized, barbaric, and violent or depict them in 
a way that is desensitizing and inhumane.  In a similar vein, Iftikhar asserts that: 
“One of the many things that keeps me awake at night is our Western media’s 
inability to view Islam and Muslims as anything more than a static monolithic entity 
[by] perpetuating the societal falsehood that ‘all Arabs are Muslims and all 
Muslims are Arabs’ to the catch-all term ‘terrorism’ being co-opted to only apply 
to acts perpetuated by Muslims…” (2018: 18). 
                                                     
9 I investigate how affirming counterstereotypes of Muslims impacts opinion about the acceptance of Syrian 
refugees in Chapter Six. 
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Not only is news content about Muslims typically sensationalized, but the coverage 
is also skewed.  Muslims are also more likely than other religious persons to be the subjects 
of religion stories.  For example, a 2012 Pew Research Center Project for Excellence in 
Journalism study finds that Islam was the subject of more religion stories (31.3%) than any 
other religion.  The study also finds that six of the top ten religious news stories in 2012 
were about Muslims and that these stories often featured accusations of extremism (Pew 
Research Center Project for Excellence in Journalism 2012).  A more recent study 
examines news coverage of all terror attacks in the United States between 2006 and 2015 
and finds that attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 357% more coverage 
than other attacks (Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux 2019).  Together, these studies provide 
evidence of a media climate that not only reinforces anti-Muslim stereotypes, but likely 
drives the generalization of those stereotypes by making it seem as though Muslims are 
more likely to perpetuate acts of terrorism and violence than members of other religious 
groups. 
 
Negative Elite Rhetoric 
So far, this narrative of negativity has discussed the grave consequences of biased 
news coverage and lack of contact with Muslims.  It gets worse.  Recent political discourse 
moves beyond out-group negativity to the realm of hostile stereotypes and perceived threat.  
Recent electoral campaigns in the United States offered even stronger levels of vitriol 
toward Muslims compared to the general news cycle.  Negativity expressed by the political 
elite may be more powerful than biased media coverage, insofar as ordinary Americans 
take heuristic cues from their co-partisan political elites when forming issue opinions 
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(Taber and Lodge 2006).  The worst of anti-Muslim rhetoric emerged during the recent 
2016 Republican primary, as contenders competed over their willingness to pursue 
negative policies toward Muslims and Muslim-dominated countries.  Gottschalk (2018: 
36) summarizes the election: 
“Herman Cain alleged ‘shariazation’ of government, Ben Carson declared that no 
true Muslim should serve as president, Ted Cruz called on U.S. law enforcement to 
‘patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods before they become 
radicalized’……Rand Paul argued that building a mosque near Ground Zero was 
equivalent to a Ku Klux Klan march, and Marco Rubio denied discrimination 
against Muslims in the United States.” 
 
Furthermore, during the election, eventual President Donald Trump frequently 
made generalized inflammatory comments about Muslims.  Then-candidate Trump 
publicly contemplated closing mosques in the United States, declared that Muslim 
immigrants have hostile attitudes, accused Islam of “hating us,” and campaigned on 
imposing a ban on refugees from a handful of Muslim countries (Johnson and Hauslohner 
2017).  The latter was delivered just seven days into the Trump presidency, in the form of 
an executive order known as the “Muslim Ban.”    
At least among the many Americans who have experienced limited or no contact 
with actual Muslims, news media bias and vitriolic elite rhetoric might serve to strip 
Muslims of their humanity (Kahn 2018; see also Herrmann 2013).  That process would aid 
stereotype formation, encouraging Americans to evaluate Muslims in terms of their power 
and cultural dissimilarity – that is, in terms of ways they might produce a perceived threat 
– with the more-fearful Americans coming to view Muslims as “monolithic and united, 
making it easier to imagine the whole population as blameworthy” (Herrmann 2013: 350).  
This process of activating anti-Muslim perceptions becomes especially consequential when 
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ordinary Americans evaluate the use of military force in the Middle East, because it “allows 
people to question whether there really are any ‘innocent civilians’” (Herrmann 2013: 350; 
see also Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). 
 
What Kind of Threat?  Who Has a Stake in It?   
Based on my review of the identity formation literature, I expect that constant 
biased media coverage and elite rhetoric about Muslims have had divergent implications 
for how American whites and blacks perceive Muslims and react to issues involving 
majority-Muslim countries.  In this section, I will explicate that expectation more clearly. 
Earlier, I noted how whites are likely to formulate their in-group identities in terms 
of normative cultural ideas.  For many whites, it is important to be an American and, 
specifically, a white American.  The content of the white American identity also carries 
with it a set of norms, such as civic liberalism (i.e., basic respect of freedoms) and 
ethnoculturalism (i.e., being white and Protestant) (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Schildkraut 
2007; Masuoka and Junn 2013).  On the other hand, some might argue that attachments to 
the nation through symbolic patriotism are more surface-level orientations or short-term 
political expressions.  For example, feelings of symbolic patriotism might lead some to 
display the American flag or rally around the President after a terrorist attack as an 
expression of solidarity, whereas a deep-rooted attachment to the American identity would 
be more likely to shape feelings of dominance and hostility toward an out-group (Skitka 
2005).  The presence or absence of that core identity among whites should shape 
perceptions of outsiders and policy preferences toward outsiders, based on whether they 
are presumed to meet or violate those ideas and norms.   
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Blacks, on the other hand, are likely to formulate their in-group identities in terms 
of racial linked fate or concerns with the upward socioeconomic mobility of the racial 
group.   In other words, black political and social homogeneity derives from their historical 
and contemporary lack of status within the broader American nation and the discrimination 
conferred by that marginal status (Dawson 1994; Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016).  The 
presence or absence of that core identity among black respondents should shape 
perceptions of outsiders and policy preferences toward outsiders, based on whether they 
are presumed to share or harm the goals of black advancement.    
I expect that Muslims are more likely to be perceived as a threat by whites rather 
than blacks.  To many whites, I expect that Muslims – at least as purported by the media 
and political elites – represent the antithesis of every core idea underlying the white 
American national identity.  At a foundational level, Muslims comprise a group that spans 
nationalities, ethnicities, cultures, and religion, all of which make Muslims vulnerable to 
sensationalized news stories and political rhetoric stereotyping them as uncivilized, violent, 
and barbaric brown men.  Even more troubling, sensationalized coverage and rhetoric 
portray Muslims as a monolithic group trying to impose their – albeit, grossly 
misrepresented – religion and way of life on the West.  I expect that whites who have 
stronger national identities will be more likely to perceive non-white “violent” Muslims as 
realistic and symbolic threats to their core identities and to develop anti-Muslim 
stereotypes.   
On the other hand, I expect that blacks are less likely than whites to perceive 
Muslims as threatening.  On a practical level, Muslims present little threat to the social 
mobility of African Americans as a whole, given that only about 1% of the American 
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population identifies as Muslim and 20% of those also identify as black.  Further, blacks 
have little cognitive motivation to “other” Muslims, because of their collective identity that 
is represented by the achievements of Islamic black nationalist groups and prominent black 
Muslims like Muhammad Ali and Malcolm X (Turner 2003).  Social-identity theory 
explains that this collective identity should invoke collective values of tolerance and 
promote positive in-group relations between blacks and Muslims (Brewer and Gardner 
1996).  Recent survey data support this idea: Blacks are more likely than other U.S. 
racial/ethnic groups to hold favorable views of Muslims and Muslims (both black and of 
other races) are more likely than Americans overall to say that more should be done for 
blacks to have equal rights with whites (Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life 
2014; Diamant, Mohamed, and Sciupac 2017). 
Finally, with the intergroup attitudes, or what others call “ethnocentric 
expressions,” included in the model, I can develop expectations about how intergroup 
attitudes fit into my story of individual cognition.  I expect that linkages from core identity 
attachments to stereotype-threat are moderated by intergroup attitudes.  The linkage 
connecting perceived threat to a core identity will be pronounced among whites who 
express higher levels of intergroup preference.  For example, a white survey respondent 
inclined toward a strong national identity would be more likely to perceive Muslims as 
threatening if that individual shows a subjective favoritism toward the morals, values, and 
lifestyles of their in-group versus others.9F10  The cumulation of these expectations are 
formally stated: 
                                                     
10 The items used in the intergroup preference measure in the models in Chapter Four does not specify an 
out-group against which the individual judges their own set of morals or values.  The question simply asks 
the respondent to evaluate his or her morals and values versus those of others. 
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Hypothesis 4.3: Stereotype threat is more likely to result from in-group 
attachments to the American identity and intergroup preference 
among whites than among blacks. 
 
 
Putting it All Together: Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response  
The final task in constructing theory is to integrate into the cognitive puzzle the 
question of when perceptions of threat from Muslims are likely to guide an ethnocentric 
policy response.  In this section, I draw insights from extant research on how core identity 
attachments structure American public opinion about Latinos and policy preferences 
toward Latinos to find that remaining puzzle piece.  Much research has been dedicated to 
understanding the identity politics that shape public opinion about immigration and Latinos 
– a group responsible for 50% of population growth in the U.S. since 2000 (Flores 2017) 
– and theoretical developments therein will be helpful in explaining how the same identity-
based idea elements shape opinion toward Muslims and policies in the Middle East. 
 
Lessons from the Identity Politics of Immigration 
Research on the identity politics of immigration and public opinion toward Latinos 
suggests that the strength of national identity attachments among whites typically structures 
ethnocentric policy preferences toward Latinos.  As perceptions of typicality, the strictness 
of criteria placed on American identity (e.g., must be white and speak English), and the 
strength of national identity increase, whites are more likely to favor restrictive 
immigration policies (Masuoka and Junn 2013).  To whites who strongly identify with the 
nation and place strict criteria on membership, Latino immigration presents a symbolic 
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cultural threat to the authentic American national identity and is therefore an existential 
threat to the nation.   Additionally, whites who express an acculturation fear or intergroup 
preference – measured by a belief that others’ lifestyles, moral standards, and family values 
are breaking down society – are more likely to believe that immigration should be 
decreased (Branton et al. 2011).  Whites exhibit an investment in protecting “white 
America” not only from peripheral members in the American racial hierarchy (i.e., blacks; 
see Lipsitz 1995; 2006), but also from outsiders who violate the American way.   
On the other hand, strong national attachments seem to attenuate anti-Latino 
attitudes and support for restrictive immigration policies among blacks.  Unlike whites, 
blacks typically do not understand the American identity as requiring the prototypical 
American to be someone who looks like them: Aware of their own peripheral status in the 
United States, blacks who strongly identify with the nation instead exhibit an unwillingness 
to marginalize other minority groups (Masuoka and Junn 2013).  In these examples, we see 
variation between white and black Americans’ attitudes toward Latinos as a function of 
their differential understandings of national identity.   
In certain contexts, ethnocentric policy preferences might arise among blacks when 
their racial group’s upward socioeconomic mobility is threatened by Latinos (Bobo and 
Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Johnson 2000; Cain, Citrin, and Wong 2000).  For example, 
Vaca (2004) finds that perceptions of diminished political power in black neighborhoods 
strongly influence opposition to bilingual policies seen as a prioritization of Latino needs 
over black needs.  Gay (2006) finds that where Latinos are economically advantaged 
relative to blacks at the neighborhood level, blacks are significantly more likely to 
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stereotype and be unwilling to share policy benefits with Latinos.  Note that a parallel 
situation rarely would arise with Muslims. 
 
The Final Piece: Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response toward Muslims 
Quite similar to the differences that researchers observe in how whites’ and blacks’ 
perceptions of Latinos structure opinions and policy preferences toward immigration, I 
expect that opinion and policy preferences toward Muslims, as well as issues involving 
majority-Muslim countries, also diverge across race.  I expect that, because whites are more 
likely than blacks to perceive Muslims as a threat to their in-group identities, whites are 
also more likely than blacks to be invested in preventing that threat from being realized.  
For example, just as whites who perceive Latinos as a symbolic cultural threat oppose the 
immigration of outsiders who violate the American way, I expect that whites who perceive 
a threat from Muslims will be more likely than blacks to oppose Muslim immigration.  
I also expect that whites are more prone than blacks toward ethnocentric response 
toward Muslims when using lethal military force is an option.  News stories and elite 
rhetoric not only attempt to remind Americans that Muslims are culturally different, but 
also constantly depict Muslims as violent barbarians hell-bent killing Americans and 
conquering the West.  In other words, the media culture likely influences whites to perceive 
Muslims as a symbolic cultural threat, but also as a realistic threat to the white way of life.  
Simply, if dealing with Muslim threat comes down to using lethal military force – rather 
than other means – to protect that way of life, whites are more likely than blacks to justify 
killing Muslims.   Even blacks who perceive a threat from Muslims will be less likely than 
their white counterparts to respond with out-group derogation or hostility toward Muslims, 
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because doing so would not have a personal or practical benefit for black identity (i.e., 
affirming or benefitting black social status in the United States).  The cumulation of these 
expectations are formally stated: 
Hypothesis 4.4: Ethnocentric response is more likely to result from stereotype 
threat among whites rather than among blacks. 
 
 
A secondary justification for my expectations derives from recent and provocative 
research that discusses “how politics became our identity” (Mason 2018).  Mason explains 
that “social sorting” has caused individuals’ social identities – religious, racial, and other 
– to grow increasingly aligned with a partisan identity, thereby reducing social cross-
pressures on their political behavior (2016; 2018a; 2018b; Mason and Wronski 2018).  As 
a result, a growing divide between socially homogenous parties has generated a 
progressively reactive and emotionally polarized electorate.  In sum, Americans have 
grown increasingly 1) attached to their party and 2) less tolerant of the other party due to 
the psychological effects of identity alignment captured by these sorting mechanisms 
(2016; 2018a; 2018b; Mason and Wronski 2018). 
Applying this research to the current investigation, the social sorting approach 
would explain how white, middle-upper class, Christian social identities have become 
increasingly aligned with the Republican party and caused many whites to be uniformly 
opposed to policies (that are typically Democratic) perceived to benefit brown, bearded, 
violent men of a different religion.  Social sorting would also explain that blacks (who are 
overwhelmingly Democratic) have become more uniformly favorable to policies that could 
benefit a non-threatening, non-white, marginalized group like Muslims and would resist 
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(typically Republican) opposition to those policies.  Further, the social sorting approach 
would explain how polarization between Republicans and Democrats – between whites 
and blacks – has occurred without much cognitive expenditure about issues.  As social 
sorting has encouraged distrust of the other party, Republicans have become emotionally 
and diametrically opposed to Democratic policies (including those that are favorable to 
Muslims) simply because they are supported by Democrats (and the inverse).   
 
American Tunnel Vision of Terrorism  
The sum of media effects and stereotype theories is that considerations of Muslims 
and considerations of terrorism are likely inextricably linked among those who hold anti-
Muslim stereotypes.  The social psychologists and journalists cited above make critical 
points that I expect provide key insights into how Americans perceive and react to terrorist 
threats in general.  Specifically, the authors point out that hostile stereotypes are more than 
just unfavorable attitudes; they are attitudes that evolve into blanket generalizations that 
promulgate hostility and violence toward members of the stereotype target.  I expect that 
this stereotype generalization, in addition to media and political reinforcement of anti-
Muslim stereotypes, influences many ordinary Americans to evaluate terrorist threats 
relative to their accessible negative considerations of Muslims: a tunnel vision of terrorism.  
Put another way, whereas a wealth of extant research posits that many ordinary Americans 
associate Islam with terrorism, I expect that the consequences of stereotype threat and 
stereotype generalization also influence many Americans to associate terrorism with Islam. 
From this theoretical discussion, I derive two primary hypotheses to be tested in 
Chapter Five.  I expect that ordinary Americans are more likely to support the use of 
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military force to preempt Islamist terrorist groups relative to equally threatening but 
explicitly non-Islamist groups.  I also expect to find evidence of asymmetric ethnocentric 
response, as a function of anti-Muslim stereotypes, when comparing support for the use of 
military force against Islamist FTOs and non-Islamist FTOs across race.  Formally stated: 
Hypothesis 5.1: Ordinary Americans are more likely to support the use of military 
force against Islamist groups compared to equally threatening 
non-Islamist groups. 
Hypothesis 5.2: Whites are more likely than blacks to support the use of military 
force against Islamist terrorists.  
 
 
What Can Be Done about This? 
For the remainder of this chapter, I turn my attention to developing a theoretical 
framework that can be applied to understand how actors in the news business and political 
elites both help frame issues involving Muslims and majority-Muslim countries, as well as 
to the question of when frames are most likely to influence opinion about these issues.  My 
theory will explain how these individuals might frame issues to drive support for anti-
Muslim policies, but a key goal is to also explain how issues might be framed in ways that 
mitigate the influence that anti-Muslim stereotypes have on support for ethnocentric policy 
preferences.  In particular, I will develop my theoretical argument with a keen eye toward 
understanding how counterstereotype-affirming information about Muslims would 
influence public opinion about these issues. 
 
The Framing Process and Competitive Framing 
The framing process is a phrase broadly used to describe how journalists 
strategically structure news stories – by adjusting headlines, word usage, and narration – 
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to influence opinion about an issue (Cappella and Jamieson 1997).  Accordingly, research 
on issue frames often seeks to explain how the strategic presentation of news on specific 
issue shifts public opinion about that issue (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Gross and 
D’ Ambrosio 2004).    
In addition to actors in the news business, political elites also seek to frame issues 
in ways that are politically advantageous by employing persuasive messages and cues 
(Zaller 1992; Druckman 2001; Sniderman and Theriault 2004; Brewer and Gross 2005).  
Since politicians are constantly debating issues and trying to encourage support for their 
issue positions, perhaps to get a bill passed or to garner votes, ordinary citizens are often 
exposed to competing frames of salient political issues (Sniderman and Theriault 2004).   
The media-effects literature suggests three main psychological processes that 
determine the extent to which the framing process will be successful – in other words, when 
frames will shift public opinion in the direction of the argument.  These psychological 
processes are:  
 availability (i.e., considerations emphasized by a frame must be available 
for cognitive retrieval and use; Eagly and Chaikin 1993); 
 accessibility (i.e., people who often think about political issues are more 
likely able to retrieve considerations emphasized by a frame; Fazio 1995), 
and; 
 applicability (i.e., conscious evaluation of the applicability of accessible 
considerations, particularly when exposed to frames of opposing 
considerations; Fazio 1995; Kuklinski et al. 2001; Druckman 2004).  
 
Strong argument frames – or frames that are most likely to alter opinion – are those 
that emphasize available and applicable considerations (Chong and Druckman 2007b; 
2013).  The more news consumers are exposed to frames emphasizing available and 
applicable considerations, the more accessible those considerations become (Chong and 
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Druckman 2007b).  Weak argument frames, on the other hand, focus on either unavailable 
or inapplicable considerations and are less likely to alter opinion.  In one-sided conditions, 
where opposing arguments are not in competition, both strong and weak frames may shift 
opinion, although strong frames should exert stronger influence on opinions than their 
weaker counterparts.  The most likely scenarios in which weak frames will be effective are 
when the consumer has lower levels of political knowledge and cannot make accurate 
judgments of the weak frame’s applicability to the issue. 
In unbalanced competitive contexts – where strong frames oppose weak frames – 
the strong likely will dominate the weak, in terms of influencing opinion toward their 
respective positions, because they will be judged as more applicable to the issue.  In 
unbalanced competitive contexts, weak frames might even backfire if the reader possesses 
higher levels of political knowledge and can deliberate effectively over the alternatives 
(Martin and Achee 1992; Chong and Druckman 2007b).  In balanced, two-sided conditions, 
where strong frames oppose strong frames, deliberation is likely to occur over emphasis on 
considerations deemed applicable to the issue, and individuals’ opinions should shift to 
more intermediate positions. 
 
Competitive Framing of Issues Involving Muslims and Majority-Muslim Countries  
I expect that elites attempt to frame antipathy toward Muslims and opposition to 
policies favorable to Muslims by primarily emphasizing threat-based considerations.  As 
noted throughout this research, perceptions of threat from Muslims are available and 
accessible considerations for many ordinary Americans.  Therefore, emphasizing threat 
should offer a particularly effective or strong way for those with anti-Muslim biases and/or 
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opposed to pro-Muslim policies to frame these issues and shape opinion.  On the other side, 
I expect that elites attempt to frame positivity toward Muslims and support for policies 
favorable to Muslims by primarily emphasizing obligations to the national identity.  As 
discussed in earlier sections, in-group identity attachments – particularly to the nation – 
exert powerful influences on ordinary Americans’ policy preferences across several issue 
domains.   Appealing to obligations of the national identity should offer a particularly 
effective or strong way for those who support pro-Muslim policies to frame issues and 
shape opinion.  I also expect that elites attempt to frame issues involving Muslims and 
policies in the Middle East by focusing on pragmatic ideas, such as those related to 
economic considerations or diplomatic considerations.  However, I expect that such frames 
– that is frames unrelated to in-group identity or threat idea elements – should be relatively 
weak.  Of particular interest is how counter-stereotype information might influence 
opinion.  If that information fits into a strong frame, it might counterbalance even relatively 
strong inclinations toward perceived threat. 
Summarizing these ideas: 
Hypothesis 6.1a: Most frames will correspond to shifts in opinion under one-sided 
conditions.   
Hypothesis 6.1b: Strong frames will have substantively larger influences on 
opinion than weak frames.   
Hypothesis 6.2a: In competitive conditions, strong frames will dominate weak 
frames. 
Hypothesis 6.2b: Weak frames, when competing against opposing strong frames, 
will backfire, moving opinion away from their respective 
positions – especially among individuals with greater political 
knowledge. 
Hypothesis 6.3: Exposure to strong opposing frames will lead to moderate 
positions.   
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have laid out a multi-layered theoretical understanding of how 
core identities associated with authoritarianism might lead to ethnocentric policy 
preferences – including support for the use of military force – against an out-group like 
Muslims.  As I developed that theoretical framework, I did so with careful attention to 
advice suggested by several scholars regarding how perceptions of threat might cause core 
identities to become linked to ethnocentric response.   
This effort helped to identify and propose solutions to some conceptual issues 
surrounding the definition of ethnocentrism and the cognitive process that produces 
ethnocentric response.  I also considered extant research suggesting that investigations of 
the linkages between group-threat and out-group hostility should pay careful attention to 
the various ways that individuals might come to perceive an out-group as threatening, as 
well as how these differences might shape responses toward the out-group.  In sum, much 
effort has been put forth in this chapter to develop a clear and synthesized theory that 
explains the cognitive calculus that produces ethnocentric response toward outsiders.   
The key contribution of this chapter was the development of the theory of 
Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response (AER), which argues that whites are more likely than 
blacks to perceive Muslims as realistic and symbolic threats, to develop anti-Muslim 
stereotypes and, consequently, to justify ethnocentric responses against Muslims and 
majority-Muslim countries.  In the pages ahead, I will apply that theoretical framework to 
investigate how core identities across racial groups in the United States shape ethnocentric 
responses toward Muslims.  In the following chapter, I predict how different core identities 
shape ordinary white and black Americans’ preferences for policies intended to deter 
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Iranian nuclear development.  In Chapter Five, I do the same to predict support for 
preemptively striking Islamist terror groups.  The AER theory also helps to explain the 
deleterious effects that anti-Muslim stereotypes have on whites’ support for allowing 
embattled Syrians to seek haven in the United States, as presented in Chapter Six.  
Finally, I have laid out a theoretical framework that explains how actors in the news 
business and political elites might frame issues in ways that encourage or discourage 
support for anti-Muslim policies.  Importantly, my theory explains the conditions under 
which issue framing might undermine – by drawing on perceived obligations to the nation 
or emphasizing counterstereotypes of Muslims – the cognitive process that links perceived 
threats from Muslims and anti-Muslim stereotypes to ethnocentric policy preferences 
toward Muslims.  In Chapter Six, I apply my framing theory to investigate and predict 
support for allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  Chapter Seven 
concludes with a recap of the cumulative contributions and implications of the research. 
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Chapter Four - Anti-Muslim Stereotypes and Ethnocentric Response toward Iran 
 
What factors influence American support for different policies – such as diplomacy, 
sanctions, or the use of military force – intended to deter Iranian nuclear 
development?  How does support for these policies diverge across American racial 
groups? 
 
For fourteen months between November 1979 and January 1981, many Americans 
sat on the edges of their seats anxiously watching news about the Iranian Hostage Crisis.   
Indeed, the crisis coincided with one of the darkest periods in recent U.S. history.  In 
Tehran, 52 Americans were tortured and kept in isolation by Islamist extremists for 444 
days.  In the United States, anxiety was high and rumors of war against Iran’s new post-
revolution theocracy circulated widely.  Iranians living in the United States – mostly 
college students – were subject to discrimination and harassment (NPR 2006; Brunner 
2018).   
The fear and suffering felt by those hostages and students notwithstanding, changes 
in the expediency of international news coverage during the Iranian Hostage Crisis had the 
most significant political consequences—some immediate and some enduring.  
Technological advances in video recording and satellite capability developed concurrent 
with the crisis; many Americans living in the late 1970s and early 1980s were, for the first 
time, able to get real-time news from around the world by simply turning on their TVs.  
Accordingly, the average audience of televised evening news spiked from 45 million 
viewers in October to 57 million viewers in December 1979, when the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis was front and center on the national news agenda (Mosettig and Griggs, Jr. 1980).  
The stark increase in foreign news stories reported from the Middle East on major cable 
networks helps illustrate how the news agenda shifted concurrent with the streamlining of 
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international news coverage:  In 1977, the number of foreign stories from the Middle East 
carried on NBC Nightly News totaled 415 and, by 1979, that number doubled to more than 
800 stories (Mosettig and Griggs, Jr. 1980).   
Unfortunately, most of the coverage coming from Iran was negative.  Video feeds 
from Tehran constantly showed blindfolded American hostages being paraded in front of 
news cameras.  Correspondents and journalists put those images in context by framing the 
crisis in ways that made ordinary Americans feel empathetic and relatable to the hostages.  
The more Americans felt proximate and relatable to the hostages – and the more cynical 
they became about the idea of the hostages returning safely – the more they wanted news 
from Tehran.  As the situation persisted, cable networks scrambled to keep up with the 
increasing demand for real-time news updates.  Many of those networks developed 
programming to cover the crisis 24 hours a day, a model of news programming that evolved 
into the 24-hour news stations that we watch today (Feuerherd 2017).   
In the short-run, the streamlining of international news coverage had serious 
consequences for public attitudes about the government’s handling of the crisis, of which 
President Jimmy Carter took the brunt (Rosenfield 2016).  In fact, the constant cycle of 
negative news coverage from Iran probably cost President Carter his re-election.  Whether 
explicitly or implicitly, the American public was constantly reminded that President Carter 
had been unable to secure a diplomatic solution to free the hostages.  To make matters 
worse, President Carter had to issue a live statement in April 1980 about a failed covert 
military operation that he authorized to rescue the hostages.  The plan was for U.S. forces 
to rendezvous at a desert location in Iran, prepare fuel and supplies, and then launch an 
assault on the embassy to free the hostages.  However, Operation Eagle Claw failed before 
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it ever got off the ground.  A desert sandstorm caused a helicopter to crash into a transport 
aircraft carrying troops and fuel.  The crash killed eight U.S. servicemembers.  In the eyes 
of many Americans, President Carter had not only been weak in foreign affairs and in 
securing the release of more than four dozen Americans, but now he had American blood 
on his hands.  President Carter’s failures to resolve the crisis and to reverse economic woes 
caused by the 1979 Iranian oil embargo helped lead to the largest Electoral College defeat 
– 489 to 49 – for an incumbent president in U.S. history (Encyclopedia Britannica 2019).  
Media coverage of the Iranian Hostage Crisis also watered the seeds of anti-Muslim 
stereotypes that continue to sprout up to this day (Feuerherd 2017).  During those fourteen 
months, Americans frequently were exposed to dramatic stories and video footage 
depicting the suffering of their fellow citizens and statesmen at the hands of bearded and 
turbaned non-white foreigners (Elba 2018).  According to Elba (2018), the crisis and the 
broader Islamic Revolution were a real “moment of vulnerability” for many Americans.  
Like the Viet Cong during the quagmire in Vietnam, a handful of Islamist students and a 
fledgling government in Tehran challenged the hegemonic power of the United States and 
U.S. citizens began to think “that these guys can really do harm if they want” (Elba 2018).  
Seemingly overnight, the traditional Orientalist view of Muslims as primitive, desert-
dwelling savages found on comic strips was replaced by a new stereotype of Muslims – as 
threatening, bearded, brown, rifle-carrying terrorists (Said 1987; Gottschalk and Greenberg 
2007, 2018; Elba 2018).  Recurring surveys measuring public opinion about Iran, which 
began in 1980, provide evidence of the endurance and pervasiveness of anti-Muslim 
stereotypes caused by the Iranian Hostage Crisis:  In every poll since 1980, at least 80% of 
Americans have reported unfavorable views of Iran (Gallup 2019).   
 
 
68 
 
What Lies Ahead 
 In this chapter, I investigate the influences that anti-Muslim stereotypes among U.S. 
citizens continue to have for their policy preferences toward Iran.  Specifically, I aim to 
answer the questions posed at the beginning of the chapter by conducting an analysis of 
public support for polices aimed at deterring Iranian nuclear development.  The issue has 
been at the center of tensions between the United States and Iran since the end of the Iranian 
Hostage Crisis.  The key hypothesis that I developed in Chapter Three and test here is that 
anti-Muslim stereotypes – the seeds of which were planted in the late 1970s – play a 
significant role in shaping preferences for policies intended to deter Iranian nuclear 
development.  An important implication of my theory why this pattern will appear is that, 
because American whites and blacks often have differing life experiences in the United 
States, whites are more likely to perceive Muslims as a threat and to justify an ethnocentric 
response (i.e., support for using military force) against Iran.  At times, I summarize these 
differential outcomes across race as asymmetric ethnocentric response toward Muslims. 
As this chapter progresses, I will briefly discuss U.S.-Iranian foreign relations (or 
the lack thereof) since the Iranian Hostage Crisis to put the conclusions of my research into 
perspective.  Then, I will recap my theoretical arguments from Chapter Three and 
enumerate the specific hypotheses to be tested in this chapter.  I will then test my 
expectations using data on policy preferences (e.g., diplomacy, sanctions, bombing, 
invading) for deterring Iranian nuclear development collected during a large-sample 
national survey and an experiment.  Finally, I present clear and compelling evidence, drawn 
from a variety of statistical methods, that links targeted anti-Muslim stereotypes to 
respondent support for the use of military force to deter Iranian nuclear development. 
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My findings offer several important contributions, both academic and practical.  I 
undertake a lot of careful theoretical development to clarify and synthesize previous 
accounts of the roles that group-level attitudes and anti-Muslim stereotypes play in shaping 
support for the use of military force in the Middle East.  In doing so, I provide a clear 
cognitive schematic to explain how these and other related idea elements might operate 
together to shape issue opinions.  I also add a theoretically-grounded explanation of when 
stereotypes, identity attachments, and threat might become linked for some, but not others, 
to produce out-group hostility (e.g., support for the use of military force).   
My findings also have significant implications for U.S. foreign policymaking.  
Whites make up the vast bulk of the Republican electorate, meaning that we will likely 
continue to see GOP candidates running for high offices on nationalist and anti-Muslim 
platforms.  This also means that whites’ views will dominate national leadership when the 
GOP governs.  Cumulatively, these electoral and political mechanisms allow white anti-
Muslim stereotypes to enter the policymaking process, suppressing support for diplomatic 
discussions with Iran, specifically, and driving support for U.S. intervention elsewhere in 
the Middle East.  Worse yet, the influence of white anti-Muslim stereotypes on U.S. foreign 
policy will likely continue to sustain the perpetual cycle of stereotypes, interventions, and 
terrorism (Tessler 2003; Tessler and Robbins 2007; Iftikhar 2016). 
  
U.S.-Iranian Foreign Relations Since the Hostage Crisis 
Many Americans recall the events of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when Islamist 
students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held over four dozen Americans hostage 
for fifteen months.  Those students saw the U.S. government as guilty of imperialism in 
the region and culpable for the brutality Iranian citizens were suffering under the 
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dictatorship of Shah Pahlavi (recall that the CIA helped the Shah seize power nearly thirty 
years prior).  Although the hostages eventually were released, the U.S. government severed 
ties with Iran and listed the post-revolution Iranian theocracy as a state sponsor of terrorism 
(Reuters 2010; 2016).  Tensions between the United States and Iran have never settled.   
 
The Iran-Iraq War 
Hostilities boiled over again, less than a decade later, during the Iraq-Iran War.  
Although the U.S. government publicly supported Iraq throughout the war, it opted to keep 
its military on the sidelines during the early stages of the conflict.  However, that policy 
stance changed in 1987, after the U.S. government was exposed for secretly selling 
weapons to Iran in exchange for hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The United States 
quickly stepped up its military support of Iraq in the wake of the scandal. 
To help Iraq in 1987, U.S. naval forces began re-flagging Kuwaiti oil tankers sailing 
in the Persian Gulf, which the Iranians had been firing upon to prevent trade with Iraq.  
Should Iranian ships attack the wrong vessel, the United States would have a reason to 
respond with force.  Two American ships were lost soon thereafter – one to Iranian attack 
and another to Iranian mines – and the United States had its “reason.”  In late 1987, U.S. 
forces began destroying Iranian oil platforms and warships and, the following year, the 
U.S.S. Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger plane and killed all 290 passengers.10F11  In 
1988, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein began threatening large-scale offensives in Iran – 
                                                     
11 The U.S. government claimed that the Vincennes mistook the civilian airliner for an Iranian fighter jet, but 
the incident had little military consequence as a ceasefire was signed soon thereafter (Hammond 2017).  The 
Iranian government sued the United States in the International Court of Justice, but the case was eventually 
settled out of court in 1996 with the U.S. agreeing to pay $62 million to the victims’ families (Hammond 
2017). 
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including the use of chemical weapons – and, combined with the uptick in U.S. operations, 
Iran was forced to accept a ceasefire. 
Throughout the 1990s, conflict between the United States and Iran faded.  Instead, 
the United States was preoccupied with its own fight with Iraq in the First Gulf War.  The 
U.S. government did, however, frequently accuse Tehran of sponsoring terrorism and 
seeking to acquire nuclear weapons (Reuters 2010; 2016).  After Iran signaled its intent to 
sign a contract with Russia to complete a nuclear power plant in 1995, President Clinton 
signed a bill that imposed crippling sanctions on Iran and on any foreign companies 
investing in Iran (Reuters 2010).  These trends continued until 2001, when Iran was again 
thrust into the spotlight as one of America’s primary enemies.   
 
The Axis of Evil and Nuclear Sanctions 
After the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush famously declared Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea as an “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union Address (Reuters 
2010; 2016).  Specifically, Bush claimed that Iran was exporting terror and aggressively 
pursuing nuclear weapons.  Relations continued to deteriorate afterward.  That same year, 
an Iranian exile group revealed that Iran had undisclosed nuclear facilities under 
construction and, within a few months, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
reported that it had found highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium at the sites (Reuters 
2010; 2016).  A few years later, in 2005, President Mohammed Khatami declared that the 
Iranian government would never give up its nuclear technology or uranium-enrichment 
programs (Reuters 2010).  The president also struck a nuclear fuel supply deal with Russia 
to help build its first atomic power plant (Reuters 2010; 2016).   
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From then until 2008, U.S. and Iranian officials met on several occasions to try to 
mend diplomatic relations, but no serious progress was ever achieved.  In 2009, the United 
States, Britain, and France again publicly accused Iran of building a secret uranium-
enrichment site (Reuters 2010; 2016).  Such accusations continued to swirl and, as a result, 
U.S. lawmakers passed legislation in 2012 that gave President Obama the power to sanction 
foreign banks and the central banks of U.S. allies if they failed to reduce their imports of 
Iranian oil (Reuters 2010; 2016).  This had a devastating impact on Iranian oil exports and 
caused a serious decline in the Iranian economy (Reuters 2010; 2016). 
 
The “Iran Deal” 
For a brief period, beginning in 2013, diplomatic relations between the United 
States and Iran seemed to be on the uptick following the election of Iranian President 
Hassan Rouhani.  Rouhani was elected on a platform of improving Iranian foreign relations 
and, later that year, he and President Obama spoke by telephone in the most significant 
discussion between the two states in nearly thirty years (Reuters 2010; 2016).  Near the 
end of 2013, Iran reached an interim pact – with the United States, Britain, France, China, 
Russia, and Germany – to curb its nuclear programs in return for sanctions relief (Reuters 
2010; 2016).  In 2015, those seven states struck another long-term agreement, under which 
Iran agreed to reduce its number of centrifuges and disable certain parts of reactors in return 
for easing of U.S., U.N., and E.U. sanctions. 
However, the U.S. government’s participation in the agreement was anything but 
“long-term.”  The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election spelled doom for the so-called Iran deal.  
Throughout the primary season, then-candidate Donald Trump chided outgoing President 
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Barack Obama on the campaign trail for being “weak with Iran.”  Trump asserted that the 
agreement allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium for weapons and he promised that, 
if elected, he would withdraw the United States from the “terrible deal.”  After he was 
elected, President Trump asserted that if the United States did not withdraw from the deal, 
“the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorists will be on the cusp of acquiring the world’s 
most dangerous weapons” (Rizzo and Kelly 2018).  Just a year after his inauguration, 
President Trump delivered on his popular campaign promise and pressed the “reset button” 
on three years of progress and amicability with Iran.  
 As a result, crippling sanctions waived under the 2015 agreement have been 
reinstated against Iran and domestic partisan debate over Trump’s policy continues.  In 
general, Trump’s co-partisans in Congress and large swaths of his Republican base support 
the decision and his claims about the one-sidedness of the deal.  Trump supporters also 
claim that the President’s tough stance with Iran afforded him leverage and made him 
stronger going into diplomatic talks about denuclearization with Chairman Kim Jong-un 
of North Korea.  Opponents of Trump’s policy (mainly Democrats) argue that the decision 
to leave the Iran deal was unfounded because the Iranian government was and is complying 
with the terms of the agreement.  They also argue that Trump’s decision has severely 
tarnished the U.S. government’s credibility on the world stage.  They express fear that Iran 
will retaliate against Israel – a United States ally – in response.  
With the recent withdrawal of the United States from that 2015 agreement, elite 
partisan debate over U.S. foreign policy toward Iran is at a fever pitch.  It is not my 
intention in this chapter to “take a side” in that debate.  In fact, it is worth noting that reports 
from news media and the International Atomic Energy Agency to this day offer a mixed 
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bag of conclusions about Iran’s compliance with the deal.  Rather, the purpose of this 
research is to demonstrate how attitudes about this ongoing and divisive issue depend on 
an individual’s view of Muslims.  The conventional wisdom among foreign policy analysts 
is that, just as it has for the past forty years, the direction of U.S.-Iran relations will have 
serious implications for U.S. policy and intervention in the greater Middle East.  My 
investigation into public opinion and policy preferences toward Iran is therefore both 
important and timely, providing a generalizable and nuanced understanding of American 
public opinion about Muslims and policy preferences toward predominantly Muslim 
countries. 
 
Identity, Threat, and Ethnocentric Response 
In Chapter Three, I developed a theory to explain how multiple cognitive factors – 
like identity, perceived threat, and other group-level attitudes – might become linked to 
shape ethnocentric response toward Muslims.  As I developed the theory and the cognitive 
map that accompanied it (reproduced below), I kept a keen eye on explaining how these 
related idea elements become linked as part of a causal process.  As such, my discussion 
began with the role authoritarianism plays in shaping the proclivity of individuals to form 
strong group attachments.  I will recap the theory briefly below before testing it in the 
analysis ahead. 
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Figure 4.1 | New Structural Approach to Explain Linkages from 
In-Group Identity to Ethnocentric Response 
                                      Authoritarianism                                             Base Personality Orientation 
 
 
Patriotism      National Identity               Linked Fate      Ideology              Core Identity Attachments 
 
 
In-Group Fav.           Out-Group Neg.         Intergroup Preference                       Intergroup Attitudes 
 
 
                                  Specific Group Stereotypes                                                     Perceived Threat 
 
               Policy Preference (e.g., support use of military force)                       Ethnocentric Response 
 
Base Personality Orientation: Authoritarianism 
Authoritarianism is not an outlier personality orientation, but one that instead 
describes the worldview of many ordinary Americans (Dean 2018; Hetherington and 
Weiler 2018).  Authoritarians are predisposed to need order and tend to sort themselves 
into social in-groups that maintain that order.  Therefore, I expect that attachments to 
identity groups – the nation, the racial or ethnic group, and the political group – should be 
stronger among those with a base personality toward authoritarianism. 
Hypothesis 4.1:  Authoritarianism influences stronger core identity attachments.  
 
 
Core Identity Attachments: National Identity, Patriotism, Linked Fate, and Ideology 
Extant social identity research suggests that patterns of core identity attachments 
diverge across American racial groups in predictable ways.  This serves as the basis for my 
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belief that blacks and whites will behave dissimilarly in an empirical analysis of their 
perceived threat from Muslims and, consequently, their policy preferences toward 
deterring Iranian nuclear development.  Whites are far more likely than blacks to express 
their in-group identities vis-à-vis national attachments and their racial identity is likely to 
be subsumed by their identification with the country or the nation.  On the other hand, race 
has been the predominant factor in the African-American experience.  Black political and 
social homogeneity derives from their longstanding lack of status in the broader American 
nation, which has resulted in disadvantage and discrimination that the country has been 
slow to redress (Dawson 1994; Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016).  If authoritarianism is 
going to prompt a respondent to express a strong in-group identity, it will be likely to 
manifest as a perception of national identity among whites and in-group linked fate among 
blacks.  The presence or absence of those core identities that should shape perceptions and 
policy preferences regarding outsiders.   
Hypothesis 4.1a: The connection between authoritarianism and national identity 
or symbolic patriotism will be stronger among whites compared 
to blacks. 
Hypothesis 4.1b: The connection between authoritarianism and racial linked fate 
will be stronger among blacks compared to whites. 
 
 
 
 
Intergroup Attitudes: In-Group Bias, Out-Group Negativity, and Intergroup Preference 
 
Core identity attachments are likely to shape biases toward in-groups.  For example, 
an individual who has strong identity attachments is also likely to feel positively about his 
or her in-groups and express a preference for them.  However, there is no theoretical basis 
to expect that core in-group attachments encourage generalized out-group negativity 
because one can have strong in-group attitudes without hating outsiders.   
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Hypothesis 4.2a: Core identity attachments will have a positive relationship with 
intergroup preference and in-group bias. 
Hypothesis 4.2b: Core identity attachments will have no relationship with out-
group negativity.  
 
Perceived Threat from Muslims and Iran 
Different sources of core identity attachments might lead some, but not others, to 
perceive Muslims and Iranians as threatening.  I expect that Muslims are more likely to be 
perceived as a threat by whites compared to blacks.  At a foundational level, Muslims 
comprise a group that spans nationalities, ethnicities, cultures, and religion, all of which 
encourage journalists and other elites to stereotype Muslims as monolithic brown men 
trying to impose their religion and way of life on the West.  News coverage of Iran likely 
encourages many whites to perceive the Islamist leadership of Iran and the country’s 
predominantly Muslim population as especially threatening.  News stories rarely 
distinguish Iranian citizens from their government, which is typically described as 
“terroristic” and “fundamentalist” (Jahedi, Abdullah, and Mukundan 2014).  The Iranian 
government’s “Islamist character” is constantly presented as a threat to regional peace in 
the Middle East and to the interests of the United States and Israel – countries the Iranians 
are purported to only know as “Great Satan” and “Little Satan” (Jahedi, Abdullah, and 
Mukundan 2014).  Moreover, political cartoons in the media lexicalize the actions of 
Khomeini and Iranian leaders as “crazy,” “backward,” “violent,” and “irrational” because 
of their association with Islam (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008). 
I expect that whites who have stronger national identities will be more likely to 
perceive Iran and its non-white “violent” Muslim citizens as realistic and symbolic threats 
to their core identities and to develop stereotypes.  I expect that blacks are less likely than 
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whites to perceive a threat from Iran or its Muslim citizens.  On a practical level, Iran and 
its citizenry present little threat to the social mobility of African Americans.  Many blacks 
will have little cognitive motivation to “other” Muslims – and, by extension, Iranians – 
considering that Islam has been a positive force in black communities for centuries and has 
fostered a collective identity that encourages positive intergroup relations between blacks 
and Muslims.   
Further, I expect that linkage connecting perceived threat to a core identity will be 
pronounced among whites who express higher levels of intergroup preference.  For 
example, a white survey respondent inclined toward a strong national identity would be 
more likely to perceive Muslims as threatening if that individual shows a subjective 
favoritism toward the morals, values, and lifestyles of their in-group versus others.  The 
cumulation of these expectations are formally stated: 
Hypothesis 4.3: Stereotype threat from Muslims is more likely to result from in-
group attachments and intergroup preference among whites than 
among blacks. 
 
 
Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response toward Muslims 
Social-identity theory explains that when individuals perceive a group-based threat, 
they will respond with out-group derogation or hostility to bolster and protect their social 
identity in the face of that threat (Brewer 2001; Stephan and Stephan 2013).  Therefore, I 
expect that the cognitive factors that encourage whites to be more likely than blacks to 
perceive Muslims as a threat will also shape their ethnocentric policy preferences toward 
Iran.  Whites are not only more likely than blacks to perceive Muslims as a symbolic 
cultural threat, but also as a realistic threat to the white way of life.   If dealing with 
threatening Muslims or a threatening nuclear Iran comes down to using lethal military force 
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rather than other means, whites will be more likely than blacks to justify killing Muslims 
to protect their way of life.  Even blacks who perceive a threat from Muslims will be less 
likely than their white counterparts to respond with out-group derogation or hostility 
toward Muslims, because doing so would not have a personal or practical benefit for black 
identity (i.e., affirming or benefitting black social status in the United States).  The 
cumulation of these expectations are formally stated:  
Hypothesis 4.4: Ethnocentric policy response toward Iran – in the form of support 
for sanctions or the use of military force – is more likely to result 
from stereotype threat among whites rather than among blacks. 
 
Support for Policies to Deter Iranian Nuclear Development: 2012 ANES Survey 
I test my hypotheses using data from the 2012 American National Election Study 
(ANES).  The ANES data are an ideal source to test my expectations for at least two 
reasons.  First, survey respondents were asked questions about their identity attachments, 
intergroup attitudes, stereotypes of Muslims, and support for various policies intended to 
deter Iranian nuclear development.  These data are an excellent resource that can be used 
to develop and test a comprehensive schematic of how various related attitudes become 
linked to shape opinion and policy preferences toward Iran.  Second, the study features a 
large oversample of blacks that permits rigorous testing of the asymmetric ethnocentric 
response theory.11F12  
 
                                                     
12 Prior to estimating the SEM model with the 2012 survey data, I replicated Kinder’s and Kam’s (2009) 
models as a preliminary test.  Although just a quick test, I subsampled their models by race and found that 
their e-scale measure is more likely to predict support for policies related to War on Terror almost 
exclusively among whites rather than blacks (see Chapter Four Appendix, Table A4.1).  Still, I test the 
cognitive schematic developed above as a more appropriate test of the asymmetric ethnocentric response 
theory. 
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Methods 
I test the cognitive schematic of policy preferences toward Iran by inputting 
measures from the ANES data into the Structural Equation Model (SEM) Builder program 
in Stata 14.  It is important to note here that, while I specify the SEM to estimate the 
relationships between different idea elements according to theorized causal directions, I 
also estimate all direct and indirect linkages in both directions.  For example, I estimate 
how authoritarianism structures core identity attachments and how core identity 
attachments structure intergroup attitudes, while also accounting for the direct effects of 
authoritarianism on intergroup attitudes.  I also account for the possibility that some 
attitudinal structures have feedback loops (e.g., core identity attachments  anti-Muslim 
stereotypes  core identity attachments).  These feedback linkages and controls for several 
demographic and social factors (e.g., age, gender, education, income, and Muslim contact) 
are not pictured for the sake of simplicity but are discussed in the written text below.  
Finally, each linkage in the model is estimated as an interaction with a dichotomous race 
variable to permit explicit testing of the asymmetric ethnocentric response theory. 
 
Variables 
 Authoritarianism refers to a rigid need for order and norms, developed early in life, 
that influences individuals to form an identity and in-group attachments.  Using the 
traditional four-item child-rearing traits battery (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; 2018), I 
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include an additive index measuring authoritarianism (scaled 0-1) in the top tier of the 
structural model.12F13  
 At the second level, I include four measures to estimate how core identity 
attachments to the country, nation, racial group, and political group might structure 
intergroup attitudes and anti-Muslim stereotypes (perceived threat).  Symbolic patriotism 
is a five-point measure of love for country.  National identity is a five-point measure of the 
importance placed on being an American.  Linked fate is a three-point measure of how 
much one’s life is affected by what happens to the racial group.  Conservatism is a seven-
point measure ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.   
At the third level, I include three measures to investigate how core identity 
attachments structure intergroup attitudes and how intergroup attitudes moderate the 
linkages between identity and perceptions of threat from Muslims.  In-group bias is an 
additive index of respondents’ ratings of their racial, religious and denominational, sexual 
orientation, and social class groups on thermometers that range from 0 to 100.  The index 
is rescaled from 0-100.  Out-group negativity is an additive index that I construct following 
the same method as before, with the exception that I subtract each group rating from 100 
such that higher scores reflect more negative assessments.  Intergroup preference is an 
                                                     
13 Measurement of this indicator and others are described in greater detail in the Appendix to this chapter 
(see Chapter Four Appendix, Structural Equation Model Measures).  However, it is worth noting here that 
recent research is inconclusive about whether the child-rearing battery – typically reflecting conservative 
authoritarianism – is an appropriate measure of authoritarianism across racial groups.  For example, Perez 
and Hetherington (2014) argue that blacks and whites construe the child-rearing items differently and, in 
their analysis of immigration attitudes, they find that authoritarianism correlates highly with the things it 
should for whites, but rarely so for blacks.”  On the other hand, (MacWilliams 2016) employs the child-
rearing battery and to predict several attitudes among African Americans and Dusso (2017) finds a strong 
connection between right-wing authoritarianism and black support for liberal candidates.  In my case, the 
child-rearing battery is the only measure of authoritarianism found in the ANES, so despite my awareness 
of its potential limitations, it is the measure I must employ in my SEM model. 
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additive index of four different items measuring agreement (on five-point scales) with 
statements measuring preference for existing cultural norms. 
 At the bottom two levels, I estimate how targeted stereotypes of Muslims as violent 
might structure public support for various policies to deter Iranian nuclear development.  
Stereotypes of Muslims is a five-point measure indicating respondents’ level of agreement 
with how well the word “violent” describes most Muslims.  Four separate three-point 
measures indicate respondents’ support for diplomacy, sanctions, U.S.-led bombing, and 
U.S. troop invasion as policies to deter Iranian nuclear development.  At a first glance, 
these measures offer suitable variation worth predicting – in particular, a sizable contingent 
of potentially ethnocentric responses.  Roughly 30% of respondents favor U.S. bombing 
and 20% favor invasion as policies to deter Iranian nuclear development (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 | Percent Supporting Various Policies to Deter 
Iranian Nuclear Development 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
Several additional variables, all conventional in public-opinion models of this sort, 
serve as controls.  Male is a binary variable indicating whether a respondent is female (0) 
or male (1).  Age is a continuous variable that ranges from 18 to 99 years.13F14  Household 
income is an eleven-point measure recoded in $10,000 increments with “$100,000+” as the 
highest category.  Education is sixteen-point measure of respondents’ level of education 
and ranges from 1st grade to professional degree.  Attention to politics is a five-point self-
reported measure of how often respondents pay attention to politics and elections.  Survey 
mode is a binary indicator of whether respondents were interviewed face-to-face or over 
the internet, included to account for the likelihood that socially desirable responses were 
given to sensitive questions (e.g., out-group ratings, stereotypes of Muslims, etc.) in the 
face-to-face interviews.  I estimate the direct effects on each of these control variables on 
every variable pictured in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. 
Finally, a proxy measure of contact with Muslims is included to account for the 
possibility that higher levels of intergroup contact promote tolerance and reduce prejudice 
and hostility toward outsiders (Allport 1954).  To capture contact with Muslims, I first 
obtained from the Census Bureau the number of foreign-born individuals living in each 
congressional district originally born in six predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan.  I then matched those data to the congressional districts 
of respondents in the ANES.  Because congressional districts are so large, this measure is 
far from ideal as a way of capturing intergroup contact – really, it is more a measure of 
potential contact – but those districts represent the lowest level of aggregation available in 
the standard ANES. The resulting measure varies greatly between observations – ranging 
                                                     
14 I also estimate the direct effect of age on anti-Muslim stereotypes to account for likelihood that older 
Americans are more likely to hold anti-Muslim stereotypes (Ogan et al. 2018). 
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from 1 Muslim and as many as 2000 Muslims – which makes it difficult to interpret the 
substantive relationship between Muslim contact and the intensity of anti-Muslim 
stereotypes.  Therefore, the next step I take is to recode the measure into quintiles or five 
manageable categories that represent the lowest 20% of the data, the highest 20% of the 
data, and the three equal groups in between.14F15   
 
Analysis 
 After estimating my SEM, I first consulted three diagnostic statistics intended to 
capture the fit of the model, customarily used to assess whether the model is adequately 
specified: the comparative fit index, the root mean square error of approximation, and the 
standardized root mean square residual.  Each indicate a strong overall model fit for my 
SEM.15F16 
Having confirmed that I likely am using a properly specified model, I turn to a 
discussion of the estimates from the SEM and the strong evidence I find supporting my 
hypotheses.  Figures 4.3 and 4.4 are provided below to aid the textual discussion.  These 
figures are derived from one model with racial interaction terms; however, I display the 
results separately by race (whites in Figure 4.3 and blacks in Figure 4.4) to depict important 
                                                     
15 The cutoff points represented by the five categories are: 1 = 0-341; 2 = 342-657; 3 = 658-1161; 4 = 1162-
2263; 5 = 2263+.   
16 Extant literature seems to lack a convention on which model-fit statistics to report, so I estimate and report 
three different statistics.  The comparative fit index (CFI) compares the fit of the SEM to the fit of a null 
model (Bentler 1990).  The standard threshold for a properly fit SEM is a CFI statistic ≥ .90 and my model 
reports a CFI of .99.  The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is a parsimony-adjusted 
index that indicates whether the model fit is better than the degree of fit specified by a cutoff value (Browne 
and Cudeck 1993).  The standard threshold for a properly fit SEM is an RSMEA statistic < .08 and my 
model reports an RSMEA of .06.  The standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) measures the 
square-root of the difference between the residuals of the sample covariance matrix and the hypothesized 
model (Mueller and Hancock 2008).  The standard threshold for a properly fit SEM is an SRMR statistic 
< .08 and my model reports a SRMR of .02.   
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nuances in the attitudinal structures of policy preferences toward Iran across race.  Finally, 
it is important to note key differences between the figures and the discussion: In the figures, 
I report multiple regression coefficients except where ordered logistic estimation is 
required and in the text I use the model estimates to make specific predictions that help us 
to understand the substantive effects of various relationships I describe. 
Starting at the top of the model, I estimate that both whites (0.59) and blacks (0.64) 
score moderately high on the authoritarianism index (0-1).  Looking at the Core Identity 
Attachments and Ideology tier of the model, I find evidence that those with stronger 
authoritarian orientations are more prone to form strong core in-group identity attachments 
(Hypothesis 4.1).  However, authoritarianism shapes the strength of core identity 
attachments for whites and blacks in different ways.  Specifically, authoritarianism 
encourages stronger attachments to the country and national identity among whites 
(Hypothesis 4.1a) but shapes stronger attachments to the racial group among blacks 
(Hypothesis 4.1b).  Authoritarianism, interestingly, correlates with conservatism among 
whites but liberalism among blacks, suggesting that it might tend to push people to more-
extreme ideological stances rather than to push them in a particular direction. 
Both whites (4.62 out of 5) and blacks (4.51) on average report high levels of 
symbolic patriotism in the survey.  However, the most authoritarian whites express higher 
levels of symbolic patriotism (4.67) compared to the average white, while the most 
authoritarian blacks express similar levels of symbolic patriotism (4.53) compared to the 
average black.  Both whites (4.40 out of 5) and blacks (4.29) also self-report strong national 
identities.  Authoritarian thinking strengthens these attachments for both racial groups, but 
the influence is much stronger among whites.  The most authoritarian whites score about 
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4.62 and the most authoritarian blacks score about 4.38.  Blacks (2.28 out of 3) self-report 
stronger expressions of linked fate than whites (2.10) and this gulf grows as a function of 
authoritarian thinking.  The most-authoritarian blacks report the highest score on linked 
fate about 37% of the time and the most-authoritarian whites score highest in linked fate 
about 24% of the time.  Finally, whites self-report higher conservatism (4.06 out of 7) than 
blacks (2.55) on the seven-point ideology measure.  This gap grows as a function of 
authoritarian thinking:  The most authoritarian whites jump up to a 4.64 and the most 
authoritarian blacks drop to a 2.37. 
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Figure 4.3 | Cognitive Schematic of Whites’ Support for Policies 
to Deter Iranian Nuclear Development 
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Note: N = 4143 | Coefficients estimated by maximum likelihood | *** p < .01 ** p < .05  * p < .10 | Structural equation 
model estimates computed in Stata 13 | Model fit statistics: RSMEA = .06; Comparative Fit Index = .99; Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual = .02 | Higher values indicate higher levels of authoritarianism, symbolic patriotism, importance 
of national identity, conservatism, in-group bias, outgroup negativity, intergroup preference, agreement that Muslims 
are violent, and support for diplomacy/sanctions/site bombing/invasion to deter Iranian nuclear development.   
Source: 2012 American National Election Study. 
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Figure 4.4 | Cognitive Schematic of Blacks’ Support for Policies 
to Deter Iranian Nuclear Development  
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Note: N = 4007 | Coefficients estimated by maximum likelihood | *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10 | Structural equation 
model estimates computed in Stata 13 | Model fit statistics: RSMEA = .06; Comparative Fit Index = .99; Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual = .02 | Higher values indicate higher levels of authoritarianism, symbolic patriotism, importance 
of national identity, conservatism, in-group bias, outgroup negativity, intergroup preference, agreement that Muslims 
are violent, and support for diplomacy/sanctions/site bombing/invasion to deter Iranian nuclear development.   
Source: 2012 American National Election Study. 
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As I move to the Intergroup Attitudes tier of the model, I find that, on average, the 
strength of core in-group national and racial attachments increases the proclivity toward 
in-group bias and intergroup preference among both whites and blacks (Hypothesis 4.2a).  
I also find that stronger core identity attachments typically decrease expressions of out-
group negativity across both groups (contrary to Hypothesis 4.2b).    
To begin, blacks (75.92 out of 100) score much higher than whites (64.77) on self-
reported in-group bias.  Stronger core-identity attachments slightly increase expressions of 
in-group bias across both groups: Across both whites and blacks, the strongest attachment 
to a given identity increases in-group bias by about a point.  Whites (37.18 out of 100) 
score slightly higher than blacks (36.80) on self-reported out-group negativity.  Across both 
whites and blacks, those with the strongest attachments to the nation and country score 
about 1.5 points lower in out-group negativity than the average white and black 
respondents.  That result cuts against the intuition that patriotism (and even more so, 
national identity) correlates with antipathy toward those who are different. 
Even less in keeping with intuition is how ideology performs, when embedded 
within this broader model. The most conservative whites and those with the strongest 
attachments to the racial group also tend to score about 1.5 points lower in out-group 
negativity.  That being said, remember that out-group negativity is not the same as having 
a preference for one’s own group, which I explore below; just because conservative whites 
do not hold more negative feelings toward other social groups does not mean that they are 
less likely to view society or politics in a polarized way.  The link between ideology and 
out-group negativity performs more intuitively among black respondents.  The most liberal 
blacks score slightly higher in out-group negativity (37.08) than the average black.  
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Meanwhile, those with the strongest attachments to the racial group score about the same 
as the average black in out-group negativity (36.75). 
On average, whites (.14) score much higher than blacks (-.19) on intergroup 
preference.  Note that this variable is measured with a factor score, which prevents the 
substantive interpretation from being expressed on a meaningful scale.  Stronger core-
identity attachments increase expressions of intergroup preference among whites.  Whites 
with the strongest attachments to symbolic patriotism increase to about .24 in intergroup 
preference, those with the strongest attachments to national identity increase to about .35, 
those with the strongest attachments to linked fate increase to about .27, and the most 
conservative increase to a whopping 1.07.  Stronger core identity attachments also typically 
increase expressions of intergroup preference among blacks, but nothing quite like the 
powerful influence of the national identity and conservative beliefs among whites.  Blacks 
with the strongest attachments to symbolic patriotism increase to about -.08 in intergroup 
preference, those with the strongest attachments to national identity increase to about -.04, 
and those with the strongest attachments to the racial group increase to about .12.  The 
anomaly in these patterns is that the most-liberal blacks score much lower in intergroup 
preference compared to the average black. 
 Moving down to the Group Specific Stereotype tier – a key level of analysis for the 
contributions promised by this thesis – I find that stereotype threat from Muslims is more 
likely to emerge from strong national identity attachments and intergroup preference 
among whites compared to blacks (Hypothesis 4.3).  I estimate that whites (2.42 out of 5) 
hold moderately more intense perceptions of threat from Muslims (measured by anti-
Muslim stereotypes) than blacks (2.20).  I estimate that direct influence of symbolic 
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patriotism on the intensity of whites’ perceived threat/stereotypes is substantively small.  
The most patriotic whites do not diverge much from the average white in the intensity of 
their perceived threat/stereotypes (2.45).  The influence of national identity attachments is 
much larger, as those with the strongest attachments score about a 2.55 in perceived 
threat/stereotypes.  Thus, distinguishing between national identity and patriotism, concepts 
sometimes conflated in popular discussion, does serve a purpose, because even when they 
are measured relatively crudely by a single survey question, the two behave different in an 
analysis – with national identity, as most scholars would expect, being more closely 
associated with hostility to out-groups. 
The influence of attachment to the racial group is also substantively large, as those 
with the strongest linked fate attachments score about a 2.57 in perceived 
threat/stereotypes.  The most conservative whites are also prone to more intense 
perceptions of threat/stereotypes as they rate about a 2.93.  Finally, higher expressions of 
intergroup preference have a strong mediating effect, as those who score highest in 
intergroup preference are also about .41-points higher (i.e., scoring around 3.06) when they 
have strong attachments to national identity and are the most conservative.  On the other 
hand, the strength of blacks’ attachments to various identities has little influence in shaping 
their perceptions of threat/stereotypes. 
Finally, looking at Policy Opinions at the bottom level – the other key level of 
analysis for this thesis – I find compelling evidence that justifications for ethnocentric 
policy responses toward Iran (i.e., support for sanctions or the use of military force) is more 
likely to result from stereotype threat among whites compared to blacks (Hypothesis 4.4).  
I estimate that the probabilities that whites and blacks, on average, express similar policy 
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preferences, with both groups supporting diplomacy (69% and 73%) or sanctions (76% and 
69%) as policies to deter Iranian nuclear development at a far-higher level than the 
probabilities that they favor using military force to bomb (34% and 30%) or invade Iran 
(17% and 19%).  However, when I trace the influences of identity attachments and 
perceptions of threat/stereotypes on policy opinions, I find divergent patterns.  Whites with 
more intense perceptions of threat/stereotypes are far more likely to justify the use of 
military force against Iran than the average white in the sample.  The probability that a 
white individual favors diplomacy drops 12% to 57% among those with the most intense 
perceptions of threat/stereotypes.  The probability that a white individual favors sanctions 
increases 5% to 81% among those with the most intense perceptions of threat/stereotypes   
Meanwhile, the probability that a white individual favors bombing increases 20% to 54% 
among those with the most intense perceptions of threat/stereotypes.  Finally, the 
probability that a white individual favors invasion increases 11% to 28% among those with 
the most intense perceptions of threat/stereotypes. In sum, whites rely heavily on their 
general attitudes toward Muslims when deciding how they want the United States to behave 
toward Iran. 
Among blacks, questions about foreign-policy toward Iran do not depend nearly as 
much on how they feel about Muslims more generally.  True, the probability that a black 
individual favors diplomacy drops 11%, to 62%, if they hold the most-intense stereotype 
threat.  However, the probability that a black individual favors sanctions drops only about 
1% among those with the most intense perceptions of threat/stereotypes.  The probability 
that a black individual favor bombing increases a miniscule 2% to 32% among those with 
the most intense perceptions of threat/stereotypes.  And the probability that a black 
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individual favors invasion increases a miniscule 2% among those with the most intense 
perceptions of threat/stereotypes.   
Clearly, anti-Muslim stereotypes play a much stronger role in encouraging 
ethnocentric response among whites compared to blacks.  Furthermore, these effects 
become even more magnified when I also estimate the direct roles that strong identity 
attachments and conservatism play in shaping whites’ preferences for ethnocentric 
policies.  The probability that a white individual favors diplomacy drops another 12% to 
45% when attachment to the nation, conservative ideology, and perceived threat from 
Muslims are all strongest.  The probability that a white individual favors sanctions jumps 
another 5% to 86% when attachment to the nation, conservative ideology, and perceived 
threat are all strongest.  The probability that a white individual favors bombing jumps 
another 11% to 65% when attachment to the nation, conservatism, and perceived threat are 
all strongest.  Finally, the probability that a white individual favors invasion increases 
another 7% to 35% when attachment to the nation, conservatism, and perceived threat are 
all strongest.  Conservative white nationalists are especially likely to support an aggressive 
posture against Iran. 
 Some other important findings are worth highlighting, specifically those regarding 
the conceptual and empirical issues I underscored from Brewer’s research in the previous 
chapter.  On the one hand, I find that in-group and out-group attitudes in the model are all 
negatively correlated.  Her admonition against rooting ethnocentrism in attitudes toward 
out-groups seems validated.  Rather, ethnocentric response primarily operates through in-
group identity considerations.  On the other hand, I find that in-group attitudes and 
generalized out-group negativity trace their cognitive sources to authoritarianism and 
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similarly structure hostile policy preferences.  While authoritarian thinking may produce 
hostile attitudes toward out-groups, it does so for some by linking threat to in-group 
attitudes and producing an ethnocentric response (Brewer 2001) and for others by linking 
threat to a generalized aversion to outsiders and disruption of order (Feldman 2013).  This 
finding highlights the risk of underestimating the significance of authoritarianism when 
including it as an independent variable alongside measures of in-group and out-group 
attitudes, because it is a cognitive source to which they trace their origins.  That is, those 
variables will swallow of up the indirect effects of authoritarianism.   
 Finally, I find evidence of several significant relationships that justified the 
inclusion of my demographic and societal control variables.  After taking into account the 
attitudinal reasons that might lead an individual to support aggressive military posturing, I 
find that wealthier respondents are more likely than those with less wealth to express 
stronger in-group attachments and to support sanctioning and bombing Iran.  Older 
respondents are more likely than younger respondents to express higher levels of 
authoritarianism, conservatism, in-group attachment, and to hold anti-Muslim stereotypes.  
However, older respondents also seem less hawkish than their younger counterparts, as 
they are more likely to support diplomacy or sanctions and less likely to support bombing 
or invading Iran.  Respondents who were interviewed online are likely to score lower in 
authoritarianism, strength of in-group attachments, and intergroup preference than face-to-
face interviewees (the opposite of the social-desirability effect that I feared).   
The relationships between several variables, including attentiveness to politics, 
seem to reflect the influences that the toxic news media and partisan environments have on 
American attitudes toward for Muslims.  Respondents who self-report higher levels of 
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attention to politics are more likely than the less attentive to express strong in-group 
attachments, higher levels of conservatism, stronger perceptions of threat from Muslims, 
and higher levels of support for sanctioning and bombing Iran.  However, they are less 
likely to justify invading Iran.  One possible explanation for this is that those who are 
attentive to politics are rarely exposed to frames that advocate for invading Iran and, 
therefore, invasion is not an applicable consideration that comes to mind when politically-
engaged individuals formulate their foreign-policy preferences.  A simpler explanation for 
why those who are more attentive to politics justify lobbing bombs at Iran but do not 
support a full-scale invasion might be that they know the latter would entail higher costs – 
both economically and in terms of loss of life – that they do not believe the country or the 
military is in a position to incur. 
Male respondents are less likely than females to express strong in-group 
attachments but score much higher than females in generalized out-group negativity and 
targeted Muslim stereotypes.  Males are more likely than females to support diplomacy, 
sanctions, and bombing as policy options to deter Iranian nuclear development but are less 
likely to support invasion.  With the effect of attentiveness held constant, one possible 
explanation for why males are less likely than females to support invasion of Iran is because 
they have a higher average baseline of policy knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; 
Dow 2009).  In other words, while also holding constant stereotype and threat impulses 
that lead some to justify an invasion and killing Iranians, males might be less willing than 
females to justify an invasion because they are more likely to consider that such an 
aggressive military posture would cost more dollars and lives compared to bombing or 
sanctioning.    
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  The pervasive influence of education on tolerance of outsiders is evidenced by 
several relationships in the model.  Respondents with higher levels of education are less 
likely than those with lower levels of education to express authoritarian thinking, out-group 
negativity, intergroup preference, and anti-Muslim stereotypes.  Educated respondents are 
also less likely to support nuking or invading Iran, while being more likely to support a 
diplomatic approach.   
I also estimate how intergroup contact (i.e., with Muslims) influences the intensity 
of anti-Muslim stereotypes or perceptions of threat from Muslims.  I included this variable 
following the intergroup contact theory, which posits that higher levels of intergroup 
contact can reduce prejudice (Allport 1954).  Consistent with Contact Theory, I find that 
living near higher concentrations of Muslims – serving as a proxy for intergroup contact – 
exerts a deleterious influence on perceived threat from Muslims.   
 
Support for Using Military Force to Deter Iranian Nuclear Development: Framing 
Experiment 
 
I also conducted a framing experiment to further investigate American opinion 
toward Iran.16F17  In the experiment, I examine how different versions of a news story 
reporting that Iran has nuclear weapons influence support for the use of military force 
against Iran.  One story framed the issue by constantly referencing Islam, Muslims, Islamic 
theocracy, etc. – using stereotype-reinforcing language.  Another story uses more neutral 
descriptions and language.  I expect that whites who read the stereotype-reinforcing frame 
                                                     
17 This research conducted while I was a student at the University of Louisville and is the centerpiece of my 
Master’s Thesis (Ledford 2012) entitled, “Ethnocentric Frames across Race: The Media’s Role in 
Activating Ethnocentrism and Public Support for Conflict Abroad.”   
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will be more likely to support the use of military force against Iran, compared to blacks 
(and whites who read the neutral frame).  Experimentation offers two distinct advantages 
to my research.  First, through random assignment of participants to treatments, I can 
overcome issues of self-selection in which individual’s attitudes might be correlated with 
the stories they read.  Second, by controlling participants’ exposure to various stories, I can 
distinguish the influences of the frames to which participants were exposed. 
 
Recruitment 
 Students in six undergraduate political-science courses as well as a university-wide 
African-American scholarship program were asked to participate in a public-opinion 
survey about politics.  This sampling process was chosen with the explicit purpose of 
oversampling black students so that I could make meaningful comparisons of attitudes 
across race.  All students who came from political-science courses were offered extra credit 
for their participation.  My focus remains on comparing attitudes across white and black 
participants; however, students of different backgrounds were included in the initial sample 
because there was no ethical way to recruit and award incentives to only black or white 
students.  The recruitment produced an initial sample of 194 participants, including 104 
whites, 70 blacks, and 20 from other racial/ethnic groups.   
 
Design 
Once recruited to the study, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two 
versions of a news story describing a fictional leaked United Nations/International Atomic 
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Energy Agency intelligence report alleging Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. 17F18 Each 
version of the article was printed with a fake URL, date, and what appeared to be a censored 
author name and source.  This effort was intended to make the news story look like a real 
article that had been printed from an online edition of a newspaper, especially given the 
prominence of media coverage of Iran and its nuclear program.  After reading the story, 
respondents were asked to answer a short battery of questions about political attitudes, 
demographics, and support for using military action against Iran.18F19 
Each version suggests that Iran has been using its nuclear program to develop 
weapons, despite maintaining for years that its nuclear program is only meant to provide 
fuel for medical reactors.  Although the story is fictional, these allegations mirrored 
political debate in the United States around the time of the experiment.  One version of the 
story featured a stereotype-reinforcing frame that used the same biased qualifiers to 
describe Muslims and Islam as identified in empirical studies and content analyses in the 
extant literature cited above.  For example, the main text of the framed article repeatedly 
uses the word Islamic to describe the Iranian government (e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran) 
and the stereotyping qualifiers rogue, threat, fundamentalist, and extremist are used 
throughout.   
The unframed version features no anti-Muslim stereotype language and simply 
refers to the country as Iran and to its government as the Iranian leadership.  The framed 
article also features statements from a fictional White House correspondent and the 
President that are laden with enemy image constructing terms identified in the same 
                                                     
18 In compliance with Institutional Review Board protocols, all participants were debriefed about the 
experiment and the fictitious stories they read at the end of their time in the experiment. 
19 Full article versions are included in the Appendix (Chapter Four Appendix, Framed and Unframed 
Articles). 
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literature, such as us, them, we, and they.  In the unframed version, I simply replace these 
terms with the United States and Iran.  I counterbalance any partisan influence participants 
might infer from mentioning President Obama by including a brief statement about the on-
going 2012 Republican primary campaign.   
Simply, the stereotype-reinforcing frame cues a threat, the associated stereotypes, 
and the target of those stereotypes.  With random assignment averaging out potential 
confounds, I expect that these cues will activate anti-Muslim stereotypes and that those 
who read the cues will be more likely to support the use of military force against Iran than 
those who read the unframed story.  As another direct test of asymmetric ethnocentric 
response, I expect that these influences will be stronger among whites compared to blacks.
   
Post-Test Measures 
 To measure support for the use of military force against Iran, I construct an index 
from nine 5-point agreement questions asked in the post-test questionnaire (scaled from 0 
to 5).  The battery of items asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the 
justification and support for the use of force, increased federal spending on defense and 
security, and about the justification of the president seeking authorization to deploy troops.  
I also measure race with a post-test item including white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Native 
American, and mixed.  My analysis only focuses on whites and blacks for consistency with 
the survey analysis and due to the costs of oversampling non-white minorities.  I measure 
a binary variable indicating to which frame participants were exposed in order to test the 
influence of the treatment on support for the use of force compared to the unframed story. 
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Findings 
 I analyze the results of the experiment using ordinary-least-squares regression due 
to the coding of the military-force index.  I regressed the military-force index on an 
interaction between race and the frame dummy, while holding the original race and frame 
variables constant (Support = Race x Frame + Race + Frame).  The findings provide yet 
another piece of evidence supporting my theoretical expectations.  Exposure to the framed 
version of the story significantly influences support for using military force against Iran 
among whites but not blacks.  Whites who read the framed story also were more likely to 
support using military force against Iran than other whites who read the unframed story.  
The substantive effects of exposure to the frame are quite telling of the relationship 
between anti-Muslim stereotypes and ethnocentric response among whites.  I estimate that, 
on average, reading the framed story increased support for the use of force against Iran 
among whites by about 2.39-points on the rescaled five-point index.  I also estimate that, 
on average, exposure to the unframed story decreased support among blacks by about .37-
points on the five-point index.  These findings provide clear evidence in support of the 
theory of asymmetric ethnocentric response.  Either my black respondents did not hold 
negative stereotypes about Muslims, or not even reminding them of Iran’s dominant 
religion induced them to draw on such stereotypes when formulating a policy preference. 
In all analyses, the evidence is consistent and robust: The influence that anti-Muslim 
stereotypes exert on ethnocentric response toward Muslims is much stronger among whites 
compared to blacks.   
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Discussion  
 The studies in this chapter contribute several important theoretical and normative 
contributions.  I began by describing two popular accounts of public support for the use of 
military force in the Middle East – stereotypes and ethnocentrism – and then situated them 
within the broader social-identity literature to illuminate how these related idea elements 
operate together in cognition.  In the process of doing so, this research unearthed several 
issues – including four different definitions – involving the conceptualization and 
measurement of the ethnocentric construct.  In sum, my comprehensive review produced a 
synthesized and testable theory: Targeted stereotypes and ethnocentric response are not 
idea elements that operate independently of one another in cognition but, instead, targeted 
stereotypes are the very expressions of perceived threat from Muslims that, when in 
conflict with in-group identity, might produce ethnocentric response toward Muslims.  The 
Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response theory, which grows from the insight that the 
mechanisms contained in my theory would not apply to African Americans, explains why 
these various idea elements are more likely to become linked and produce ethnocentric 
response toward Muslims among whites rather than blacks. 
From there, an SEM modeling strategy (Hoyle 1995; Kline 1998; de Carvahlo and 
Chima 2014) and a framing experiment were developed to test the theory.  I found 
compelling evidence that anti-Muslim stereotypes are foundational building blocks of 
support for the use of military force, rather than diplomacy, as a policy option to deter 
Iranian nuclear development.  I also found strong evidence that anti-Muslim stereotypes 
exert a much greater influence on support for the use of military force against Iran among 
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whites compared to blacks – especially when those stereotypes are activated by stereotype-
reinforcing news coverage. 
These theoretical and empirical contributions are not limited to studies of public 
opinion about Muslims or Middle East issues.  Just as I drew insights from research on the 
identity politics of Southern racial issues and Latino immigration to inform my research, I 
expect that the current research will contribute to a variety of subfields in American and 
comparative political science in which researchers are focused on explaining the structures 
of public opinion about specific issues wherein group attitudes and/or stereotypes are 
theorized to play an important role.  
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Chapter Five - Anti-Muslim Stereotypes and American Tunnel Vision of 
Terrorism 
 
When do ordinary Americans support the use of military force to combat equally 
threatening foreign terrorist groups, both Islamist and non-Islamist?  
 
The U.S. Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism currently designates 59 
foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  
To be legally designated as an FTO, the organization must: (1) be foreign and (2) engage 
or have intent to engage in terrorist activity (3) that threatens the security of U.S. nationals 
or the national security of the United States (National Counterterrorism Center; U.S. 
Department of State 2015).  Considering how elite discourse focuses on terrorist activity 
in the Middle East, it likely would surprise many ordinary Americans that several groups 
designated as FTOs are not Islamist.   
On the outside, non-Islamist FTOs look like their Islamist counterparts.  They 
commit serious atrocities in the name of religion, anti-U.S. ideology, and anti-imperialism.  
However, aside from the “usual suspects” (i.e., notorious Islamist FTOs like al-Qaeda and 
ISIS), we know relatively little about public opinion and support for the use of force against 
non-Islamist FTOs.  The narrow focus on Muslims and Islamist terrorism in the literature 
derives, in part, from the skewness and negativity of media coverage of Muslims:  Most 
Americans do not have accessible considerations of non-Islamist groups because they 
typically are not exposed to news about these groups.  But how would ordinary Americans 
react to non-Islamist FTOs if they were actually exposed to them? 
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Motivating Examples 
In this section, I discuss two motivating examples of non-Islamist FTOs, 
highlighting their similarities with Islamist FTOs in terms of foundational ideology and 
security risk to U.S. interests.  It is important to keep this discussion in mind as the chapter 
progresses, as I draw on these specific examples in the forthcoming empirical investigation 
of how ordinary Americans react to various sources of terror threat. 
 
Revolutionary Struggle - Greece 
In 2004, the Revolutionary Struggle in Greece (“EA” for Epanastatikos Agonas) 
published a manifesto explicitly stating its anarchist, anti-globalist, and anti-imperialist 
ideological aims.  The group is an offshoot of N-17 which, over a period of 25 years, was 
responsible for the deaths of 22 people and attacks against police and military installations, 
tax offices, and foreign multinational corporations (Burton and West 2009).  Since 2004, 
EA has carried out several attacks that clearly borrow from the N-17 playbook.   In January 
2007, EA militants carried out an attack on the U.S. embassy in Athens and fired a rocket 
propelled grenade at the building.  Then-U.S. ambassador to Greece, Charlie Ries, told 
CNN that the incident was “a very serious attack” (CNN 2007).  The group is also linked 
to several attacks against other U.S. and Greek interests, including several bank robberies 
and a bombing at the Bank of Greece in Athens (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence 2019).  
 
 
 
105 
 
Lord’s Resistance Army - Uganda 
In Uganda, the militant Christian ideologue Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) have been engaged in looting, sex trafficking, and violence for over 25 years, 
as part of their mission to overthrow the Ugandan government and impose the Ten 
Commandments as the law of the land (Bavier 2011; Cakaj 2016).  The brutality 
perpetuated by the group has displaced more than two million civilians and killed 
thousands.  An estimated 65,000 children have been kidnapped to be trained as LRA 
fighters or used and sold as sex slaves (Bavier 2011; Cakaj 2016).  The LRA is also anti-
American and deplores U.S. military involvement in joint special operations – particularly 
in the last few years – that have significantly reduced LRA ranks.  While U.S. special forces 
remain in the region to train local army units and police forces, remaining LRA members 
are still on the run throughout Uganda and the South Sudan.  In some regions, the U.S. 
military presence is the only protection civilians have against terrorists who are still on the 
run and becoming increasingly violent as their organization crumbles.  In practice, there is 
little difference between the LRA in Uganda and ISIS in Syria.   
 
What Lies Ahead 
Just as in the Middle East, FTOs in Europe and Africa are waging wars against their 
own governments and peoples, while citing anti-American, anti-imperialist, and religious 
ideologies as justification for violence.  Just as in the Middle East, FTOs in Europe and 
Africa engage in brutal rape, sex trafficking, and the use of children as human shields.  Just 
as in the Middle East, FTOs in Europe and Africa hold virulent attitudes toward the U.S. 
military for helping local forces fight against them.  From both extant research and previous 
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chapters in this dissertation, we have a theoretical picture of factors that motivate American 
support for the use of military force against Muslims and/or Islamist FTOs.  What 
structures American support for the use of force against non-Islamist FTOs when 
Americans are actually exposed to news about these groups? 
In this chapter, I investigate how ordinary Americans respond to terror threats from 
both Islamist and non-Islamist FTOs.  I rely on extant research in political communications 
and social psychology – discussed in Chapter Three – to develop a theory that explains 
how ordinary Americans are likely to react to differential sources of terror threat and, 
specifically, when they support the use of military force to deter those threats.   
In short, my theory holds that decades of negative media and elite coverage of 
Muslims – portraying them as violent and barbaric – have caused many Americans to 
develop targeted anti-Muslim stereotypes and have primed many Americans such that they 
exhibit a limited cognitive ability to distinguish considerations of terror threat from their 
perceptions of threat from Muslims.  At times throughout this project, I summarize these 
cognitive processes as American “tunnel vision of terrorism.”  Consequently, I expect that 
many ordinary Americans are more likely to support the use of military force to deter 
Islamist FTOs rather than non-Islamist FTOs.  I also draw upon the asymmetric 
ethnocentric response theory, developed in previous chapters, to derive the expectation 
about the nature of these relationships across race.  Simply, I expect that the skewness of 
support for using force against Islamist groups rather than non-Islamist groups is more 
pronounced among whites compared to blacks.  
I put my theory to empirical test in a survey experiment by exposing white and 
black participants to one of five fictional stories about real FTOs threatening attacks against 
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U.S. installments and citizens abroad.  I focus on whites and blacks – as in other chapters 
– because they are the two largest racial groups in the United States and therefore, in theory, 
should have the largest aggregate impacts on policymaking.  To summarize what’s to 
come: I find compelling evidence for the baseline expectation that ordinary Americans are 
more likely to support the use of military force against Islamist FTOs compared to their 
non-Islamist counterparts.  I also find evidence of an asymmetric ethnocentric response 
toward Islamist FTOs, as much of the variance in support for the use of military force 
explained by exposure to an Islamist FTO is constrained among whites rather than blacks.   
 My investigation into how Americans respond to terror threats from various FTOs 
offers both important theoretical and normative contributions.  Whereas most extant 
research focuses almost exclusively on public support for the use of military force against 
Islamist FTOs, this research investigates responses to FTOs that are Islamist or non-
Islamist—by “observing the counterfactual” (see Robinson, McNulty, and Krasno 2009).  
I am uniquely able to parse out reaction to the terrorism from reaction to the religious 
affiliation of the terrorists.  My findings illustrate that pervasive and generalized anti-
Muslim stereotypes among the American public have consequences that reach far beyond 
just increasing support for ethnocentric response against Muslims (i.e., the use of military 
force against Muslim-majority countries or Islamist terror groups).  Anti-Muslim biases 
also seem to create a sort of tunnel vision through which ordinary citizens – particularly 
whites – are likely to see other potential security risks as relatively non-threatening.   
 My findings have important normative implications for the broader “perpetual 
cycle of stereotypes, intervention, and terrorism” discussed throughout this dissertation.  
My analysis in this chapter not only provides another piece of evidence that links anti-
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Muslim stereotypes to support for the use of military force in the Middle East, but also 
reveals the influence that anti-Muslim stereotypes have in encouraging ordinary citizens to 
take other terror threats less seriously.  Put another way, American whites show a tendency 
to support using violence only against Muslims, a bias likely to aggravate intergroup 
relations.  These realities will likely continue to fuel the “perpetual cycle” of cultural 
conflict, especially if such biases are reflected in actual U.S. foreign policymaking. 
 
Anti-Muslim Stereotypes and Stereotype Generalization 
 
In Chapter Three, I discuss a wealth of research suggesting that the confluence of 
constant negative media coverage, vitriolic elite discourse, and the lack of direct contact 
most Americans have with Muslims has had serious implications for how ordinary citizens 
think about Muslims.  Specifically, these factors have helped to form, crystallize, and 
reinforce targeted stereotypes of Muslims as barbaric, terroristic, and violent (Alexander, 
Brewer, and Herrmann 1999; Gerges 2003; Sides and Gross 2013; Saleem, Yang, and 
Ramasubramanian 2016).  Even worse, recent research finds evidence that higher levels of 
exposure to news portraying Muslims as terrorists or in a negative light is positively 
associated with support for military action in Muslim countries, public policies that harm 
Muslims domestically and internationally, and increased perceptions of Muslims as 
aggressive (Saleem et al. 2015).   
Often, negative discourse about Muslims is also accompanied by visuals – intended 
to represent Muslims – depicting a man identified as a terrorist, often in stereotypical attire 
worn by terrorists (Jackson 2010).  When these images are employed – referred to as 
implicit visual propositioning (Abraham 2003) – alongside explicit negative statements 
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about Muslims, media can have an even stronger influence in activating anti-Muslim 
attitudes and priming stereotypes (Abraham and Appiah 2006).   However, I expect that 
this negative media environment has far more serious implications than just setting the tone 
for how ordinary Americans think about Muslims. 
Social psychologists explain that as stereotypes develop – particularly when the 
target is a distant group like Muslims – the target is increasingly evaluated in terms of their 
cultural dissimilarity (Herrmann 2013).  For example, as an individual forms stereotypes 
about Muslims and those stereotypes intensify, that individual is likely to progress from 
thinking “Muslims are a violent threat” to thinking “Muslims are violent, different, and a 
threat.”  It is precisely at this stage in stereotype formation that I expect that the 
implications of whites’ and blacks’ anti-Muslim stereotypes diverge.  White Americans 
live in a country where dominant cultural expressions treat them as prototypical.  Thus, 
whites are likely to attach their in-group identities to a combination of core ideas about 
national and racial identity, whereas blacks – who reside in a country where a large majority 
of the population is viewed as “different” from them – are likely to attach their in-group 
identities to core ideas about the upward mobility of their racial group.  Viewing the 
sociopolitical world through these identity lenses, Muslims – who are culturally, ethnically, 
and religiously “other” – are more likely to be stereotyped and perceived as a realistic and 
symbolic cultural threat by whites compared to blacks.   
As stereotypes intensify, they become generalized.  At least among the many 
Americans who have experienced no or limited contact with Muslims, anti-Muslim 
stereotypes – reinforced by news media bias – serve to strip Muslims of their humanity 
(Kahn 2018; see also Herrmann 2013).   More fearful Americans will come to view 
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Muslims as “monolithic and united, making it easier to imagine the whole population as 
blameworthy” (Herrmann 2013; emphasis added).  Such an individual no longer thinks that 
“Muslims are violent, different, and a threat” but rather “most” or even “all Muslims 
support a religion that is violent, different, and a threat.”  Impenetrable walls of 
indifference, dread, and fatigue are built (Kahn 2018), preventing the most basic human 
responses of concern or willingness to learn (Leyens et al. 2000; Castano and Giner-Sorolla 
2006; Goff et al. 2008).  This process of stereotype generalization becomes especially 
consequential when ordinary Americans [particularly whites] evaluate the use of military 
force in the Middle East, because it “allows people to question whether there really are any 
‘innocent civilians’” (Herrmann 2013: 350; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Kahn 
2018). 
 
Expectations 
I expect that stereotype generalization influences many ordinary Americans to 
evaluate foreign terror threats relative to their accessible negative considerations of 
Muslims.  Put another way – and echoing Iftikhar (2018) – whereas anti-Muslim stereotype 
threat and the generalization of anti-Muslim stereotypes encourage many ordinary 
Americans to associate Islam with the threat of terrorism, I also expect that these also 
influence many Americans to evaluate terrorism and threat conditional upon Islam—or 
what I describe as a “tunnel vision of terrorism.”  I expect that ordinary Americans are 
more likely to support using military force to deter Islamist threats than they are to support 
using force against their equally threatening non-Islamist counterparts.  Stated as a formal 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 5.1: Ordinary Americans are more likely to support the use of 
preemptive military force against threatening Islamist terror 
groups compared to equally threatening non-Islamist terror 
groups. 
 
Extending the AER theory, I expect that this relationship is largely explained by 
whites’ special orientation toward using military force against Islamists.  As discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four, core national identity attachments – to which Muslims are 
perceived as a threat – influence a higher likelihood of ethnocentric response (i.e., support 
for the use of military force) against Muslims among whites compared to blacks.  Formally 
stated:  
Hypothesis 5.2: Whites are more likely than blacks to support the use of 
preemptive military force against threatening Islamist terror 
groups compared to equally threatening non-Islamist terror 
groups.  
 
 
Finally, I test how the combination of imagery or implicit visual cues and explicit 
identifications within the stories mediate my expectations in Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2.  After 
considering research finding that use of stereotype-reinforcing images and language 
exhibits a stronger effect on activating and priming stereotypes (Abraham 2003; Abraham 
and Appiah 2006), my final hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 5.3: Exposure to stories that explicitly and implicitly identify a 
threatening Islamist terror group are more likely to encourage 
support for the use of preemptive military force against the 
Islamist FTO than stories using only implicit (visual) 
information. 
 
Methods 
I conducted a survey experiment to test my hypotheses regarding how ordinary 
Americans respond to threats from Islamist and non-Islamist FTOs.  Experimentation 
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offers two distinct advantages to my research.  First, through random assignment of 
participants to treatments, I can overcome issues of self-selection in which individual’s 
attitudes might be correlated with the stories they read.  Second, by controlling participants’ 
exposure to various stories, I can distinguish the influences of the FTOs to which 
participants were exposed. 
 
Recruitment 
A total of five-hundred participants – 250 whites and 250 blacks – were recruited 
to take part in a “public opinion survey.”  The participants were recruited from marketing 
research panels – featuring over 25 million panelists – operated by Ask Your Target Market 
(AYTM).  The AYTM panels offer three distinct advantages over other modes: (1) I can 
oversample blacks from the thousands available on the panel to have equal amounts of 
whites and blacks in each condition, thereby permitting the explicit testing of Hypothesis 
5.2; (2) AYTM closely monitors their panelists to maintain survey response quality; and, 
(3) AYTM maintains and provides demographic information about its panelists which 
enables me to minimize survey fatigue by omitting tedious demographic questions and 
focusing the survey instrument on substantive questions.   
 
Design 
During the experiment, I first measured participants’ prior support for using 
military force to deter FTOs threatening to attack U.S. installments and interests.  
Participants were then randomly and equally assigned to five experimental conditions 
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designed to test how they react to different FTOs making equivalent terror threats.19F20  In 
each condition (Table 5.1), the news stories describe a recently released (fictional) video 
wherein a real FTO threatens the United States and its foreign installments.   
In Condition 1 (example in Figure 5.1), the byline and statements throughout the 
story explicitly describe the FTO as Islamist and identify the FTO as the Haqqani Network 
(Pakistan).  The story also contains an image “from the video” that implicitly identifies the 
group as Islamist by depicting terrorists dressed in traditional thobes and ghutras (robe and 
headscarf).  In Condition 2, the group is implicitly described as Islamist by including only 
the image of Haqqani fighters in traditional garb.  These two conditions permit the explicit 
testing of Hypothesis 5.3.  Note that it also hints at a way to parse the extent to which anti-
Muslim sentiments are rooted in a general racism, or if instead Islam itself must be invoked 
to induce stereotype threat.  If “Muslim” is just sloppy American shorthand for darker-
skinned people, then the implicit threat ought to be enough, whereas if the reaction to Islam 
looks more like a developed “clash of civilizations” then the religious ties might need to 
be made explicitly. 
In Conditions 3 and 4, the groups are explicitly described as non-Islamist (e.g., 
anarchist or Christian) in the bylines and are identified as either the Revolutionary Struggle 
(EA) in Greece or the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.  Each story also implicitly 
distances the terrorists from anti-Muslim stereotype threat by using real images of EA and 
LRA group members “from the video,” showing that they are not wearing traditional 
thobes and ghutras.  In Condition 5, the story does not include an explicit or implicit 
description; the report maintains that the identity of the source of the threat is still unknown 
                                                     
20 In compliance with Institutional Review Board protocols, all participants were debriefed about the 
experiment and the fictitious stories they read at the end of their time in the experiment. 
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at the time (full frames in Chapter Five Appendix, Figures A5.1-A5.5).  After exposure in 
each condition, I again measured participant support for the use of preemptive military 
force to deter FTOs: this time, with participants thinking about the FTOs about which they 
read.   
It is important to note here that, in each condition, the stories were presented as 
online versions of articles from the Associated Press.  This design specification is intended 
to mitigate the potential for perceived source biases to confound responses to the stories.  
For example, portraying the news source as the New York Times (commonly perceived as 
a liberal-leaning source) or the Wall Street Journal (commonly perceived as a 
conservative-learning source) might have exerted ideological biases on responses to the 
stories.  Portraying the source as the Associated Press – a balanced source known for highly 
factual reporting – should minimize the potential for ideology confounding the analysis 
(AllSides 2019).  A date only a few days prior to the experiment was added to each story 
to make the news story look recent and to enhance credibility.   
 
Table 5.1 | Conditions in Threat ID Experiment 
 Identity Explicit Implicit Sample 
Condition 1 Islamist (Haqqani)   50 White + 50 Black
Condition 2 Islamist (Haqqani)  50 White + 50 Black
Condition 2 Non-Islamist (EA)   50 White + 50 Black
Condition 3 Non-Islamist (LRA)   50 White + 50 Black
Condition 5 Ambiguous (Control) 50 White + 50 Black
 
 
 
 
  500 
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Figure 5.1 | Example of Explicit Islamist (Haqqani) Frame Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures 
 The background questionnaire included a pretest measure of support for using 
military force to deter FTOs making threats against U.S. troops and installments.  The 
pretest opinion item asks, “How strongly do you agree or disagree that the United States 
should use military force to preempt threats made against U.S. troops and installments by 
terror groups?”  Response options range from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 5 “Strongly agree.”  
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The background questionnaire also asked questions about party ID, conservatism, and anti-
Muslim stereotypes.20F21  AYTM provided demographic information including gender, age, 
marital status, income, career field, education, and zip code.   
The second questionnaire, completed after exposure in the various conditions, 
measures post-test opinion with an item analogous to the pretest.  This time, the question 
asked about participants’ support for the use of military force to preempt the threat about 
which they read.  These two items are used to construct the primary dependent variable in 
the experimental models: change in opinion.  I measure how exposure to the various news 
stories influenced participants’ opinions from the pretest to the posttest by subtracting 
pretest opinion from posttest opinion.    Change in opinion ranges from -4 to 4.21F22   
The primary independent variables in the experimental models are five binary or 
“dummy” variables – EA Explicit, LRA Explicit, Haqqani Explicit, Haqqani Implicit, and 
Ambiguous – that indicate if an individual was exposed to a given story.  The Ambiguous 
item is omitted to serve as a point of reference (i.e., reference or baseline category) in all 
models.  White is a binary variable – 1 “White and 0 “Black: -- included as an interaction 
term in the models to test how the various frames shifted opinions across racial groups.  
 
                                                     
21 Responses on the party ID item range from 1-5 (1 – None; 2 – Democrat; 3 – Independent; 4 – Republican; 
5 – Other).  Responses on the conservatism item range from 1-7 (1 – Extremely liberal; 7 – Extremely 
conservative). The anti-Muslim stereotype item asks participants to indicate how well or not “violent” 
describes “most Muslims” and ranges from 0 – Not at all to 5 – Extremely well. 
22 Over 70% of the sample is below the maximum (5 – “Strongly Agree”) on the pretest item, so I am 
confident that this measure will capture a significant amount of changes in opinion that occurred over the 
course of the experiment (i.e., not violating any model assumptions). 
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Support for the Use of Military Force against Islamist and Non-Islamist FTOs 
I estimate two models to investigate how exposure to news about differential 
sources of terrorist threats (i.e., Islamist and non-Islamist) influences support for the use of 
military force to preempt those threats.  First, I estimate Model 1 to get a sense of how 
exposure to various FTOs influences support for the use of military force to preempt the 
threat.  I estimate Model 2 and interact each of the five binary exposure variables with the 
race item (i.e., white) to investigate how frames influence opinion among whites and 
blacks.  In both models, I use ordinary-least-squares regressions to estimate the influence 
of exposures to the various stories.  I also treat the “ambiguous” control condition as a 
baseline or point of comparison in both models.  This allows me to measure the independent 
impact (relative to the control group) of receiving one type of frame while holding constant 
exposure to all other types of frames.   
Estimates from the models offer compelling evidence in support of my hypotheses.  
In Model 1 (Table 5.2), I find clear evidence that, on average, increased support for the use 
of preemptive military force to deter terrorism is more likely to occur when the threat 
originates from an Islamist FTO rather than a non-Islamist FTO.  To understand how 
exposure to various FTOs influences support for the use of force, it is helpful to first look 
at the predicted values for opinion change in each condition.  Here, a clear pattern emerges: 
In all conditions, except for the Haqqani Explicit condition, the predicted values reflect 
decreasing support for the use of military force (Ambiguous = -.31; LRA Explicit = -.24; 
Haqqani Implicit = -.19; EA Explicit = -.08; Haqqani Explicit = .13).  Thinking about the 
predictions relative to the Ambiguous condition, what this means is that support for the use 
of preemptive military force increases by about .44-points when the FTO is explicitly and 
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implicitly described as Islamist and identified as the Haqqani Network (p < .01).  Although 
the predicted opinion change influenced by exposure to the EA Explicit condition is 
negative, that predicted change is still a significantly higher change – by about .24-points 
– than change influenced by exposure to the Ambiguous condition (p < .05).  Support for 
the use of force against the LRA and the implicitly identified Islamist group do not differ 
significantly from support against the unknown FTO.  These findings offer strong support 
for Hypothesis 5.1.  Given how these other treatments differ from the ambiguous control 
article, it is likely that when Americans are not told identity of a terrorist group, they tend 
to assume that it is Islamist and behave accordingly. 
Table 5.2 | Model 1 – American Support  
for the Use of Preemptive Military Force against Terror Groups 
Frame Predicted Change in Opinion Change Relative to  
Ambiguous Frame
  
Ambiguous -.31  
  
Haqqani Explicit .13 .44*** 
(.12) 
Haqqani Implicit -.19 .12 
(.12) 
EA Explicit -.08 .24** 
(.12) 
LRA Explicit -.24 .07 
(.12) 
Constant  -.31*** 
(.08) 
Note: Entries are predicted values and ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors 
in parentheses below.  *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10.  N = 457 R2 = .04 
 
In Model 2 (Table 5.3), I estimate the how the impact of exposure in each condition 
varies across race.22F23 I find clear evidence that whites who were exposed to news that 
                                                     
23 I estimate the impact of each interaction term separately to avoid multicollinearity and biased standard 
errors (Farrar and Glauber 1967).   
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explicitly and implicitly identifies an Islamist FTO are significantly more likely than blacks 
who were exposed to the same news to express increased support for the use of preemptive 
military force.  Again, it is helpful to first look at the predicted values for opinion change 
in each condition—this time as an interaction across race.  Another clear pattern emerges: 
In all conditions, except when whites were exposed to the Haqqani Explicit condition, the 
predicted values reflect decreasing support for the use of military force (EA*Black = -.09; 
EA*White = -.06; LRA*Black = -.26; LRA*White = -.22; Haqqani Explicit*Black = .00; 
Haqqani Explicit*White = .24; Haqqani Implicit*Black = -.05; Haqqani Implicit*White = 
-.33; Ambiguous*Black = -.09; Ambiguous*White = -.52).  Looking at these predictions, 
I estimate that support for the use of military force increases by about .24-points among 
whites who were exposed to the Haqqani Explicit condition.  This shift is quite large 
compared to blacks in the Haqqani Explicit condition (effectively no increase), whites in 
the Ambiguous condition (.76-point increase), and blacks in the Ambiguous condition (.33-
point increase).  These findings strongly support Hypothesis 5.2.  
Further, comparing the positive shift in support among whites in the Haqqani 
Explicit condition to the negative shift in support among whites in the Haqqani Implicit 
condition seems to clearly suggest that pairing implicit stereotype-reinforcing imagery with 
explicit “Islamist” tags is a key factor that triggers strong ethnocentric response among 
whites.  Not everyone wearing Middle Eastern garb will do.  This finding strongly supports 
Hypothesis 5.3.  Cumulatively, these findings also offer another piece of substantive 
evidence supporting the AER theory. 
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Table 5.3 | Model 2 - Support for the Use of  
Military Force against Terror Groups 
in Black and White 
Frame * Race Predicted Change 
in Opinion
 
Haqqani Explicit * White .24
 
Haqqani Explicit * Black .00
 
Haqqani Implicit * White -.33
 
Haqqani Implicit * Black -.05
 
EA Explicit * White -.06
 
EA Explicit * Black -.09
 
LRA Explicit * White -.22
 
LRA Explicit * Black -.26
 
Ambiguous * White -.52
 
Ambiguous * Black -.09
Note: Entries are predicted values from OLS regression.   
N = 457  R2 = .05
 
Discussion 
The research presented in this chapter offers important theoretical contributions to 
scholarship at the intersection of public opinion, foreign policy, and terrorism literatures 
by painting a clearer picture of how anti-Muslim stereotypes shape American public 
opinion and policy preferences.  Where prior research has focused almost exclusively on 
explaining how anti-Muslim attitudes shape American support for the use of military force 
against Islamist FTOs, I contribute to theory by explaining and finding evidence that anti-
Muslim stereotypes also shape how ordinary Americans react to threatening FTOs in 
general.  This novel contribution was made by stepping beyond the bias of the research 
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literature to investigate how ordinary citizens respond to equal threats from both Islamist 
and non-Islamist FTOs with similar foundational ideologies (i.e., by “observing the 
counterfactual”; see Robinson, McNulty, and Krasno 2009).    
I found strong evidence suggesting that anti-Muslim attitudes have primed ordinary 
Americans such that they are more likely to support the use of military force against 
Islamist FTOs rather than non-Islamist FTOs.  I also found another piece of evidence that 
corroborates the Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response (AER) theory discussed throughout 
this research.  I found that whites are far more likely than blacks to support the use of 
preemptive military force against Islamists compared to non-Islamist FTOs.  Finally, I 
found compelling evidence that ordinary white Americans are especially likely to support 
the use of preemptive military force against Islamist FTOs when they are exposed to 
information that explicitly – rather than just implicitly – describes a foreign terrorist threat 
as Islamist.  This evidence reinforces others’ conclusions about the serious influences that 
actors in the news business can have in shaping biases toward Muslims and other out-
groups by subtly manipulating the use of explicit textual and implicit visual cues (Abraham 
and Appiah 2006).  Consistently ascribing acts of terror to members of a religious group – 
underscoring the religion of the terrorists, rather than their other traits – ultimately results 
in religious stereotyping.  
Cumulatively, my research has thus far provided evidence that anti-Muslim 
stereotypes exert strong influence on white Americans preferences for using military force 
rather than diplomacy against a majority-Muslim country and against Islamist FTOs rather 
than non-Islamist FTOs.   These findings reinforce the broader normative implications of 
my dissertation: the idea that cultural biases that fester among the white majority run the 
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risk of shaping American involvement in the Middle East and perpetuating cycles of 
intervention and terrorism.  Specifically, the biases and narrow understandings of global 
terrorism that characterize the worldviews of many white Americans are likely to enter to 
foreign policymaking process via public opinion and candidate election (Goren 2012).  The 
emergence of nationalist and anti-Muslim candidates in recent years is a good example of 
how anti-Muslim biases are influencing our politics and corroding political debate.  
Furthermore, whites often make up 70% or more of representative samples and comprise 
90% of the Republican electorate, meaning that anti-Muslim biases have great potential to 
shape foreign policymaking when the GOP governs.   
Through each of these mechanisms – mass opinion, elections, and policymaking – 
anti-Muslim biases and tunnel vision of terrorism will continue to shape support for the use 
of military force in the Middle East and for other policies disadvantageous to Muslims.  To 
make matters worse, U.S. military interventions in the Middle East are the fundamental 
source of anti-imperialist and anti-American orientations at the core of Islamist FTO 
ideology (Tessler 2003; Blaydes and Linzer 2012).  In other words, pervasive anti-Muslim 
attitudes among the American public will continue to provide terrorists with justification 
for attacking the United States and its interests and will continue to fuel a perpetual cycle 
of stereotypes, interventions, and terrorism.  To be clear, it is not my intent to suggest that 
the United States should refrain from using military force when it is justified to do so.  
However, it should be very concerning to citizens, policymakers, academics, and 
journalists alike, that so much of the public’s foreign-policy attitudes can be motivated by 
misguided and unfounded stereotypes, rather than concrete details related to the policy 
question at hand.   
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The most important follow-up question to what has so far been a very dispiriting 
narrative is: What can be done about this?  To answer this question, it is important that our 
discussion of public opinion and citizens’ policy preferences not overshadow the role that 
politicians and actors in the news business play in shaping negative attitudes toward 
Muslims.  In Chapter Six, I will develop a theory that explains how these individuals frame 
policy issues involving Muslims and majority-Muslim countries and when those frames 
are most likely to influence preferences for policies concerning Muslims.  Specifically, I 
will develop my arguments with a focus on understanding how politicians and journalists 
might frame issues in ways that mitigate the influence misguided stereotypes have on 
American policy preferences vis-à-vis the Middle East. 
I believe that politicians and actors in the news business can have a strong impact 
on shifting negative opinions about Muslims, considering recent political communications 
research that suggests that arguments can influence opinion shifts when they emphasize 
considerations that citizens already have in mind and deem relevant to the issue (Chong 
and Druckman 2007b).  Further, my research and the multiple studies cited herein offer 
insights about how Chong’s and Druckman’s (2007b) theory can be applied to understand 
how elite arguments influence shifts in opinion about issues specifically involving 
Muslims.  I consistently find that identity and threat are important considerations that come 
to mind for many Americans when they evaluate political issues.  I expect that academics, 
politicians, and actors in the news business could impact meaningful shifts in public 
opinion about Muslims by framing narratives of Muslims that appeal to the American 
identity and the obligations that come with it, in addition to affirming counterstereotypes 
of Muslims.  The latter should contrast billions of ordinary Muslims – who do not condone 
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violence, who enjoy Western culture, and who have favorable impressions of American 
citizens – with Islamist terrorists who have narrowly interpreted a single religious text (the 
Quran) and hijacked a religion for the purposes of exporting violence around the world.  
The ideas motivate my investigation of news framing of issues in the Middle East in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Six - The Political Potential of Affirming Muslim Counterstereotypes 
 
How do elites and actors in the news business frame policy issues concerning 
Muslims and/or the Middle East?  How do competing news frames influence public 
opinion about such issues, such as the Syrian refugee crisis?  How do frames that 
affirm counterstereotypes of Muslims influence public opinion about these policy 
issues?  
 
 
 
In 2011, as the Arab Spring swept throughout the Middle East, pro-democracy 
demonstrations erupted in Syria with calls for the overthrow of the brutal dictatorship of 
President Bashar al-Assad.  Soon thereafter, President Obama and the heads of government 
of other democratic world powers – including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
– began echoing the calls of the Syrian demonstrators.  The Assad regime responded by 
using chemical weapons to suppress its dissenters.  An internal sectarian conflict between 
state and non-state actors exploded in the years after, and the infighting has only been 
complicated by the presence and competing goals of rival superpowers: Russia and the 
United States.  Now turning the calendar page on its eighth year, the armed free-for-all in 
Syria has displaced nearly thirteen million refugees – or about 60% of Syria’s pre-conflict 
population – and over half a million have been killed (United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees 2019).    
For the past four years, U.S. political elites and droves of their constituents have 
been entrenched in partisan debate over policy that would allow embattled Syrians to seek 
refuge in the United States.  The Syria debate ramped up in 2015 as polarizing candidates 
vied for the Democratic and Republican nominations to the upcoming U.S. Presidential 
Election.  Then-candidate Hillary Clinton campaigned on a pro- refugee platform that 
frequently emphasized to voters the dire humanitarian crisis in Syria and the moral 
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obligation of Americans to help and accept refugees.  Then-candidate Donald Trump 
gained popularity with Republican voters by opposing the entry of Syrian refugees to the 
United States.  Trump emphasized the threat of ISIS fighters infiltrating the country by 
posing as Syrian refugees and argued that the economic costs of accepting refugees should 
be shouldered by Syria’s Arab neighbors.  These arguments are part of Trump’s broader 
nationalist-populist platform that carried him to the Republican nomination and, ultimately, 
to the White House.  
 
What Lies Ahead 
In this chapter, I investigate how elites and actors in the news business frame policy 
issues concerning Muslims and majority-Muslim countries.  Specifically, I focus on the 
partisan debate surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis.  After identifying how the issue is 
framed, I investigate how various arguments influence American public opinion about 
allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  I draw on extant framing 
research to develop a theory that explains when specific frames or arguments, as a function 
of their quality and strength, will be likely to shift opinion about issues and then apply that 
theory to explain when frames or arguments might shift opinion, specifically, about issues 
concerning Muslims or majority-Muslim countries.  I then put that theory to empirical test 
in a survey experiment by exposing participants to various combinations of arguments 
about Syrian refugees and measuring changes in their opinions.  I describe the various 
arguments and survey experiment in greater detail below, but here I will summarize the 
findings and give a preface about the implications of the research to guide the discussion. 
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I analyze data collected at the beginning of the survey experiment to first get a sense 
of the factors that shape opinion about allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the 
United States (i.e., pretest support).  Again, I find evidence linking whites’ anti-Muslim 
stereotypes to policy preferences unfavorable to Muslims (i.e., opposition to allowing 
embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States).  I also find evidence supporting 
theories of the positive effects of intergroup contact (Allport 1954) and other research 
finding positive relationships between Muslim contact and preference for policies 
favorable to Muslims (Saleem, Yang, and Ramasubramanian 2016; Sikorski et al. 2017).  
In my study, those who self-report higher numbers of Muslim friends and colleagues are 
more likely than those with no Muslim friends to support allowing embattled Syrians to 
seek refuge in the United States.   
In the framing experiment, I find evidence that single exposures to pro-refugee 
arguments – specifically, frames that emphasize the moral obligation of Americans to help, 
the humanitarian crisis, and counterstereotypes of Muslims – influence substantive 
opinion shifts toward a more-supportive position.  In dual-exposure competitive conditions 
– where participants are exposed to opposing arguments – I find that pro-refugee frames 
also dominate anti-refugee frames by influencing opinion shifts toward their position.  The 
most telling conclusion from my analysis is that these framing effects are not simply 
influencing those already supportive of Syrian refugees to become more steadfast in their 
beliefs.  Instead, the framing effects influenced by pro-refugee frames in both single and 
competitive conditions are most pronounced among those who were initially opposed to 
accepting refugees rather than those who were initially supportive.     
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My investigation into public opinion surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis offers 
important theoretical and practical contributions.  I use existing theories of framing to 
explain when frames might influence public opinion about political issues.  Then I apply 
that theory to develop expectations about when frames might influence opinion about 
issues involving Muslims and majority-Muslim countries.  My analysis of elite frames 
surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis both replicate existing framing studies and adapts 
them to understand framing of Muslims and issues in the Middle East.  My focus on the 
on-going Syrian refugee crisis and frames employed during the recent 2016 Presidential 
Election also offer important perspective about how frames of Middle East issues influence 
opinion in the real world (i.e., external validity).  The most important and most practical 
takeaway from my investigation is that certain types of frames – particularly those that 
affirm counterstereotypes of Muslims – can shift issue opinions that are rooted in anti-
Muslim biases.  Although I focus explicitly on the Syrian refugee crisis in this chapter, I 
expect that research can offer practical ideas to politicians and actors in the news businesses 
for how to build unbiased narratives in reporting on Muslims and Middle East issues.   
In the following section, I briefly review the history of the Syrian civil war and 
refugee crisis – through the lens of U.S. involvement – since 2011.  I also spend some time 
detailing the partisan debate about the Syrian crisis in the United States.  With a better 
contextual understanding, I then delve deeper into political-communications research to 
develop expectations about how the domestic partisan debate shapes public opinion about 
accepting Syrian refuges into the United States.  Finally, I put my expectations to rigorous 
empirical test and conclude with discussion of the findings and implications of those 
findings. 
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The Syrian Civil War and Refugee Crisis 
Most Americans have more than passing familiarity with the Syrian civil war and 
the ongoing refugee crisis.  Although they may be unfamiliar with the circumstances that 
led to U.S. involvement in the conflict, many are likely familiar with partisan debate over 
the issue.  Many might recall President Obama’s “red line” warning to President Assad at 
the beginning of the war, which directly set the stage for U.S. intervention in Syria.  
Although President Obama – along with several of his European counterparts – began 
issuing sanctions against the Assad regime in 2011, his “red line” remarks to reporters at 
an August 2012 White House press briefing were the sparks that lit the fiery political debate 
over Syria and ultimately led to U.S. military intervention (Chollet 2016).  When asked 
about Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons against his citizens – and if the United 
States would respond with force – President Obama responded that, “We have been very 
clear to the Assad regime…that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of 
chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.  That would change my calculus.”   
Indeed, in August 2013, the Syrian government launched a chemical attack against 
rebels in Damascus that killed nearly 1,500 civilians – including many children – and 
Obama’s “red line” was crossed (Almukhtar 2018).  Political pressure for a U.S. response 
mounted quickly and Obama’s comments were debated on a constant loop on network 
news.   Over the next year, U.S. involvement in the Syrian conflict rose to the top of the 
foreign-policy agenda.  Instead of taking action, President Obama sought to share 
responsibility with members of Congress, asking them to authorize air strikes in Syria 
(Conway 2017; Associated Press 2019).  When that proposal was met with skepticism from 
both parties – following extensive public backlash against the idea – the President resorted 
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to negotiating with Russia to cut a deal that would remove or destroy Syria’s chemical 
weapons stockpile (Conway 2017; Associated Press 2019).  Within the year, the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons signaled that Assad’s chemical-
weapons stockpile had been removed from the country (Conway 2017; Associated Press 
2019).  Although this initially seemed to be a major foreign policy victory for Obama, the 
report proved to be inaccurate and the worst was yet to come. 
 Syria saw a rapid influx of non-state actors into the country – particularly ISIS and 
other terrorist groups – and a drastic increase in terror attacks against civilians and U.S. 
military personnel in 2013 and 2014 (Conway 2017; Associated Press 2019).  After 
declaring themselves an Islamic caliphate, ISIS fighters took over the provincial capital of 
Raqqa in March 2013 and established the city as their own capital (Conway 2017; 
Associated Press 2019).  ISIS continued to overtake large chunks of territory along the 
Syria-Iraq border over the next year and toppled the Iraqi cities of Fallujah and Ramadi 
(Conway 2017; Associated Press 2019).  By June 2014, ISIS had seized control of Mosul, 
a northern Iraqi city with a population of over one million.  With this serious blow to 
security in the Middle East, President Obama finally gained enough backing from Congress 
to intervene in Syria.  On September 18, 2014, the President’s plan for the United States to 
arm and train rebels to fight against ISIS passed Congress with bipartisan support (Conway 
2017; Associated Press 2019).  Just four days later, the first of many airstrikes were 
authorized by the President and carried out against ISIS targets over the next four years 
(Conway 2017; Associated Press 2019). 
Despite an initial plan for a limited on-the-ground presence, the U.S. troop count in 
Syria quickly increased from just a few hundred to over 2,000 in 2015 (where it remains 
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as of this writing).  Much of the troop surge coincided with the establishment of a Russian 
military base in Latakia and a declaration of support for the Syrian regime by Russian 
President Vladimir Putin.  If the list of combatants and their roles weren’t confusing enough 
already, here’s where things have stood since the end of 2015: Russia has a strong presence 
in Syria and, along with Iran, supports the Syrian regime against rebels; the United States 
and its allies support rebel groups – particularly Kurds – fighting the Syrian forces; and, 
all combatants are fighting ISIS.   
Beginning with Russian involvement, U.S. policy in Syria starts to come across as 
a muddle.  Rather than conveying clear policy goals, much of the news about the conflict 
since late 2015 reads like retaliatory playground versions of Cold War ”I didn’t do it, he 
did it!” After the United States and Russia agreed to a ceasefire on September 12, 2016 – 
to allow aid to reach embattled civilians – fourteen people and nine children were killed 
three days later in an airstrike (Conway 2017; Associated Press 2019).  The United States 
and Russia publicly blamed each other.  Two days later, coalition airstrikes intended to 
target ISIS militants instead killed sixty-two Syrian soldiers and were publicly criticized 
by Russia (Conway 2017; Associated Press 2019).  On September 20, U.S. officials blamed 
Russia for strikes on a humanitarian convoy that left more than twenty dead and 
temporarily halted the movement of U.N. convoys in Syria (Conway 2017; Associated 
Press 2019).  The week culminated in a game of military one-upmanship when over 200 
airstrikes hit Aleppo in a three-day period in what must have looked like a space battle in 
Star Wars (Conway 2017; Associated Press 2019). 
 In 2016, as the U.S. Presidential Election ramped up, much of the domestic political 
debate focused on the U.S. government’s role in helping displaced Syrian refugees.  
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Throughout the election, Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton established her pro-refugee 
platform by emphasizing the humanitarian crisis and evoking affect toward the suffering 
of women and children (Ballotpedia 2016).  Clinton also frequently appealed to the sense 
of moral obligation that Americans should have toward helping those in the warzone 
(Ballotpedia 2016).  Meanwhile, Republican frontrunner Donald Trump expressed 
concerns over the economic costs of accepting refugees and the potential threat of terrorism 
from ISIS fighters posing as refugees and entering the U.S (Ballotpedia 2016).  At one 
point, he also called for a “complete and total shutdown” of Muslims entering the U.S 
(Ballotpedia 2016).   
Trump was eventually elected and just seven days after taking office, he delivered 
on his campaign promise by signing Executive Order 13769 – the so-called “Muslim Ban” 
– which indefinitely suspended the entry of Syrian refugees to the United States and banned 
entries from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somali, Sudan, and Yemen for 90 days.  That initial ban set 
off a wave of protests, many of which took place in U.S. airports.  The detention of U.S. 
visa holders and legal residents created confusion, receiving a great deal of media coverage 
and prompting involvement by the ACLU of Washington.  In the aftermath of the executive 
order, the Supreme Court has overturned the explicit “banning” of citizens from these 
countries but has upheld subsequent revisions that restrict entry to only those with business 
(B-1) and tourist (B-2) visas.  As domestic political debate surrounding the refugee crisis 
rages on; so too does the conflict in Syria.  Research at the intersection of the two is timely 
and will continue to be important into the foreseeable future. 
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In the next section, I will briefly recap our theoretical discussion from Chapter 
Three before proceeding with my empirical investigation into framing of the Syrian refugee 
crisis. 
 
Framing Effects 
The framing process is a term broadly used to describe the strategic structuring, 
writing, and producing of stories, with emphasis on the adjustment of headlines, word 
usage, rhetoric, and narration (Cappella and Jamieson 1997).  Elites seek to frame certain 
political issues by making these adjustments in ways that might shift constituents’ opinions 
toward their position, which means that citizens in multi-party systems will often be 
exposed to competing frames or competing arguments about an issue (Zaller 1992; 
Druckman 2001; Sniderman and Theriault 2004; Brewer and Gross 2005).   
Political communications research that focuses on cognitive reasoning suggests that 
three main psychological processes determine the extent to which issue frames produce 
framing effects and influence public opinion.   For frames to shift opinion, they must target 
values or considerations that are:  
 available (i.e., a consideration must be available for retrieval and use; Eagly 
and Chaikin 1993); 
 accessible (i.e., people who think about issues are likely to have more 
accessible considerations; Fazio 1995); and,  
 applicable (i.e., conscious evaluation of the applicability of accessible 
considerations, particularly when exposed to frames of opposing 
considerations; Fazio 1995; Kuklinski et al. 2001; Druckman 2004).   
 
The impact that frames have on opinion will be congruent to their strength.  Frames will 
be strong and most likely to shift opinion by targeting available, accessible, and applicable 
ideas.  In contrast, weak frames will have less impact on opinion because they emphasize 
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unavailable or inapplicable considerations.  When consumers are exposed to opposing 
frames that are unbalanced in strength, opinion is likely to shift toward the position of the 
strong argument.  In some cases, the news consumer might infer that the poor quality of 
the weak frame is due to an indefensible position (Martin and Achee 1992; Chong and 
Druckman 2007b).  Finally, exposure to opposing frames that are balanced in strength 
should influence the news consumer to moderate their position.  Those who are higher in 
political knowledge and more attentive to issues should be especially motivated to 
deliberate and find the “correct position.”  
From here, my research departs from other work because I do not choose frames to 
test experimentally based on theoretical criteria (Chong and Druckman 2007b).   Instead, I 
let theory guide my expectations about how the Syrian refugee crisis is framed and how 
those arguments vary in strength.  Then, I conduct two pretests to test those expectations 
and use the results of those pretests to develop hypotheses about how frames surrounding 
the Syrian refugee crisis influence public opinion about the issue.  Finally, I put those 
expectations to rigorous experimental testing.     
 
Framing the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
Earlier, I noted that elites and actors in the news business attempt to frame issues 
in ways that influence public opinion toward their respective issue positions.  Frames or 
arguments should be particularly effective at influencing such opinion shifts when they 
emphasize considerations that, for news consumers, are present in mind (available) and 
deemed relevant to the issue.  Throughout this research, I find that considerations of threat 
and in-group identity are idea elements that are pivotal in shaping public opinion about 
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policy issues involving Muslims and majority-Muslim countries.  Therefore, I expect that 
elites attempt to frame antipathy toward Muslims and opposition to policies favorable to 
Muslims by primarily emphasizing threat-based considerations.  Emphasizing threat 
should offer a particularly effective or strong way for those with anti-Muslim biases and/or 
opposed to pro-Muslim policies to frame these issues and shape opinion.   
On the other side, I expect that elites attempt to frame Muslims in a positive way 
and/or support for policies favorable to Muslims by primarily emphasizing obligations to 
the national identity.  Appealing to obligations of the national identity should offer a 
particularly effective or strong way for those who support pro-Muslim policies to frame 
issues and shape opinion.  I also expect that elites attempt to frame issues involving 
Muslims and policies in the Middle East by focusing on pragmatic ideas, such as those 
related to economic considerations or diplomatic considerations.  However, I expect that 
such frames – that is frames unrelated to in-group identity or threat idea elements – should 
be relatively weak.   
I identify frames surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis by reviewing speech and 
debate content from the recent 2016 Presidential Election.  By focusing on the elite debate 
surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis, I can investigate my expectations about how elites 
frame policy issues involving Muslims and majority-Muslim countries, as well as test how 
those frames influence public opinion.  By focusing on frames of the Syrian refugee crisis 
employed during the 2016 Presidential Election, my research will unearth how arguments 
– to which many Americans have been exposed – influence opinion in an on-going political 
debate and, therefore, will speak to real-world framing effects (i.e., external validity).   
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My review of candidate statements yields four frames of the Syrian refugee crisis 
constantly employed during the election: 
 an economic frame (Trump argument that we should not accept refugees 
because other Middle East states need to put up the resources, not the United 
States); 
 a threat frame (Trump argument that we should not accept refugees because we 
do not know who they are, and they could be terrorists trying to come to the 
United States to commit acts of terror); 
 a humanitarian frame (Clinton argument that we should accept refugees 
because the United States needs to help the innocents who are suffering and 
dying in the Syrian conflict); and, 
 a moral obligation frame (Clinton argument that we should accept refugees 
because it is not who we are as Americans to discriminate and turn away those 
in need. 
 
These commonly used frames align with my expectations about how competing 
sides frame the Syrian refugee crisis.  Throughout the election, then-candidate Donald 
Trump frequently framed the Syrian refugee crisis by emphasizing the threat of terrorism 
from ISIS fighters who will pose as refugees and enter the United States.  At times, he also 
made pragmatic appeals to the economic costs of allowing Syrians to seek refuge in the 
United States.  Then-candidate Hillary Clinton also frequently framed the issue by 
emphasizing the moral obligation of Americans to help Syrians, rather than turning them 
away.  Clinton’s other common arguments typically focused on affective appeals, rather 
than pragmatic issues, by focusing on the emotional subject of suffering inflicted on Syrian 
women and children. 
In addition to these frames, I also construct a counterstereotype affirming frame to 
examine how direct statements that affirm counterstereotypes about Muslims and refugees 
influence opinion in this competitive information environment.  The counterstereotype 
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affirming frame argues that the United States should accept Syrian refugees because “there 
are a lot of stereotypes out there that are wrong” and then lists several examples.  Finally, 
I construct a neutral frame to serve as a baseline – or a control condition – against which I 
can compare the influence of the five directional arguments.  The neutral frame does not 
take either side in the debate on the Syrian refugee crisis.   
To recap, I will investigate how public opinion about allowing embattled Syrians 
to seek refuge in the United States is influenced by six different frames: economic, threat, 
humanitarian, moral obligation, counterstereotype affirming, and neutral frames.  
However, to draw some expectations about how these frames influence opinion, I first need 
to empirically test their strength.  To do this, I conduct two pretests.   
In Pretest 1, my goals are to determine if consumers of the frames correctly perceive 
the directions of the arguments (i.e., supporting or opposing entry of refugees) and how 
they evaluate the effectiveness (i.e., applicability) of each argument.  Note that a strong 
evaluation of effectiveness on the pretest might reflect strong applicability, but not 
necessarily availability.  In Pretest 2, my goal is to evaluate the availability of the 
arguments by asking individuals – with no knowledge of the frames or the research – what 
ideas come to mind when they think about the Syrian refugee crisis and then comparing 
those to the considerations espoused by the frames.   The results from these pretests are 
considered when I evaluate strong and weak frames on each side of the Syrian refugee 
debate and develop expectations about the influence of the frames on opinion about Syrian 
refugees.  Finally, it is worth noting here that time and resources limited the scope of 
coming experiment and I did not investigate how exposure to various frames over time 
influenced the accessibility of certain considerations or shifts in opinion about the crisis.   
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Pretest 1: Direction and Applicability 
 In Pretest 1, I asked a student sample (N = 52) drawn from two research methods 
courses at a large midwestern university to evaluate the six frames – in random order and 
in isolation from each other – in terms of their direction and effectiveness.  I presented each 
frame as a “statement made by a candidate for Congress next year” in order to eliminate 
bias that might arise from the arguments being referenced to the polarizing presidential 
candidates.  The students had no knowledge that they were participating in an experimental 
pretest or of the forthcoming experiment.  The full versions of these frames – used in both 
the pretest and in the full experiment below – are presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 | Elite Framing of the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
Frame 
(Direction) 
Argument 
Threat Frame 
(Anti-Refugee) 
 
Candidate: “We can’t accept Syrian refugees.  There will be attacks that you 
wouldn’t believe.  There will be attacks by the people that are, right now, that 
are coming into our country.  I have no doubt in my mind.  Our country has 
enough difficulty right now without letting the Syrians pour in, and again, we 
don't know that they're Syrians.  We don't know where they come from; we have 
no idea.  They could be ISIS.  They could be who knows…”   
 
Economic Frame 
(Anti-Refugee) 
Candidate: “We can’t accept Syrian refugees.  We don’t know where they’re 
from…we don’t know where they’re from and they have no documentation.  We 
all have hearts and we can build safe zones in Syria.  But we need to get the 
Gulf states to put up the money.  We’re not putting up the money.  The Gulf 
states need to play a bigger role in taking the Syrian refugees.”   
 
Humanitarian Frame 
(Pro-Refugee) 
 
Candidate: “We must accept Syrian refugees.  We can't let anyone in our 
country that poses a risk to us.  But there are a lot of refugees...women and 
children; think of that picture we all saw of that 4-year-old boy with the blood 
on his forehead because he'd been bombed by the Russian and Syrian Air 
Forces.  There are children suffering in this catastrophic war, largely, I believe, 
because of Russian aggression.  And we need to do our part.  We by no means 
are carrying anywhere near the load that Europe and others are.  But we will 
have vetting that is as tough as it needs to be from our professionals, our 
intelligence experts and others." 
 
Moral Obligation 
Frame 
(Pro-Refugee) 
 
Candidate: “We must accept Syrian refugees.  We have to accept refugees from 
Syria.  Turning away orphans, applying a religious test, discriminating against 
Muslims, slamming the door on every Syrian refugee; that is just not who we 
are.  We are better than that.  And remember, many of these refugees are fleeing 
the same terrorists who threaten us.  It would be a cruel irony indeed if ISIS can 
force families from their homes and then also prevent them from ever finding 
new ones." 
 
Counterstereotype  
Affirming Frame 
(Pro-Refugee) 
 
Candidate: " We must accept Syrian refugees.  Put yourself in their position.  
What if your homes and communities were being attacked and bombed by your 
own leader, while other countries were fighting your armed forces and each 
other?  Plus, there are a lot of stereotypes out there that are wrong.  Let's talk 
about facts.  Many Muslims have favorable views of American people; and they 
overwhelmingly oppose terrorism and violence.  These people are trying to 
escape the very same terrorists we are fighting in Syria and Iraq.  Perhaps the 
most important fact of all...zero attacks in the United States have been 
committed by refugees.  We need to do our part." 
 
Neutral Frame  
(Control Condition) 
Candidate: "I’m not sure what is the best approach with the refugees.  We have 
to closely evaluate this situation with Syria and carefully consider our options.  
I want to see more information and talk with our senior defense and intelligence 
officials.  I want to see an assessment of the risks, while keeping in mind that 
can help these people." 
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I test the direction of each frame by analyzing how participants rated each frame on 
a seven-point directional support scale (1 = Definitely opposes; 7 = Definitely supports).  
My findings suggest that each frame sufficiently conveys the direction of its position.  The 
economic and threat frames identify as arguments opposing acceptance of Syrian refugees 
into the United States.  On the directional support scale, the threat frame averages a score 
of 1.21 (closest to “Definitely opposes”) and the economic frame averages a score of 2.17 
(closest to “Opposes”).  The remaining three directional frames also identify as arguments 
supporting the acceptance of Syrian refugees into the United States.  The 
counterstereotype-affirming frame averages a score of 4.96, the humanitarian frame 
averages 4.6, and the moral obligation frame averages 4.88.  The average score for the 
neutral frame is 4.0 – or precisely at the middle of the directional support scale – which 
corresponds with the idea that the candidate “neither supports nor opposes” admitting 
refugees.  These results are depicted graphically in Figure 6.1. 
I test the effectiveness of each frame by analyzing how participants rated each 
frame on a seven-point argument effectiveness scale (1 = Definitely ineffective; 7 = 
Definitely effective).  In summary, all three pro-refugee frames rate – on average – as more 
effective arguments than the anti-refugee frames.  At first glance, I was concerned that 
social desirability biases influenced how the frames were rated.  However, in the 
forthcoming experiment, I find strong evidence that the influence that the pro-refugee 
frames have on opinion about refugees corroborate the ratings from the pretest.  Social 
desirability bias does not seem to be a problem. 
The economic frame averages a score of 3.54 and the threat frame averages a score 
of 3.71.  The humanitarian frame averages 4.54, the moral obligation frame averages 4.68, 
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and the counterstereotype-affirming frame averages 4.76.  These scores indicate that each 
pro-refugee argument is perceived as more effective than each anti-refugee argument.  
Specifically, the economic frame represents the least applicable anti-refugee argument and 
the least applicable overall argument.  The counterstereotype-affirming frame presents the 
most applicable pro-refugee argument and the most applicable argument overall.  
Interestingly, the mean score for the neutral frame is 4.42 which indicates that it is 
perceived as a more applicable argument than each anti-refugee argument, despite not 
taking a position.  These results are depicted graphically in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.1 | Pretest Direction of Syrian Refugee Crisis Frames 
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Question: How would you rate the extent to which this candidate opposes or supports allowing 
refugees from Syria? (N=52)
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Figure 6.2 | Pretest Strength of Syrian Refugee Crisis Frames 
 
 
 
Pretest 2: Availability 
The analysis from Pretest 1 offer some insight about the strength of the various 
Syrian refugee frames, but I am not able to directly interpret whether frames scores reflect 
their applicability or the combination of their applicability and availability.  For example, 
the humanitarian frame was rated as very applicable to the issue, but this does not 
necessarily mean that humanitarian considerations are also available.  I conducted a second 
pretest with an independent sample drawn from the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform (N 
= 64) to test whether frames that rated as (in) applicable are also (un) available.   
In Pretest 2, I began by giving an impartial description of the Syrian refugee crisis 
to participants: 
The Syrian civil war began in 2011.  Still ongoing, the conflict in Syria has 
displaced many of its citizens and is often referred to as the Syrian refugee crisis.  
The Syrian refugee crisis was a focal point of the 2016 Presidential Election and 
remains a divisive issue today.  Politicians and their constituents are very divided 
about what should be the United States’ role in the Syrian refugee crisis. 
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After participants read the description, I then asked them to list the ideas that come 
to mind when they think about the issue.  To help guide them, I gave an example of the list 
task – without divulging its purpose – conducted in the experimental framing research by 
Chong and Druckman (2007b):  
Consider the following: In a recent survey, participants were asked to list ideas that 
came to mind when they thought about an urban growth proposal.  Some examples 
of common ideas are “open space,” “citizen participation,” “taxes,” and 
“pollution.” 
 
When you think about Syrian refugees coming to the United States, what ideas 
come to mind?  Please list any ideas that you have.  List as many ideas as you desire. 
 
Thirty-one percent of participants listed ideas consistent with humanitarian 
concerns (e.g., humanitarian crisis, help those suffering), 19% listed economic concerns 
(e.g., we can’t take care of our own people, this will cost too much), 15% listed threat 
concerns (e.g., terrorism, attacks), and 15% listed moral obligations of Americans or the 
United States to help refugees.   
These results – combined with those from Pretest 1 – strongly suggest that the 
humanitarian frame evokes available and applicable considerations.  The economic, threat, 
and moral obligation frames seem to emphasize considerations that are less available, but 
applicable for many citizens.  The counterstereotype-affirming frame scores as the most 
applicable argument, but this also doesn’t seem to be a function of bringing available 
considerations to mind:  Only one response in Pretest 2 explicitly mentions a concern about 
anti-Muslim attitudes influencing opinion about refugees.  These results are summarized 
graphically in Figure 6.3.  
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Figure 6.3 | Pretest Available Considerations about the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
 
 
Expectations   
In the forthcoming experiment, I investigate how six elite arguments – economic, 
threat, humanitarian, moral obligation, counterstereotype, and neutral frames – influence 
opinion about the acceptance of Syrian refugees into the United States.  Results from the 
two pretests will guide the development of expectations about how these various frames – 
as a function of the variance in their availability and applicability – impact public opinion 
in single exposure and dual exposure competitive conditions. 
  
Single Exposure Conditions 
Evidence from the pretests suggests that each of the five directional arguments (not 
including the neutral frame) are clear about their positions (direction) and evoke applicable 
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However, recall from prior discussion that framing effects depend, in part, on the 
strength of the arguments.  In other words, while each frame should shift opinion toward 
its respective position, those opinions shifts (or the magnitude of the framing effects) 
should also be congruent to their applicability and availability.  On the anti-refugee side of 
the debate, I expect that the threat frame will exert more influence on opinion than the 
economic frame because it scores higher in applicability and about equal in availability.  
On the pro-refugee side of the debate, I expect that the humanitarian frame will be more 
effective than the moral obligation and counterstereotype-affirming frames at shifting 
opinion because it scores highest in availability and applicability.  Finally, I expect that all 
three pro-refugee frames – much higher in applicability – will be more effective than their 
anti-refugee frames at moving opinion toward their position.  Stated as formal hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6.1: All frames will shift opinion toward their respective positions in 
single exposure conditions, but the threat frame will be more 
effective than the economic frame and the humanitarian frame will 
be more effective than the moral obligation and counterstereotype-
affirming frame. 
 
Hypothesis 6.2: Humanitarian, moral obligation, and counterstereotype-affirming 
frames will influence substantively larger shifts toward their 
position than threat and economic frames influence toward their 
position. 
 
Dual Exposure (Competitive) Conditions 
Extant framing theory also helps me derive expectations about how these frames 
might influence opinion about allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United 
States in competitive contexts.  On the one hand, strong frames should dominate their 
weaker oppositional counterparts in unbalanced conditions – shifting opinion toward their 
position – because they bring available and applicable considerations to mind.  On the other 
 
 
146 
 
hand, in balanced conditions, opposing strong arguments should cause deliberation – and, 
therefore, moderation of opinion – because both are available and applicable.   
However, recall that the Syrian refugee crisis frames were not selected for this 
research based on pre-specified criteria vis-à-vis their direction and strength (i.e., roughly 
equivalent opposing strong and weak frames).  In fact, as the pretests show, prevalent 
frames of the Syrian refugee crisis do not sort quite so neatly based on pre-specified criteria.  
Put another way, frames on opposing sides of the debate do not stand on equal ground.   All 
three pro-refugee frames rate higher in applicability than their anti-refugee counterparts 
and the pro-refugee humanitarian frame rates higher in availability than all anti-refugee 
frames.  Based on this evidence, I expect that in all dual-exposure conditions, pro-refugee 
frames will dominate anti-refugee frames.  I expect that the pro-refugee frames will exert 
substantively larger influences on opinion shifts toward their position when they oppose 
weakest anti-refugee argument in the economic frame.  Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 6.3: Pro-refugee frames will dominate anti-refugee frames in dual 
exposure conditions by shifting opinion toward the pro-refugee position.  These 
effects will be substantively larger when a pro-refugee frame opposes the economic 
frame. 
 
I also expect that pro-refugee frames will have substantively larger influence on 
opinion among those with existing anti-refugee opinions compared to those with existing 
pro-refugee opinions.  As the pretests suggest, those with existing anti-refugee opinions 
likely find little support from value-consistent weak anti-refugee frames and, therefore, I 
expect that they should be especially likely to shift their opinions after exposure to the 
much stronger pro-refugee frames.  I restate Hypotheses 6.2 and 6.3 with this caveat 
included:  
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Hypothesis 6.2a:  Humanitarian, moral obligation, and counterstereotype-
affirming frames will influence substantively larger opinion shifts toward their 
position among those who had existing anti-refugee opinions compared to those 
with existing pro-refugee opinions. 
Hypothesis 6.3a: Pro-refugee frames will dominate anti-refugee frames in dual 
exposure conditions by shifting opinion toward the pro-refugee position.  These 
effects will be substantively largest among those with existing anti-refugee 
opinions when a pro-refugee frame opposes the economic frame.   
 
Methods 
 I conducted a survey experiment to investigate my hypotheses about the influences 
that various frames have on public opinion about allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge 
in the United States.  Experimentation offers two distinct advantages to my research.  First, 
through random assignment of participants to treatments, I can overcome issues of self-
selection in which individual’s attitudes might be correlated with the messages they 
receive.  Second, by controlling participants’ exposure to various frames, I can distinguish 
the influences of the content and the combinations of messages.  Below, I analyze pretest 
data to understand what factors shape participants’ existing opinions about the acceptance 
of Syrian refugees.  I then investigate how frames shifted those opinions during the 
experiment.   
 
Recruitment 
I initially recruited 600 adult white participants from the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) online labor market to “participate in a survey about politics and recent statements 
made by candidates for Congress” (i.e., a deception used to hide the experiment).  I focused 
on recruiting whites – rather than a representative sample – because of the consistent 
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evidence I find that whites are more prone than blacks to stereotype Muslims and, as a 
result, to prefer policies that are hostile or disadvantageous to Muslims.  In other words, as 
I investigate how frames – particularly those that might mitigate the influence that anti-
Muslim stereotypes have on public opinion – I focus my investigation on those most likely 
to harbor anti-Muslim stereotypes and ethnocentric policy preferences.  Participants also 
had to agree that they lived in the United States and offered their participation voluntarily 
to screen into the study. 
MTurk is a tool that is widely used by social scientists to recruit diverse pools of 
research subjects in an efficient manner and at low costs (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; 
Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby 2017; Owens and Hawkins 2018).  However, recent research 
suggests some MTurk workers try to circumvent sample screening methods by using 
virtual private servers and virtual private networks that conceal their physical location 
(Dennis, Goodson, and Pearson 2018).  This means that an unsuspecting researcher might 
receive fraudulent responses from outside the United States and/or multiple responses from 
the same individual (Dennis, Goodson, and Pearson 2018).  Considering this, I aimed my 
initial recruitment higher than the final sample target.  Once the data were collected on the 
600 initial participants, I analyzed those responses for duplicate IP addresses and duplicate 
GPS coordinates to the fourth decimal place (i.e., accurate to 11 meters) to identify and 
remove fraudsters from the sample.  The final sample came to 485 participants or roughly 
40 in each of my twelve framing conditions — plenty to be able to make valid statistical 
comparisons between the conditions.   
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Design 
After successfully screening into the study, participants were directed to the 
Qualtrics survey program where they completed the survey.23F24  Participants first completed 
a pretest questionnaire that asked about the importance of the Syrian refugee crisis and 
support for allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  The pretest 
questionnaire also included demographic questions, questions about attitudes toward and 
contact with Muslims, and political knowledge questions that are used to construct control 
variables in the pre-experimental analysis ahead.  Other pretest questions were included to 
mask the purpose of the experiment, such as opinion questions about the confirmation of 
Justice Brett Kavanaugh and factual questions about the Electoral College.   
After the pretest questions, participants were randomly and equally assigned to 
twelve experimental conditions designed to test how different frames of the Syrian refugee 
crisis influence opinion about allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United 
States.  In each condition (Table 6.2), participants were exposed to either one or two 
competing arguments about accepting Syrian refugees.  After reading the argument(s) in 
their assigned conditions, participants answered a posttest questionnaire, including 
questions – analogous to the pretest – about support for allowing embattled Syrians to seek 
refuge in the United States.  Finally, participants were debriefed about the experiment and 
the purpose of the research before exiting the survey.  Those who completed the survey 
received a validation code to enter back into the MTurk portal in order to receive 
compensation for participating. 
                                                     
24 In compliance with Institutional Review Board protocols, all participants were debriefed about the 
experiment and the fictitious stories they read at the end of their time in the experiment. 
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Table 6.2 | Conditions in Syrian Refugee Crisis Framing Experiment 
  
 Single Exposure Conditions 
Condition 1 Economic Frame
Condition 2 Threat Frame
Condition 3 Humanitarian Frame
Condition 4 Moral Obligation Frame
Condition 5 Counterstereotype Affirming frame 
Condition 6 Neutral (no frame)
 
 Dual Exposure Conditions 
Condition 7 Economic + Humanitarian
Condition 8 Economic + Moral Obligation 
Condition 9 Economic + Counterstereotype Affirming 
Condition 10 Threat + Humanitarian
Condition 11 Threat + Moral
Condition 12 Threat + Counterstereotype Affirming 
 
Measures 
 The key dependent variable in the pre-experiment model below is pretest opinion.  
The pretest item asks, “How strongly do you support or oppose Syrian refugees coming to 
the United States?” Response options range from “Strongly oppose” (1) to “Strongly 
support” (7).  The key dependent variable in the experimental model is change in opinion.  
This indicator measures how participants’ opinions shifted from the pretest to the posttest 
as a result of exposure to various frames.  When this variable was created, twelve 
observations or about two percent of the sample were identified and omitted from the 
analysis.  These observations corresponded to five- or six-point opinion shifts (on a seven-
point scale) that seem unlikely to have occurred in earnest due to brief exposures to news 
stories, but instead due to participants shirking the survey.  Change in opinion is simply 
taken as the difference in pretest opinion and posttest opinion and ranges from -2 to +2. 
 The primary independent variables in the pre-experiment model below are percent 
of friends Muslim, percent of colleagues Muslim, intensity of Muslim stereotypes, age, 
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party ID, male, education, political knowledge, and survey duration.1  The intensity of 
Muslim stereotypes measure is included to provide another test of the theory developed in 
Chapter Three: Anti-Muslim stereotypes among whites are likely to shape ethnocentric 
preferences toward policy issues involving Muslims or majority-Muslim countries.  The 
contact variables (i.e., percent of friends Muslim and percent of colleagues Muslim) provide 
a direct test of the theory that higher levels of intergroup contact can promote tolerance and 
lead to positive intergroup relations (Allport 1954; Voss 2001).  The demographic variables 
are included as standard political control variables.  Finally, survey duration is intended to 
control for the possibility that participants may have shirked giving quality responses in 
the survey leading to estimates that diverge from theoretical expectations.   
The primary independent variables in the full experimental model are twelve binary 
or “dummy” variables that indicate if an individual was exposed to a given frame or 
combination of frames.  In the experimental model, the neutral frame variable is omitted 
to serve as a point of reference (i.e., reference or baseline category). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 The percent Muslim friends and percent Muslim colleagues items range from 0-100. The intensity of Muslim 
stereotype item is a five-point indicator of agreement that “violent” describes “most Muslims (1 = Not at 
all; 5 = Extremely well).  Age ranges from 18-99+.  Party ID is a four-point indicator (1 = Independent 2 
= Republican; 3 = Democrat; 4 = Other, or Other).  Male is a dichotomous gender variable (0 = Female; 1 
= Male).  Education is a six-point item ranging from 1 = No high school to 6 = Some post graduate or post-
graduate degree.  Political knowledge is an index of six political knowledge items.  Finally, survey duration 
is a measure of the amount of time (in seconds) respondents spent in the survey.   
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Pre-Experiment Support for Allowing Embattled Syrians to Seek Refuge in the 
United States  
 
I estimate a pre-experiment model (Table 6.3) to understand the factors that shape 
opinion opinions about allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States 
before later experimentally testing how various frames shift those opinions.  The model 
estimates ordinary least squares regression coefficients given the continuous nature of the 
dependent variable pretest opinion. 
I find clear evidence – corroborating expectations and other findings presented 
throughout this dissertation – that, on average, anti-Muslim stereotypes among whites exert 
a strong and deleterious influence on support for policies harmful to Muslims.  In this case, 
I find strong evidence that anti-Muslim stereotypes erode support for allowing embattled 
Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  I estimate that each one-point increase in the 
intensity of Muslim stereotypes decreases support for accepting Syrian refugees by about 
.75 points (p < .01).  This means that those harboring the most intense stereotypes of 
Muslims as violent (i.e., “violent” describes “most Muslims” extremely well) are likely to 
register 3.75 points lower in support for accepting refugees than those with the least intense 
stereotypes.     
I also find evidence that, on average, both forms of contact – estimated in separate 
iterations of the model because of high multicollinearity – increase support for allowing 
embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  I estimate that a one percent increase 
in either the percent of one’s friends who are Muslim or colleagues who are Muslim 
increases support for accepting Syrian refugees by about .02 points (p < .01).  I estimate 
that, on average, partisanship also exerts strong influences on support for allowing 
embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  I estimate that Democrats are more 
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likely than Independents to support accepting Syrian refugees by about 1.12 points and 
Republicans are less likely than Independents to support accepting Syrian refugees by 
about .88 points (p < 01 each).   Finally, I estimate that, on average, males and older 
participants are less likely to support allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the 
United States compared to females and younger participants.  I estimate that males are 
more likely than females to oppose accepting refugees by about .28 points and that each 
year increase in age decreases support for accepting refugees by about .01 points (p < .01).  
Survey duration – or the amount of time spent in the survey measured in seconds – seems 
to have no influence on responses about accepting Syrian refugees.  
I should note an interesting finding regarding the influence of education on support 
for allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  The estimates presented 
in the model might suggest that education, on average, has no influence on support for 
accepting Syrian refugees.  In a preliminary version of the model, I did find that education 
seems to have a strong influence on support for accepting Syrian refugees.  However, most 
of the variance in support for accepting Syrian refugees explained by education is soaked 
up when I add the Muslim contact variables to the model.  This evidence resonates with 
my discussion in Chapter Four: Those who are involved in an academic setting – either as 
a student or faculty member – are more likely, on average, than others to have contact with 
Muslims and, by extension, to be more tolerant toward Muslims and favorable toward 
policies that help Muslims.   
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Table 6.3 | Pretest Support for 
Accepting Syrian Refugees into the United States 
 
Intensity of Muslim Stereotype (Violent) -.74***
(.07)
-.75*** 
(.07) 
Percent of Friends Muslim .02***
(.00)
 
Percent of Colleagues Muslim  .02*** 
(.01) 
Party ID  
  
Democrat 1.12***
(.15)
1.13*** 
(.15) 
Republican -.88***
(.17)
-.87*** 
(.17) 
Age -.01** 
(.01)
-.01*** 
(.01) 
Male -.28** 
(.14)
-.29** 
(.13) 
Education .04 
(.05)
.04 
(.05) 
Survey Duration .00 
(.00)
.00 
(.00) 
Constant 4.95***
(.42)
4.96*** 
(.42) 
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  The 
coefficients and SEs for “Age” might seem to be an error, but this is due to 
rounding.  *** p < .01 ** p < .05 |  N = 437 |  R2 = .54 |  
 
Analysis: Framing the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
With these insights, I turn my focus to estimating how exposure to various frames 
or arguments about the Syrian refugee crisis influences public opinion about allowing 
embattled Syrian refugees to seek refuge in the United States.  To do this, I treat the neutral 
frame – or the control condition – as a baseline or point of comparison in each model.  The 
models ahead estimate ordinary-least-squares regression coefficients given the continuous 
nature of the dependent variables.   
In the experimental model (Table 6.4 below), I find compelling support for my 
hypotheses.  I find clear evidence that pro-refugee arguments, on average, influence 
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substantive opinion shifts toward support for allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in 
the United States.  In substantive terms, I estimate that single exposure to the humanitarian 
frame increases support for Syrian refugees by about .43-points (or .51-points relative to 
the neutral frame) on the five-point scale (p < .01).  Single exposure to the moral obligation 
frame increases support for Syrian refugees by about .22-points (or .30-points relative to 
the neutral frame; p < .05).  Exposure to the counterstereotype frame increases support for 
Syrian refugees by about .18-points (or .26-points relative to the neutral frame; p < .10).  
These findings strongly support Hypothesis 6.2 but offer only limited support for 
Hypothesis 6.1.  At this point, I do not see much evidence that permits me to make 
inferences about the influences of the anti-refugee frames.  Perhaps the threat and 
economic frames are influential only among those already inclined to oppose Syrian 
refugees.  I investigate this possibility ahead. 
In dual exposure competitive conditions, I find further evidence that each of the 
pro-refugee frames, on average, have substantial influence on public opinion about 
allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  I find that, in each condition 
pitting one of the pro-refugee frames against the economic frame, the pro-refugee frames 
are particularly effective.  When the humanitarian frame competes with the economic 
frame, I estimate that the humanitarian frame dominates the latter and increases support 
for Syrian refugees about .28-points (or .36-points relative to the neutral frame; p < .05).  
When the moral obligation frame competes with the economic frame, I estimate that the 
moral obligation frame dominates the latter and increases support for Syrian refugees by 
about .18-points (or .26-points relative to the neutral frame; p < .10).  I also estimate that 
when the counterstereotype-affirming frame competes with the economic frame, the 
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counterstereotype-affirming frame dominates the latter and increases support for Syrian 
refugees by about .34-points (or .42-points relative to the neutral frame; p < .01).  Taken 
together, these findings offer compelling support for Hypothesis 6.3.  
 
Table 6.4 | The Effect of Framing on 
Support for Accepting Syrian Refugees into the United States 
Frames Predicted Change 
in Opinion
Change Relative to 
Ambiguous Frame
 
Neutral -.08
 
Threat .02 .10 
(.15) 
Economic .00 .08 
(.16) 
Humanitarian .43 .51*** 
(.16) 
Moral Obligation .22 .30** 
(.15) 
Counterstereotype .18 .26* 
(.16) 
Economic + Humanitarian .28 .36** 
(.16) 
Economic + Moral .18 .26* 
(.16) 
Threat + Humanitarian .14 .22 
(.15) 
Threat + Moral .06 .14 
(.16) 
Economic + Counterstereotype .34 .42*** 
(.16) 
Threat + Counterstereotype .14 .22 
(.15) 
Note: Entries are predicted values and OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
below.  * p < .01; ** p < .05; *** p < .10. N = 482
  
In a secondary analysis of the experimental model, I also investigate how frames of 
the Syrian refugee crisis influence opinion conditional on participants’ initial (i.e., pretest) 
levels of support.  Here, I split the experimental sample into “opponents” (1, 2, and 3 on 
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the pretest measure) and “supporters” (5, 6, and 7 on the pretest measure) of Syrian 
refugees to gain a deeper understanding of how and among whom these frames are 
influencing opinion.   
 The secondary analysis (Table 6.5) suggests that, on average, average framing 
effects reported above are especially pronounced among those who oppose allowing 
embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  I estimate that the humanitarian 
frame influences a .46-point increase in support for Syrian refugees among opponents and 
.40-point increase in support those already supportive.  I estimate that the moral obligation 
frame influences a large .31-point increase in support for Syrian refugees among opponents 
compared to a .13-point increase among those already supportive.  I estimate that the 
counterstereotype-affirming frame influences a large .36-point increase in support for 
Syrian refugees among opponents compared to a .05-point increase among those already 
supportive.  This cumulative evidence strongly supports Hypothesis 6.2a.  I find an 
additional piece of supporting evidence for Hypothesis 6.1, as I estimate that the threat 
frame has a larger substantive impact than the economic frame in shifting opponents toward 
lower levels of support.  
 On average, the impacts that pro-refugee frames have in shifting opinion in dual 
competitive exposures are also pronounced among opponents rather than supporters of 
Syrian refugees.  When the humanitarian frame competes with the economic frame, the 
humanitarian frame dominates the latter and increases support among opponents by about 
.70-points.  When the counterstereotype-affirming frame competes with the economic 
frame, the counterstereotype-affirming frame dominates the latter and increases support 
among opponents by about one (1.00) point.  When the counterstereotype-affirming frame 
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competes with the threat frame, the counterstereotype-affirming frame dominates the latter 
and increases support among opponents by about .67-points.  These findings provide strong 
support for Hypothesis 6.3a. 
 
Table 6.5 | The Effects of Framing on Support for Accepting Refugees 
into the United States among Prior Opponents and Supporters 
 Opponents Supporters 
 Pretest 
Mean 
Posttest 
Mean 
+/- Pretest  
Mean 
Posttest 
Mean 
+/- 
Neutral 2.14 2.14 0 5.63 5.50 -.13
Threat 2.20 2.06 -.14 5.90 5.95 .05
Economic 2.07 2.07 0 6.09 6.09 0
Humanitarian 2.20 2.66 .46 6.16 6.56 .40 
Moral Obligation 2.19 2.50 .31 5.87 6.00 .13
Counterstereotype 1.93 2.29 .36 5.90 5.95 .05
Economic + Humanitarian 2.20 2.90 .70 6.04 6.19 .15
Economic + Moral 2.46 2.61 .15 5.83 5.91 .08
Threat + Humanitarian 2.14 2.21 .07 5.91 6.05 .14
Threat + Moral 2.18 2.18 0 5.95 6.05 .10
Economic + Counterstereotype 2.00 3.00 1.00 5.85 5.95 .10
Threat + Counterstereotype 1.58 2.25 .67 6.04 5.92 -.12
  
Note: Opponents are those who indicated a 1 (Strongly oppose), 2 (Oppose), or 3 (Somewhat oppose) 
on the pretest measure of support for allowing Syrian refugees to the United States.  Supporters are 
those who indicated a 5, 6, or 7. 
  
 
Discussion 
The current research takes an important first step toward understanding how elite 
frames – such as those emphasizing threat or counterstereotypes of Muslims – influence 
public opinion about policy issues involving Muslims and/or majority-Muslim countries.  
Whereas conventional wisdom holds that anti-Muslim stereotypes play a significant role 
in shaping public opinion about Middle East issues, less attention has been paid to 
understanding how elite arguments might influence these cognitive linkages.  This chapter 
aims to paint a clearer theoretical picture of these processes.  As a byproduct, this research 
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was undertaken with a focus on explaining how typically biased elite discourse of Muslims 
and Middle East issues might be structured in ways that serve to mitigate the role that ill-
informed biases of Muslims play in shaping ordinary Americans’ foreign policy 
preferences.  
I find compelling evidence throughout my analyses that, in general, elite frames 
that support allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States have positive 
influences on support for refugees.  On average, I find that frames emphasizing the 
humanitarian nature of the refugee crisis, the moral obligation of Americans to help 
refugees, and counterstereotypes of Muslims are each effective at influencing support for 
refugees.  I find that these effects are strong and significant when exposure to these frames 
occurs in isolation and in competition with elite arguments that oppose allowing embattled 
Syrian to seek refuge in the United States.  Additionally, my findings do not seem to reflect 
circumstances where only existing support for accepting refugees is getting stronger.  
Rather, I find that pro-refugee frames are particularly effective at shifting opinion toward 
their position among those with anti-refugee prior opinions. 
The evidence presented here contributes to extant framing theory by replicating 
previous studies that investigate the influence of issue frames on public opinion in 
competitive information environments (Chong and Druckman 2007b).  This research also 
builds upon those previous studies by offering insights into how competing political 
information affects public opinion about a salient real-world foreign policy issue.  
Specifically, where prior experimental research develops framing theory and then tests it 
using frames that meet certain criteria (i.e., strength and direction), I use insights from that 
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research to derive expectations about how a foreign policy issue is framed and then 
investigate how those frames influence public opinion. 
The normative implications of my findings are paramount.   I find evidence that 
counterstereotype-affirming information about Muslims substantively increases support 
for a policy that might be beneficial to Muslims (i.e., allowing embattled Syrians to seek 
refuge in the United States).  My findings comport with experimental social psychology 
research that finds evidence suggesting that affirming counterstereotypes can reduce 
automatic stereotype activation (Gawronski et al. 2008).  I extend the normative 
implications of this scholarship by demonstrating that such information is effective when 
it is used to frame an on-going real-world issue and when it is perceived as coming from 
real-world political elites.   
My findings that one side (i.e., pro-refugee) of the elite debate about Syrian 
refugees consistently dominates the other and, in particular, dominates the debate among 
those who oppose helping Syrian refugees is interesting.   Unfortunately, the scope of my 
investigation into the frames surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis does permit me to 
explore why some arguments are more applicable and available – and ultimately, more 
effective – than others.  Such an undertaking would likely require costly focus-groups or 
personal interviews wherein participants could evaluate and discuss the frames in great 
detail.   
However, it is worth noting here the possibility that the framing effects I observe 
corroborate others’ findings of a “backlash effect” against the recent “Muslim Ban” 
(Collingwood, Lajevardi, and Oskooii 2018).  These authors argue that, “an influx of new 
information portraying the ‘Muslim Ban’ at odds with inclusive elements of American 
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identity prompted some citizens to shift their attitudes” (Collingwood, Lajevardi, Oskooii 
2018).  Perhaps my analysis provides real-time evidence of the shifts these authors describe 
and of a political context that is especially ripe for narratives and demonstrations that speak 
out about the incongruities between American identity and othering or stereotyping others 
based on the violence perpetuated by terrorists.  Further investigation into these topics – 
through the lenses of the Syrian refugee crisis and other Middle East issues – would 
certainly comprise a timely and fruitful research agenda. 
In the same vein, future research should build upon the evidence presented here by 
investigating how the framing effects I observe are influenced by time and source 
attribution.  As I mentioned earlier, previous research has found that framing effects – in 
particular, those resulting from exposure to strong applicable frames – become more 
enhanced with repetition and attribution to credible or trustworthy sources (Miller and 
Krosnick 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006; Chong and Druckman 2007b).  The framing effects 
I observe in this study compete with Hillary Clinton’s relative inability to shift opinion 
during the 2016 Presidential Election, which begs the question of how her arguments would 
influence opinion when employed by a candidate not caught up in a nasty election 
dominated by headlines of scandals, cover-ups, and insults.  Another interesting question 
(and potential study) is how would Republicans react to pro-Muslim frames coming from 
Republican candidates or conservative-leaning news sources?   
These are just two potential avenues for future investigations.  The take-home point 
is that much painting remains to be done on the theoretical canvas that I have started here.  
The prospect that the framing effects I observe might be magnified under certain conditions 
should present great normative appeal to anyone interested in offering practical, 
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theoretically-rooted ideas to help offset the misguided influences that unfounded anti-
Muslim attitudes – perpetuated by negative media coverage – have on American public 
opinion and policy preferences. 
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Chapter Seven - The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
 
 If we can assume one thing about conflict in the Middle East, it is that history is 
likely to repeat itself.   The outbreak of sectarian violence in the Middle East has led the 
U.S. government to intervene militarily, time after time, on behalf of its strategic and 
economic interests in the region.  Today, several conflicts are cooking up in the region – 
with the same major ingredients as their forerunners – that risk the potential of drawing 
U.S. intervention in the future. 
In Yemen, a civil war is raging much like the one in Syria.  In fact, the crisis in 
Yemen traces its origins to the same underlying causes in the broader Arab Spring 
movement as the Syrian civil war (BBC News 2018).  In 2014, a coup d'état forced out the 
authoritarian President Ali Abdullah Saleh and now jihadists and separatists are 
backlashing against the new United States and Saudi-supported regime (BBC News 2018).  
A severe humanitarian crisis is escalating while regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran 
are engaged in their own satellite war for power and influence in the country and the 
broader Middle East.  It is built mostly on centuries-old sectarian divisions – Saudi Arabia 
as the leader of the Sunni Muslim world and Iran as the leader of the Shia Muslim world 
(Reardon 2015).  
To the north, unrest is growing between Palestine and the U.S.-Israeli alliance.   
Many citizens in Palestine and Muslims throughout the Middle East feel that the U.S. 
government is alienating them in favor of Israel (Thahoor 2018).  Under the Trump 
administration, the U.S. government has quit funding the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency which has tended to the needs of Palestinian refugees for nearly seventy years.  
President Trump has declared Jerusalem – a holy location for Christians, Jews, and 
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Muslims – as the Israeli capital and moved the U.S. embassy there from Tel Aviv.  Many 
speculate about the role Iran will play in contributing to the unrest in the region, fearing 
that it will retaliate against Israel because the United States left the Iran nuclear deal.  
Recently, President Donald Trump abruptly declared that ISIS has been defeated in 
Syria and that U.S. forces will withdraw.  U.S. allies assert that they will not stay in Syria 
should U.S. forces leave. Many speculate that a quick exit by the United States will leave 
a power vacuum that allows ISIS to make a comeback, much like the U.S. withdrawal in 
Iraq that gave birth to ISIS in the first place.  Both Democratic and Republican elites have 
speculated publicly about the consequences of ceding control over the still volatile 
humanitarian crisis to Russia and Iran and enabling them to redraw the map of the Middle 
East’s blocs in a way that could undermine America’s and Israel’s positions in the region.   
If history indeed serves as a lesson, the lesson is that there is a high probability that 
the United States will become increasingly involved in these issues as they unfold.  In the 
not-so-distant future, we might be watching campaigns during the 2020 U.S. Presidential 
Election that are centered on American foreign policy in Yemen, the displacement of 
Yemeni refuges, troop levels in Syria and in the fight against ISIS, and, as always, the best 
approach to deterring Iranian nuclear development.  What factors will influence American 
policy preferences toward and, ultimately, U.S. intervention in these issues? 
 
Anti-Muslim Stereotypes and Ethnocentric Policy Preferences in the Middle East 
The research presented herein helps answer this important, albeit hypothetical, 
question.  Throughout this dissertation, I argue that U.S. interventionism in the Middle East 
– primarily since the Iranian Hostage Crisis – has left residual cultural attitudes that shape 
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Americans’ policy preferences and U.S. involvement in the region today.  Specifically, I 
expect and find compelling evidence that anti-Muslim stereotypes shape policy preferences 
on several important contemporary issues, such as: support for the use of military force to 
deter Iranian nuclear development, support for the use of preemptive military force against 
Islamist terror groups, and opposition to admitting Syrian refugees into the United States.  
Given the pervasive influence that misguided stereotypes and perceived threat from 
Muslims have on ordinary Americans’ justifications for ethnocentrically-grounded 
policies, it seems likely that public opinion about developing issues in Yemen, Israel, Syria, 
and Iran will no less be shaped by these misguided stereotypes.   Before expanding upon 
these ideas and suggestions for mitigating the linkages between anti-Muslim stereotypes 
and ethnocentric policy preferences, in the following sections I will briefly recap the 
theoretical groundwork that was laid to develop these arguments and the appropriate 
analyses to test them. 
 
Theory Building 
I am certainly not the first to explore or posit linkages between Americans’ targeted 
stereotypes of Muslims and their preferences for U.S. policies in the Middle East.  
However, the current research was motivated by the idea that there are important nuances 
in this story of bias-driven warfare in the Middle East that have been left unaddressed in 
the literature and, more importantly, that have serious implications for U.S. foreign policy 
in the region.   
In Chapter Three, I dug deeper into extant research to explicate these nuances and 
paint a more complete theoretical picture of the influence that targeted stereotypes and 
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perceptions of threat from Muslims have on ordinary citizens’ preferences for U.S. policies 
in the Middle East.  I found that prior research offers two competing explanations of 
American support for the use of military force in the Middle East: ethnocentrism and 
targeted stereotypes of Muslims.  I also found that these studies have potentially troubling 
conceptual and empirical issues that risk confusing our understanding of American public 
opinion about Muslims and majority-Muslim countries, such as: 1) inconsistency in 
defining ethnocentrism; 2) a lack of explanation for how ethnocentrism and targeted 
stereotypes might operate together in cognition to shape policy preferences; and, 3) a lack 
of clear explanation of how these factors are causally related to other idea elements (e.g., 
authoritarianism) to which they are shown to be correlated.   
With a better idea of these theoretical hurdles, I set out in Chapters Three and Four 
to provide a synthesized theory of American policy preferences in the Middle East and a 
suitable empirical method to test the theory and account for these issues. 
 
Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response 
I adopted from Brewer (2001) a theoretically-grounded working definition of 
ethnocentric response that can be summarized like this:  Someone will exhibit an 
ethnocentric response, such as hostile policy preferences on issues involving Muslims or 
majority-Muslim countries, when anti-Muslim stereotypes combine with an individuals’ 
in-group identity to result in perceived threat.  I also drew from other applications of this 
theory to draw inferences about when identity elements and threat might become linked 
for some, but not others, to produce an ethnocentric response toward Muslims.   
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My core argument was that Muslims are uniquely situated to be perceived as a 
realistic and symbolic threat to the core national identity of American whites, rather than 
blacks, because they differ in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion.  Media encourage 
evaluations of Muslims in terms of their cultural dissimilarity and portray Muslims as 
monolithically violent group.  I argued that Muslims present little identity threat to blacks, 
whose core in-group identity typically revolves around their status as a racial minority in 
the United States.  Muslims present little socioeconomic threat to blacks in the United 
States and, in fact, Islam has typically been viewed as a positive force in black communities 
since the founding of the country (Davis 2006; Curtis 2012; Beydoun 2018).  Even blacks 
who identify with the nation will not view Islam as incompatible or Muslims as threatening 
because that identity is typically not predicated on looking, living, or believing a certain 
way.  My expectation was that these differential attitudinal structures make whites more 
prone to out-group hostility toward Muslims than blacks – or what I call asymmetric 
ethnocentric response (AER) toward Muslims.  
 
Taking the Right Approach 
My search for a suitable empirical method to test the AER theory led me to 
structural equation modeling (SEM).  Outlining my cognitive schematic and then testing it 
using SEM proved to be an appropriate analytical approach because it allowed for the 
explicit testing of relationships between multiple related constructs like identity 
attachments, authoritarianism, targeted stereotypes, etc.  Specifically, I developed the SEM 
to simultaneously test my expectations regarding: 1) the causal cognitive process that 
produces ethnocentric response; 2) the role that authoritarianism plays in this causal 
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process; and, 3) the potential for ethnocentric response toward Muslims diverges across 
race.  I used the new SEM strategy to test my cognitive schematic in an analysis of support 
for various policies, including the use of military force, to deter Iranian nuclear 
development.  In short, I found compelling evidence linking anti-Muslim attitudes – among 
whites – to support for using military force (rather than diplomacy) to deter Iranian nuclear 
development.  The findings from the SEM were also corroborated with evidence from a 
framing experiment.   
 
Theory Integration: Tunnel Vision of Terrorism and Opposition to Accepting Refugees 
From there, I set out in Chapters Five and Six to build upon the AER theory by 
applying it in investigations of other issues wherein anti-Muslim attitudes might play a 
substantive role in shaping policy preferences.  In Chapter Five, I integrated the AER 
theory with social psychology research on stereotype formation and generalization to 
investigate how targeted anti-Muslim stereotypes shape policy preferences for using 
military force against terror groups.  I contributed theoretical perspective about the 
implications of anti-Muslim attitudes for policy preferences to deter terrorism by 
investigating how ordinary citizens respond to threats from both Islamist and non-Islamist 
FTOs with similar foundational ideologies.  I found compelling evidence in a survey 
experiment suggesting that anti-Muslim attitudes have primed many ordinary Americans 
such that they are more likely justify the use of military force against a terror threat when 
it emanates from an Islamist group rather than an equally threatening non-Islamist group.  
I also found that justification for deploying military force against a terror threat is 
magnified when participants are informed about the threat through exposure to information 
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that explicitly (textual) and implicitly (visual), rather than only textually, describes the 
threat as Islamist.  Finally, I found another piece of evidence that corroborates the 
Asymmetric Ethnocentric Response (AER) theory.  I found that whites are substantively 
and significantly more likely than blacks to justify the use of military force against 
Islamists compared to non-Islamist FTOs. 
 In Chapter Six, I integrated the AER theory with extant scholarship on news 
framing and political communications to explain how targeted anti-Muslim stereotypes 
influence whites’ preferences for policies that might be beneficial to Muslims or majority-
Muslim countries.  Specifically, I contributed theoretical perspective about the implications 
of anti-Muslim attitudes by investigating the factors that shape public support for allowing 
Syrian refugees to come to the United States.  I found compelling evidence in a survey 
experiment suggesting that, even when controlling for other factors, the intensity of anti-
Muslim stereotypes among whites plays a substantive and significant role in shaping 
opposition to allowing embattled Syrians to seek refuge in the United States.  On a positive 
note, I also found evidence supporting the positive intergroup contact hypothesis, insofar 
as individuals who self-report higher percentages of Muslim friends and Muslim colleagues 
exhibit a higher willingness to allow Syrian refugees to come to the United States. 
 
Contributions 
The AER theory clarifies important nuances about how anti-Muslim stereotypes 
shape policy preferences across race toward issues in the Middle East.  It also helps us to 
understand why anti-Muslim stereotypes seem to be so impactful on the direction of foreign 
policy on these issues.  In every one of my analyses, I find that the linkages between 
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perceptions of threat and targeted stereotypes of Muslims leads to a stronger preference for 
ethnocentric response among whites.  
My theory also helps to explain a state of perpetual warfare between the United 
States and the Middle East that cannot otherwise be explained by theories of international 
relations.  International relations scholars tend to conceptualize rivalries as prolonged 
interstate disputes that typically arise from competition over resources or territory.  
However, this approach is less helpful in explaining nearly a history of rivalry between the 
United States and an entire region on opposite sides of the globe, or more generally why 
democracies with rapidly revolving leadership would maintain a consistent stance toward 
another country.  My research helps to fill this gap by rooting rivalry in core public 
attitudes, explaining how cultural biases that exist among the majority population of a 
major world power shape an enduring rivalry that persists on a global scale.  
Some may wonder how my theory and findings are different from a more 
parsimonious framework such as white supremacy.  White supremacy is defined as “a 
political, economic, and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power 
and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white supremacy and 
entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination 
are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings” (Ansley 1997: 
592).  Further, Smith (2015) conceptualizes white supremacy as a system that does not 
operate through mere racism alone, but that is perpetuated by three “separate and distinct, 
but still interrelated logics” or pillars: slavery, genocide/colonialism, and orientalism.  
According to these conceptualizations, my theory would indeed be subsumed by a more 
parsimonious framework like white supremacy.   
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Rooting the conceptual language in color – “white” supremacy – does not fit 
especially well with my results.  News stories that showed Muslims did not evoke the 
backlash that brought on when they were identified specifically as being Islamic. Nor 
would rooting this research in the concept of “white supremacy” adequately capture my 
theoretical contribution.  The benefit of situating my specific investigations within social 
identity theory and developing an appropriate SEM modeling strategy (Hoyle 1995; Kline 
1998; de Carvahlo and Chima 2014) to investigate how multiple interrelated idea elements 
shape out-group hostility is that my approach can be used to explain a myriad of issues at 
the intersection of core identity attachments and perceived out-group threat involving both 
whites and non-whites.  For example, my approach offers an empirically tested and 
replicable method that can be used to investigate how multiple idea elements can become 
linked to perceived threat and shape public opinion about gay rights, immigration, and 
other divisive issues.  It can be used to investigate how non-whites might come to perceive 
threat from whites and react with out-group hostility.  In another example, my approach 
could be used to investigate how different identity constructions might lead whites to 
perceive threat from other predominantly white groups (e.g., communists or Russians).  
Together, my theory and empirical approach offer a package deal that is more generalizable 
to investigations of issues involving group-threat and identity politics than a framework 
like white supremacy. 
 
The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
The research presented here reports a dark forecast with a strong chance for targeted 
anti-Muslim stereotypes to have a whirlwind of consequences for U.S. policy in the Middle 
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East.  Cumulatively, my findings present several pieces of evidence linking anti-Muslim 
stereotypes and perceptions of threat from Muslims, among whites, to ethnocentric policy 
responses toward Muslims and majority-Muslim countries.  I have utilized a variety of 
survey and experimental data, analyzed with a diverse set of empirical methods, and found 
evidence that anti-Muslim attitudes shape asymmetric ethnocentric responses in the form 
of whites’ policy preferences for: 1)  using military force rather than diplomacy to deter 
Iranian nuclear development; 2) using military force against Islamist terror groups rather 
than equally threatening non-Islamist groups; 3 a variety of items related to support for the 
War on Terror (Chapter Four Appendix, Table A4.1); and, 4) opposition to accepting 
Syrian refugees into the United States.     
If history indeed serves as a lesson, future U.S. Presidential Election debates will 
more than likely center upon policy proposals for intervention in Yemen, restricting 
embattled Yemeni citizens from entering the United States, a troop surge against a 
rejuvenated ISIS, and, as always, the best way to strangle the Iranian economy.  There will 
more than likely continue to be candidates vying for office who run on nationalist, anti-
Muslim platforms that appeal to voters who harbor stereotypes and perceive Muslims as a 
threat. 
 
The Political Potential for Framing Counterstereotypes of Muslims 
  In Chapter Six, I turned from this consistent narrative of negativity to ask a more 
hopeful question: Can anything be done about this?  My analysis in Chapter Six contributes 
important theoretical perspective about the political potential of reporting and discussing 
Middle East issues in unbiased ways that might mitigate the influence of anti-Muslim 
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stereotypes on policy preferences.  I found compelling evidence in a survey experiment 
suggesting that strong frames emphasizing the moral obligations of American identity, 
humanitarian concerns, and counterstereotype-affirming information about Muslims have 
a positive influence on opinion toward accepting Syrian refugees.  I also found evidence 
of these framing effects when the frames were encountered in isolation or when they 
competed with anti-refugee arguments.  Importantly, I found strong evidence that, in both 
single and dual-exposure conditions, pro-refugee frames were most effective at moving 
opinion toward pro-refugee positions among those who were previously opposed.   
The research presented in Chapter Six contributes to extant framing theory by 
replicating previous studies that investigate the influence of issue frames on public opinion 
in competitive information environments.  This research also builds upon previous studies 
by offering insights into how competing political information affects public opinion about 
a salient real-world policy issue.  Specifically, where prior experimental research (Chong 
and Druckman 2007b) tested the influence of frames based on meeting certain criteria (i.e., 
strength and direction), I use insights from that research to identify six prominent frames 
surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis and test how each influence public opinion about the 
Syrian refugee crisis. 
The normative implications of my findings are paramount.   I find evidence that 
counterstereotype-affirming information about Muslims substantively influences increased 
support for accepting Syrian refugees into the United States.  These effects comport with 
research in experimental social psychology that finds evidence of the influence of affirming 
counterstereotypes on reducing automatic stereotype activation (Gawronski et al. 2008).  I 
extend the normative implications of this scholarship by demonstrating that such 
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information is effective when perceived as coming from real-world political elites.  Like 
my investigation of policy preferences toward Iran, I expect that these findings might 
generalize to framing of other issues in the Middle East.  That possibility certainly warrants 
further investigation. 
On this latter point, it is interesting that one side (i.e., pro-refugee) of the elite 
debate about Syrian refugees consistently dominates the other and, in particular, dominates 
the debate among those with anti-refugee prior opinions.   My investigation into the frames 
surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis does not explore why some arguments are more 
applicable and available – and ultimately, more effective – than others.  However, it is 
worth noting here the possibility that the framing effects I observe corroborate others’ 
findings of a “backlash effect” against the recent “Muslim Ban” (Collingwood, Lajevardi, 
and Oskooii 2018).  These authors argue that, “an influx of new information portraying the 
‘Muslim Ban’ at odds with inclusive elements of American identity prompted some 
citizens to shift their attitudes” (Collingwood, Lajevardi, Oskooii 2018).  Perhaps my 
analyses are finding evidence of short-term effects that competing information has on 
opinion among those most likely to oppose policies sympathetic to refugees and other 
Muslims.  More importantly, perhaps the bigger picture normative possibility is that, in the 
wake of the Muslim Ban and widespread political protest, the current political context is 
especially ripe for narratives and demonstrations to speak out about the incongruities 
between American identity and othering or stereotyping others based on the actions of 
terrorists who have hijacked a religion of billions for the purposes of exporting and 
justifying violence around the world.  
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Future Research on Framing and Building Positive Narratives about Muslims 
Future research should build upon the evidence presented here by investigating how 
the framing effects I observe are influenced by time and source attribution.  As I mentioned 
earlier, previous research has found that framing effects – in particular, those resulting from 
exposure to strong applicable frames – become more enhanced with increased time and 
attribution to credible or trustworthy sources (Miller and Krosnick 2000; Taber and Lodge 
2006; Chong and Druckman 2007b).  As such, much painting remains to be done on the 
theoretical canvas that I have started here.  The prospect that the framing effects I observe 
might be magnified under certain conditions should present great normative appeal to 
anyone interested in offering practical, theoretically-rooted ideas to help offset the 
misguided influences that unfounded anti-Muslim attitudes – perpetuated by negative 
media coverage – have on American public opinion and policy preferences. 
Finally, researchers have suggested other practical ideas that can be used to 
supplement or complement counterstereotype-affirming narratives about Muslims.  A 
recent collaborative volume – and a must read for anyone interested in learning about Islam 
– summarizes a number of these practical ideas as creative suggestions to help “news 
reporters better serve their communities and be able to move away from narratives about 
Islam and Muslims that trap them in stereotype” (Pennington 2018: 15).  In her “lessons 
for reporters,” co-editor Rosemary Pennington (2018: 15-16) suggests that reporters can: 
 Adopt a Muslim (or several): “This can be useful for reporters working in 
any beat, but when you are covering a marginalized group, having someone 
you trust to run story ideas by is invaluable.” 
 Get a good translation of the Qur’an: “There are a lot of accusations about 
what the Qur’an sanctions.  Instead of taking those verbatim, open a Qur’an 
and see what it says before running out to write about how Islam condones 
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wife beating or the slaying of indels or whatever other inflammatory thing 
is being said.” 
 Visit the local mosque: “We are taught to cultivate sources.  Without good 
sources, we can’t do our job.  Look to the local Muslim community as a 
source for stories, not just a thing to be reported on.” 
 Follow Muslims in social media: “Muslims from all over the world, and 
from all traditions, use the space to discuss politics, their identity, and their 
faith.  There may even be Muslims in your local community using Twitter, 
or other social media, to write about their lives.  Find these individuals.  
Follow them.  Interact with them.  Social media can be a great tool for 
finding sources, but also for learning more about whatever beat you are 
covering.” 
 
While Pennington’s (2018) comments seem to offer logical and practical ideas, 
future research could also take an empirical approach to validating her ideas.  It would be 
interesting to content analyze journalist reports of issues involving Muslims or majority-
Muslim countries and investigate how the content of those stories vary as a function of a 
reporter’s social media connections.  Though it would likely be more costly, future research 
could also recruit journalists and actors in the news business to focus groups (or perhaps 
panel experiments), wherein the content of their stories is assessed relative to exposure to 
images of mosques or excerpts from the Qur’an. 
These ideas and those presented in this research become more important with each 
passing day, as conflicts throughout the Middle East continue to develop.  No matter the 
reason, the United States will likely continue to play an important role in said conflicts.  
Public opinion – whether operating through polling or electoral choice or both – will 
influence how and when the United States next intervenes.  Thus, it is of the utmost 
importance that ordinary Americans are informed about these issues and are presented with 
ideas and information – from those on whom they depend for news – that enable them to 
evaluate and disentangle misguided biases from relevant policy ideas.  As the references 
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in this writing suggest, a number of researchers are invested in scholarship at the 
intersection of stereotypes and public opinion.  We are thoughtful in offering solutions 
about what journalists and politicians should do to “disentangle.”   However, the onus is 
also on us as researchers to bridge the gap between empirical research on the consequences 
of stereotypes and their persistence in media and elite discourse on Middle East issues.  We 
need to be more diligent about sharing our research with non-specialists in ways that are 
meaningful, such as communicating with the growing number of research blog sites that 
operate out of newsrooms.  Until then, the perpetual cycle of bombs, intervention, and 
terrorism is doomed to keep repeating itself unimpeded. 
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CHAPTER FOUR APPENDIX 
 
Re-specification Models with Race Subsamples 
 Table A4.1 below presents estimates from ordered probit regression models 
presented by Kam and Kinder (2007) that are subsampled for blacks and whites.  I also re-
specified their original models of support for the president but did not find any significant 
estimates across race. 
Table A4.1 | Support across Race for the War on Terror: 
Protecting the Homeland 
 War on Terror Home.  Sec. Border Control Nat’l Defense 
 White Black White Black White Black White Black 
Ethnocentrism 1.62*** 
(.53) 
1.70 
(2.28) 
.93* 
(.53) 
-1.00 
(1.64) 
1.27*** 
(.40) 
-.24 
(1.18) 
.81** 
(.35) 
.88 
(1.09) 
Partisanship -.77*** 
(.19) 
1.43 
(.95) 
-.40** 
(.20) 
-.40 
(1.01) 
-.46*** 
(.14) 
.35 
(.63) 
-1.04*** 
(.14) 
.25 
(.60) 
Education -.76 
(.28) 
-1.05 
(1.25) 
.45 
(.30) 
-.44 
(1.05) 
-.55*** 
(.21) 
.66 
(.71) 
-.22 
(.19) 
-.59 
(.66) 
Threat .80*** 
(.25) 
.16 
(.66) 
.27 
(.26) 
.37 
(.76) 
.48*** 
(.19) 
.61 
(.45) 
.47*** 
(.17) 
.65 
(.43) 
N 443 398 846 843 
Note: Entries are ordered probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses below.  
Models also control for political awareness and gender.  *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 
Source: 2000-2002 American National Election Study Panel 
 
Structural Equation Model Measures 
 This section details coding schemes for indicators used in the structural equation 
model in the full chapter.  The data come from the 2012 American National Election Study.   
I measure authoritarianism by constructing an index of responses to four questions 
about important child-rearing traits, consistent with that measurement of the construct in 
the extant literature (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 2018).  In each question, 
respondents were asked which of two traits is more important for children: 1) independence 
or respect for elders; 2) curiosity or good manners; 3) self-reliance or obedience, and; 4) 
being considerate or being well behaved.  Each item was recoded such that the first trait 
(less authoritarian) in each pair equals 0, a response of “both” equals 1, and the second trait 
(more authoritarian) in each pair equals a 2.  The items were then combined in an additive 
scale (α = .60).25F26  
                                                     
26 The original ANES variables are auth_ind, auth_cur, auth_obed, and auth_consid. 
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Symbolic patriotism, closely aligned with national pride (Huddy and Khatib 2007), 
is a five-point measure of love of country, ranging from hate it (0) to love it (5).  The 
question asks, “How do you feel about this country?  Do you [hate it, dislike it, neither like 
nor dislike it, like it, or love it]?”26F27  
National identity is a five-point measure of the importance placed on “being 
American” and ranges from “not at all important” (1) to “extremely important” (5) (Huddy 
2001, 2003; Huddy and Khatib 2007).  The question asks, “How important is being an 
American to you personally [Extremely important, very important, somewhat important, a 
little important, or not at all important]?”27F28 
Linked fate is a three-point measure of how much one’s life is affected by what 
happens to the racial group and ranges from “not very much” (1) to “a lot” (3).  The 
question asks, “How much is your life affected by what happens to [racial group]?  Will it 
affect you [a lot, some, or not very much]?” Self-identified whites and blacks (i.e., race 
measure below) were directed to different questions with the same wording.  I create a 
combined measure for whites and blacks by including answers to the white linked fate 
question if “white” was true on the race measure and by including answers to the black 
linked fate question if “black” was true on the race measure.28F29 
Conservatism is a measure of ideology ranging from extremely liberal (1) to 
extremely conservative (7).  The question asks, “Where would you place yourself on this 
scale, or haven’t you thought much about this [Extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, 
moderate/middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely 
conservative]?”29F30 
In-group bias is measured by adding individuals’ thermometer ratings (0-100) of 
their racial, religious and denominational, sexual orientation, and social class in-groups and 
re-scaling to 0-100.30F31 I measure out-group negativity by taking individuals’ thermometer 
ratings of out-groups following the same criteria as before, subtracting each score from 
100, creating an index, and re-scaling from 0-100.  I measure intergroup preference by 
creating an additive index of four five-point Likert items measuring agreement with the 
statements measuring preference for existing cultural norms.31F32 
                                                     
27 The original ANES variable is patriot_love. 
28 The original ANES variable is patriot_amident 
29 The original ANES variables are link_whiteamt and link_blackamt. 
30 The original ANES variables is libcpre_self. 
31 To compute the in-group bias scores, demographic questions were analyzed to identify respondents’ racial 
(white or black), religious/denominational (Catholic, Christian, atheist, Mormon, or other), sexual 
orientation (straight or gay), and perceived social class (working class, middle class, upper) in-groups.  The 
original ANES variables are identified with the prefix “ft_casi.” 
32 The items measure agreement with the statements: “the world is changing, and we should adjust”; “we 
should be more tolerant of other moral standards”; “newer lifestyles are breaking down society,” and; “we 
should place more emphasis on traditional values.” Before constructing the index (α = .70), I code the first 
two items such that higher values indicate stronger disagreement and the latter two items such that higher 
values indicate stronger agreement, indicative of higher preference for the existing culture. 
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The Muslims violent stereotype measure is a five-point measure which asks 
respondents, “How well does the word ‘violent’ describe most Muslims [Extremely well, 
very well, moderately well, slightly well, or not at all]?” (emphasis added).  The original 
item was reverse coded to range from not at all (1) to extremely well (5).32F33  
The four items measuring policy preferences for deterring Iranian nuclear 
development begin with the same prompt, “To try to prevent Iran from developing nuclear 
weapons, would you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose…” and the separate 
questions conclude with: “Direct diplomatic talks between the United States and Iran to try 
to resolve the situation”; “Increasing international economic sanctions against Iran”; “The 
United States bombing Iran’s nuclear development sites,” and; “Invading with U.S. forces 
to remove the Iranian government from power.”  Responses to each item were recoded 
such that oppose = -1, neither favor nor oppose = 0, and favor = 1.  The virtue of the way 
these questions are asked separately is that my analysis can focus on factors that influence 
support for the use of force, generally, (i.e., bombing and/or invasion) versus other 
preferred methods of deterrence.  All remaining values, indicating “not asked,” “deleted 
due to partial,” and so forth were coded to missing on this item and others. 
 
Framed and Unframed Articles 
Framed Article  
(Manipulations underlined) 
Rogue Islamic Nation Confirmed to Have Nuclear Weapons 
 
Washington, DC- Yesterday, a joint United Nations/International Atomic Energy 
Agency intelligence report was leaked confirming that the Islamic republic of Iran has 
developed and possesses nuclear weapons.  The one-thousand-plus page report confirms 
American and European beliefs that Tehran has been secretly building nuclear weapons.  
For years, Iran's Islamic leadership has maintained that its goal in developing a nuclear 
program is to generate electricity without dipping into the oil supply it prefers to sell 
abroad and to provide fuel for medical reactors. 
 
While the United States and other Western nations have suspected weapons development 
in the Islamic republic since 2003, a lack of concrete intelligence has subjected the United 
States to a decade of tense relations, disarmament negotiations, inspections, financial and 
trade sanctions, and potential embargos on the Islamic nation's goods. 
 
The UN/IAEA report confirms that nuclear weapons are stored in a new nuclear facility, 
which is surrounded by anti-aircraft guns, and is in a mountainous setting ideal for making 
bombing campaigns nearly impossible.  Top officials in the radical Muslim government 
                                                     
33 The original measure is rstype_violmusl. 
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have long warned of retaliation and attack resulting from U.S. involvements in the Middle 
East.  With the release of this intelligence, years of attempts at diplomacy will likely cease 
and armed conflict between the United States and the militant Islamic nation will likely 
become reality. 
 
White House Correspondent Brad Hambrick reports that, "The President knows 
Republican presidential hopefuls are talking tough on Iran.  He knows the release of the 
UN/IAEA report will heighten public concern.  He will be meeting with top security 
officials this week to coordinate the best response to their nuclear developments." 
 
In a brief press statement, the President declared, "We have suspected that they have been 
deliberately misleading the international community for years, regarding their nuclear 
ambitions.  They now pose a great threat to us, as well as our allies abroad, and such rogue 
behavior will not be tolerated by the United States." 
 
Even as years of deception have now been realized, Russia, China, Britain, France, and 
European Union foreign policy leaders still call for multilateral talks with Iran.  With 
Republican presidential hopefuls calling for action, a stern response from the Obama 
administration to the Islamic fundamentalist regime seems imminent. 
 
Unframed Article 
Report Confirms Iran Has Nuclear Weapons 
 
Washington, DC- Last week, a joint United Nations/International Atomic Energy 
Agency intelligence report was leaked confirming that Iran has developed and possesses 
nuclear weapons.  The one-thousand-plus page report confirms American and European 
beliefs that Tehran has been secretly building nuclear weapons.  For years, the Iranian 
government has maintained that its goal in developing a nuclear program is to generate 
electricity without dipping into the oil supply it prefers to sell abroad, and to provide fuel 
for medical reactors. 
 
While the United States and other Western nations have suspected weapons development 
in Iran since 2003, a lack of concrete intelligence has subjected the United States to a 
decade of tense relations, disarmament negotiations, inspections, financial and trade 
sanctions, and potential embargos on Iranian goods. 
 
The UN/IAEA report confirms that nuclear weapons are stored in a new nuclear facility, 
which is surrounded by anti-aircraft guns, and is in a mountainous setting ideal for making 
bombing campaigns nearly impossible.  Top officials in the Iranian government have long 
warned of retaliation and attack resulting from U.S. involvements in the Middle East.  
With the release of this intelligence, years of attempts at diplomacy will likely cease and 
armed conflict between the United States and the Iranians will likely become reality. 
 
White House Correspondent Brad Hambrick reports that, "The President knows 
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Republican presidential hopefuls are talking tough on Iran.  He knows the release of the 
UN/IAEA report will heighten public concern.  He will be meeting with top security 
officials this week to coordinate the best response to Iran's nuclear developments." 
 
In a brief press statement, the President declared, "The United States has suspected that 
Iran has been deliberately misleading the international community for years, regarding 
nuclear ambitions.  Iran poses a great threat to the international community, and such 
behavior will not be tolerated by the United States." 
 
Even as years of deception have now been realized, Russia, China, Britain, France, and 
European Union foreign policy leaders still call for multilateral talks with Iran.  With 
Republican presidential hopefuls calling for action, a stem response from the Obama 
administration to Tehran seems imminent. 
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CHAPTER FIVE APPENDIX 
 
Threat Experiment Conditions  
 
Figure A5.1 | Explicit + Implicit Islamist Story (Haqqani) 
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Figure A5.2 | Implicit Islamist Story  
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Figure A5.3 | Explicit + Implicit EA Story (Revolutionary Struggle – Greece) 
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Figure A5.4 | Explicit + Implicit LRA Story (Lord’s Resistance Army – Uganda) 
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Figure A5.5 | Ambiguous Story 
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